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Iowa Law Review
VOLUME 58

JUNE 1973

NUMBER 5

THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN THE
IOWA CRIMINAL TRIAL PROCESS
Kermit L. Dunahoo*

Trial judges must constantly make decisions with no fixed rules to
guide them. This absence of structure is unavoidable-it would be a
Herculean task, and a pyrrhic victory at best, to attempt to establish
formal rules of procedure to cover every possible situation that can
occur in the many stages of the criminal trial process. As one commentator has observed:
Situations inevitably arise wherein two possible lines of action offer themselves to the judge; decision is to be made between two principles of
law; or some of the few conditions present themselves wherein there is
no governing rule. Under such circumstances, since the court is bound
to act. he must use his judgment as to what is best under the particular
conditions for arriving at justice, and therein he exercises the power of
decision termed "judicial discretion."l

The purpose of this Article is to explore in depth what is meant by
judicial discretion and to pinpoint some of its parameters. This is explored in a detailed analysis of how the concept of judicial discretion
has been used, and sometimes abused, in the Iowa criminal trial process.

I. Tm: NATURE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION
As suggested, the exercise of discretion by the trial court is an essential foundation stone of the criminal trial process. Even though it
is a crucial element of this process, it is clear that the power to act in
a discretionary manner does not give the trial court the license to take
*Assistant Attorney General, Area Prosecutor's Division, Iowa Department of
Justice, Member, Iowa Criminal Code Review Study Committee, B.S., 1963, M.S.
1968, Iowa State University; J.D. 1971, Drake University. Effective September,
1973, Mr. Dunahoo will be an assistant professor of law at the college of William
and Mary.
Nothing herein is to be construed as an official opinion or expression of policy
of the Attorney General of Iowa.
1 R. BoWERs, Tm: JUDICIAL DISCRm'ION OF TRIAL CoURTS § 6, at 11-12 (1931).
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arbitrary, off-handed actions in the name of orderly administration of
justice. Rather, the power to exercise discretion
must be utilized fairly and impartially, not arbitrarily, by application of
relevant, legal and equitable principles to all !mown or readily available
facts of a given issue or ·~ause to the end that justice may more nearly
be effectuated.2

Thus, judicial discretion can never mean "the arbitrary will of the
judge•... It is a legal discretion, founded upon conditions which call
for judicial action, as distinguished from mere individual or personal
view or desire.'' 3 Accordingly, discretion "imports the exercise of
judgment, wisdom, and skill, as contradistinguished from unthinking
folly, heady violence, and rash injustice."4
Once this discretion has been exercised, it is subject to appellate review, but only to the limited extent of determining whether it has
been abused. However, 1he decisions of the trial court are cloaked
with "a strong presumption in [their] favor,'' 5 and "[u]ntil the contrary appears, the presumption is that the discretion of the district
court was rightfully exercised."6 Indeed,
[a]ll reasonable presumptions are in favor of regularity, and against error;
and if there is any reasonable hypothesis upon which the ruling can be
upheld, it must be adopted.7

.

Moreover, to overcome this presumption of regulatity requires an affirmative showing of abuse and the burden of so showing rests upon
the party complaining.8
•
This burden is heavy, indeed, for it can only be sustained by showing abuse and prejudice. In the words of a leading treatise on discretion:
to warrant an appellate court in setting aside a ruling of the trial court
made in the exercise of a conceded discretion. . . . The action complained
of must have been unreasonable in the light of attendant circumstancesthe discretion must have been exercised for reasons clearly untenable or
to an extent clearly unreasonable [and] the action must have resulted
prejudicially to the rights of the party complaining. Without a union of
these conditions, the ruling will stand; and, they concurring, it is seldom
that a reversal is refused.o
State v. Vickroy, 205 N.W.2i 748, 751 (Iowa 1973).
a Arthaud v. Griffin, 205 Iowa 141, 144, 217 N.W. 809, 811 (1928), citing In re
Superintendent of Banks, 207 N.Y. 11, 100 N.E. 428 (1912); accord, State v. District
Court, 213 Iowa 822, 830, 238 N.W. 290, 294 (1931).
4 See generally Commonwealth v. Evans, 190 Pa. Super. 179, 225, 154 A2d 57,
82 (1959).
6 Murray v. Buell, 74 Wis. U:, 18, 41 N.W. 1010, 1011 (1889).
a R. BowERs, Tm: JUDICIAL DI3CRETION OF TnrAL CoURTS § 18, at 34 (1931) ; accord, State v. Bastedo, 253 Iowa 103, 110 111 N.W.2d 255, 259 (1961). ''We presume the regularity of actions of officials or courts unless the contrary is made
to appear." Id.
7 Breed v. Ketchum, 51 Wis. 164, 169, 7 N.W. 550, 552-52 (1880).
BR. BoWERs, Tm: JUDICIAL DIECRETION oF TRIAL CoURTS § 18, at 33 (1931).
2
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The heavy burden borne by a party seeking review of the exercise
of discretion is further weighted by the fact that appellate courts tend
to apply the stringent "reasonable man" standard of review. Discretion accordingly has been abused.
only where no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial
court. If reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action
taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused
its discretion.:w

This means that, in the absence of injustice, an appellate court will not
substitute its discretion for that of the trial court. Within this analytical framework, the following sections of the Article will examine the
actual exercise of discretion in the criminal trial process, beginning
with the pretrial stage, the first stage of the process in which the trial
judge has an opportunity to exercise discretion in any substantial manner.

n.

JunrciAL DIScRETioN m THE PRETRIAL PRocEss

There are numerous situations which call for the exercise of judicial
discretion prior to the actual commencement of trial. During the pretrial process the court may be called upon to rule on questions of such
disparate nature as whether to appoint counsel for an allegedly indigent defendant, whether to sever the trials of jointly indicted defendants, or whether to accept or reject a proffered plea of guilty. In this
section, we will discuss the most significant matters that may be raised
by the parties or by the court on its own motion. Obviously, all of
these questions will not arise in every trial, nor will they necessarily
occur in the order in which they are discussed.

A. Legal Assistance for Indigents
One problem with which the trial court must be prepared to deal
before trial is that of determining whether to appoint counsel for a
defendant who claims to be unable to afford legal assistance. In making
the determination of whether an individuai case is a proper one for the
appointment of publicly paid counsel, the trial court must resolve
three issues: (1) whether the specific crime charged is of the type
requiring appointment of counsel; (2) whether an indigent defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appointive counsel;
and (3) whether the defendant in fact qualifies as an indigent.
The Iowa Code affords the right of appointive counsel to indigents
charged with felonies11 or indictable misdemeanors.12 However, it is
Id. § 13, at 25.
0Delno v. Market St. Ry. Co., 124 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1942).
1 1 See IowA CoDE §§ 775.4-.5 (1973).
12 See Wright v. Denato, 178 N.W.2d 339, 341-42 (Iowa 1970), interpreting Iowa
CODE §§ 775.1, .2, .4, .8 (1973).
9
1
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silent about simple misdemeanors, and, in Wright v. Denator the Iowa
Supreme Court expressly refused to comment on whether indigents
so charged are entitled to appointive counseJ.l~
In light of Argersinger v. Hamlin/ 5 however, it appears unlikely
that the Iowa SupremE~ Court will extend the right to counsel to
simple misdemeanor charges. fu Argersinger, the United States Supreme Court, rather than extending the sixth amendment right to
counsel to all state offenses/6 held that a trial court's refusal to appoint
counsel for an indigent defendant merely precludes subsequent sentencing of that person to imprisonment. The Court said:
We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trialP

The Court continued:
Under the rule we annotmce today, every judge will know when the trial
of a misdemeanor start~; that no imprisonment may be imposed, even
though local law permits it, unless the accused is represented by counsel
He will have a measure of the seriousness and gravity of the offense and
therefore know when to name a lawyer to represent the accused before
the trial: starts.1 s

The import of Argersinger is that the trial court is not required to
appoint counsel on simple misdemeanors, but the court's refusal to
do so, albeit a refusal properly within its discretion, has the effect of
sharply curtailing the court's normally broad sentencing discretion.
In other words, even though practically all simple misdemeanors are
punishable by either a :fine or imprisonment, a judge who chooses not
to appoint counsel may only impose a fine i£ the defendant is subsequently convicted.
If the crime charged re!quires the court to appoint counsel, or if the
court so chooses, the cow:-t must determine whether the defendant has
waived his right to counsel. Simple waiver, however, is not all that
must be established, for it would appear to be an abuse of discretion
for the trial court to fail to appoint counsel even though the indigent

13178 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 19'10).
Hid. at 342.
15 407
25 (1972).

u.s.

10

C/. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963) (sixth amendment
right to counsel on felony charges extended to states).
In [Gideon], the Court w1animously announced a clear and simple constitutional rule: In the absence of waiver, a felony conviction is invalid
if it was obtained in a court that denied the defendant the help of a
lawyer. Loper v. Beto, 4:>5 U.S. 473, 481 (1972).
17 Argersinger

1S[d.

at 40.

v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
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defendant waived his right, if the record indicated that the defendant
did not do so knowingly and intelligently.19
Assuming that counsel is required and that there has been no knowing and intelligent waiver, it remains for the court to determine
whether the defendant is indigent. 20 However, except for the vague
directive to appoint counsel for a defendant who "is unable to employ
any," 21 the Code provides neither a specific definition of indigency nor
general criteria for the trial court to consider in reaching its own
determination. The supreme court has not set forth any definitive
guidelines in this regard. Instead, it has confined its opinion to enumeration of some of the factors that should be considered in making the
determination, as well as some that should not.
Thus, in Bolds v. Bennett/2 for example, the supreme court listed
some of the factors that a trial court can properly consider in making
its determination of indigency. These include:
(1) real or personal property owned; (2) employment benefits; (3) pensions, annuities, social security and unemployment compensation; (4) inheritances; (5) number of dependants; (6) outstanding debts; (7) seriousness of the charge; and (8) any other valuable resources not previously
mentioned.2 3

On the other hand, the supreme court has ruled that the availability
of the resources of the defendant's relatives is an improper consideration,24 as is the fact that the defendant has posted bail.25
Once counsel has been appointed for an indigent, a related matter
must sometimes be considered. The Code provides that a courtappointed attorney "shall be entitled to a reasonable compensation ...
including such sum or sums as the court may determine are necessary
for investigation in the interests of justice.•.•" 26 The supreme court
has interpreted this section as lodging
19 For further discussion of the indigent defendant, see text accompanying notes
718-19 infra.
20 There is a legislative standard for determining eligibility of a defendant to
make use of the public defender system: inability to employ private counsel
"without prejudicing his financial ability to provide economic necessities for himself or his family." See IowA CoDE § 336A.4 (1973).

Although this standard is mentioned in the Iowa Code only with respect
to public defenders, one may reasonably argue that it was the intent of
the legislature to have this standard applied in the case of appointed
counsel as well. Contemporary Studies Project: Perspectives on the Administration of Criminal Justice in Iowa, 57 IowA L. REv. 598, 681 (1972).
21 IowA CoDE § 775.4 (1973).
2 2159 N.W.2d 425 (Iowa 1968).
23 Id. at 428.
2
~ State v. Wright, 111 Iowa 621, 624, 82 N.W. 1013, 1013-14 (1900).
25 State v. Van Gorder, 192 Iowa 353, 354-55, 184 N.W. 638, 639 (1921).
26
IowA CoDE § 775.5 (1973). A common sense interpretation of this statute
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limited discretionary power in the trial court to disburse reasonable compensation to an attorney defending an indigent for the purpose of conducting an investigation in the interests of justice.2 7

This discretion should be exercised in such a way that the courtappointed attorney is not required to incur personal expenses "in
preparing and conducting a meaningful and conscientious defense for
the accused," while also protecting against frivolous, unwarranted
claims "by restricting payment to those investigations which in the
court's judgment are nec:essary in the interests of justice."28
State v. Hancock 29 is a case where the trial court abused its discretion in this regard. In this forgery case, the court denied the def~ndant's application for public funds to obtain an independent analysis of her handwriting for comparison purposes, after the state had
given notice that it intended to use expert witness testimony concerning the defendant's handwriting exemplar.30 Reversing the subsequent conviction, the supreme court was
convinced the refusal to provide funds for an independent analysis of
defendant's handwriting was not in the best interests of Justice, particularly in view of the fact the State had given notice it intended to call an
expert.••.31

This seems to indicate that mutuality of opportunity for expert witness' services is a definite factor in deciding whether the defendant
should be entitled to such funds. However, these public funds do not
appear to be limited to services used in offsetting the state's theory of
the case and instead might be available, as a matter of right under certain circumstances, to enable the defendant to effectively develop any
affirmative defense. 32 This broader approach was given at least some
impetus by the fact that, in Hancock, the court premised its decision
upon "the interests of justice" rather than on mutuality per se, and
the court stated:
In denying her request the court effectively prevented defendant from

would, of course, render these public services available also to an indigent defendant who is permitted to proceed pro se.
27 State v. Hancock, 164 N.ViT.2d 330, 332 (Iowa 1969).
28 I d.
20 Id.
30Jd.
31 I d. at 333.
3 2 For a listing of a number of cases in which various appellate courts have
upheld, as a matter resting in the trial court's discretion, the appointment of
investigators or experts to aid in the preparation of an indigent's defense notwithstanding the absence of specific statutory authority see Anot., 34 AL.R. 3d
1256, 1269-72 (1970). But see Hardt v. State, 490 P.2d 752, 756 (Okla. Crim. App.
1971) (trial court cannot appoint investigator and expert in the absence of
specific legislative authority to do so).

.1973]

JUDICIAL DISCRETION

1029

even the possibility of obtaining evidence which may have been highly
relevant and material to a meaningful defense.ss

B. Pretrial Release
Another problem which trial courts must face in nearly every case
is that of initially determining whether to allow a particular defendant
to be released prior to trial, and, i£ so, under what terms and conditions. Bail is ordinarily set twice during the pretrial process, :P.rst at
preliminary arraignment34 upon the informal charge and again at the
arraignment35 after the defendant has been formally charged. Considerable judicial discretion is involved in determining whether and in
what amount a surety bond will be required or whether the defendant will be released on his own recognizance or on unsecured bail, but
the courts apparently have no discretion to refuse to set bail on bailable offenses.36 This is because both the Iowa constitution37 and the
Iowa Code38 render all defendants "bailable," except when charged
with certain crimes. It is arguable that all defendants are bailable,
however, because the Iowa constitution affords a right to bail on all
noncapital offenses and there no longer are any capital offenses in
Iowa. Therefore, the statutory prohibition of bail in cases of first-degree murder and kidnapping for ransom is arguably unconstitutional.
Although the Iowa Supreme Court has never faced this question, the
majority of other appellate courts that have rul~d under similar circumstances have held that bail is a matter of right on all charges.39
33164 N.W.2d at 333, see also State v. Williams, 207 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 1973).
34!owA Code§ 761.5 (1973).
ss Id. §§ 763 et seq.
36 But see Commonwealth v. Truesdale, 449 Pa. 325, - - , 296 A.2d 829, 835
(1972):
We do not intend by this opinion that pretrial bail may not be denied
regardless of the circumstances. As noted before, the right to release
before trial is conditioned upon the accused giving adequate assurance
he or she will appear for trial. If upon proof shown, the court reasonably concludes the accused will not appear for trial regardless of the
character or the amount of the bail, then in such an instance bail may
properly be denied, regardless of the nature of the charges. The burden
of proof is upon the Commonwealth. This decision must be reached
by the application of certain criteria, such as: (1) general reputation in
the community; (2) past conduct while on bail; (3) ties to the community
in the form of a job, family, or wealth . . . . However, the trial court
must also consider that modern police methods, such as exchange of
photographs and fingerprints, act as deterrent to flight. Id.
37 IowA CoNST. art. 1, § 12.
38 IowA CoDE § 763.1 (1973).
39 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Truesdale, 449 Pa. 325, - - , 296 A.2d 829, 832
(1972); State v. Johnson, 61 N.J. 351, 358-59, 294 A.2d 245, 249 (1972); Taglianetti
v. Fontaine, 105 RJ. 596, 600, 253 A.2d 609, 611 (1969); State v. Pett, 253 Minn.
429, 435, 92 N.W.2d 205, 209 (1958); In re Ball, 106 Kan. 536, 537-38, 188 P. 424,
425 (1920); contra, People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 657 n.45, 100 Cal. Rptr.
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In setting the terms of pretrial release of "bailable" defendants, the
Code mandates either release on personal recognizance or upon unsecured appearance bond "unless the magistrate determines, in the exercise of his discretion, that such a release will not reasonably assure the
appearance of the defendant as required."40 Once the magistrate has
made such a determination, he "shall" then impose the least severe of
the statutorily enumerated conditions of release "which will reasonably assure the appear~mce of the person for trial . . •." 41
Because the decision to allow pretrial release demands first that the
court determine whether to require the defendant to post a bond, and,
if so that the court set the amount thereof, many appeals present assignments of error in the alternative, asserting that there was an abuse
of discretion in not affording pretrial release merely on personal recognizance or, alternatively, that the amount. of the cash or surety bail
bond was set excessively high under the circumstances. The supreme
court takes the position that " [ d] etermination of the conditions for
the release of one charged with a public offense is directed to the
magistrate's discretion," and accordingly "[i]f such order is supported
by the record we must affirm." 42 Because the sole statutory criterion
in setting the specific terms of pretrial release is to impose the least
severe condition which will "reasonably assure the appearance of the
person for trial ... ,"43 the question of the defendant's credibility can
be a crucial factor. Accordingly, noting that the statute clearly implies that the district court has discretion in allowing release on personal recognizance, the supreme court has pointed out that at least the
152, 171 n.45, 493 P.2d 880, 899 n.45 (1972); People e:c Tel. Dunbar v. District
Court, - - Colo. - , 502 P.2d 420, 421-22 (1972).
~o IowA CODE § 763.17 (1) (1973).
41ld. The conditions of release are:
a. Place the defendant in the custody of a designated person or organization agreeing to supervise him;
b. Place restrictions on the travel, association or place of abode of the
defendant during the period of release;
c. Require the execution of an appearance bond in a specified amount
and the deposit with the clerk of the court in cash or other qualified
security of a sum not to exceed ten percent of the amount of the bond,
such deposit to be returned to the defendant upon the performance of
the appearances as required in section 766.1;
d. Require the execution of a bail bond with sufficient surety, or the
deposit of cash in lieu thereof, provided that. except as provided in section 763.2, bail initially given shall remain valid until final disposition
of the offense. If the amount of bail is deemed insufficient by the court
before whom the offense is pending, the court may order an increase
thereof and the defend~t must provide the additional undertaking, written or cash, to secure his release.
e. Impose any other condition deemed reasonably necessary to assure
appearances as required, including a condition requiring that the defendant return to custody after specified hours. l<l.
42
43

State v. Fenton, 170 N.W.2d 678, 680 (Iowa 1S69).
IOWA CODE § 763.17 (1) (1973).
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trial court has "the benefit . • . of seeing and hearing this defendant
which we do not have."«
Considerable discretion is generally recognized in setting the amount
of bail on a particular charge, especially when the defendant has a
previous record or other charges pending against him. Typical of the
supreme court's attitude is the case of State v. Mussman,45 where thQ
court said:
Admittedly the amount of the bail which was ordered is large, but in view
of the defendant's past misconduct and the pendency of two rape charges
against him now, we conclude the order appealed from is supported by
the proceedings in the district court.4S

Nevertheless, the supreme court has held that excessive bail cannot bQ
used as a means of keeping a "dangerous" defendant incarcerated before trial.47 Thus, in State v. Cummings/ 8 the court noted that "the
[trial] court's reluctance to allow defendant his liberty pending trial
is readily understandable but illegal."49 In that case the supreme
court further acknowledged that it did "not have before it the psychiatric reports available to the trial court" but felt that if incarceration
were required on psychiatric grounds, "the legal provisions for such
incarceration must be followed." 50 Accordingly, the supreme court
felt constrained to order that "[o]n the record before us any bail requirement in excess of $50,000 would be excessive, and thus ordered
reduction of the $200,000 bail."51
C. Discovery
One of the primary reasons for allowing a defendant to be released
on bail 18 to enable him to more effectively prepare his defense.52
HState v. Arbuckle, 162 N.W.2d 279, 281 (Iowa 1968).
45178 N.W.2d 319 (Iowa 1970).
46 Id. at 320.
47 State v. Cummings, No. 55294 (Iowa, Jan. 3, 1972); accord, Commonwealth
v. Truesdale, 449 Pa. 325, 296 A.2d 829, 836-37 (1972):
The Commonwealth also urges us to rule that bail may be denied to
protect the community from further criminal activity on the part of the
accused, or in order to safeguard the well-being of witnesses in the
case . . . . The traditional decision to deny bail was not a means of
keeping an accused confined to protect the public, it was a means of
assuring he would appear at trial. . . . Thus, anticipated criminal activity alone cannot stand as a grounds for the denial of bail. This, however, is not to say it cannot be considered in setting the amount of bail
in conjunction with the aforementioned elements in determining if the
accused will flee. Moreover, it may be considered by the trial judge in
setting the terms of bail, but as the sole ground for the absolute denial
of bail it is invalid. Id.
·
4BState v. Cummings, No. 55294 (Iowa, Jan. 3, 1972).
49ld.
so Id.
51Jd.
52 See ABA PRoJECT
RELATING TO

Pro:nuAL

ON Mnm.roM SrANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
RELEASE 3 (Approved Draft 1968).

JusTICE,

SrANDARDS
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Even the most liberal pretrial release provisions may not ensure that
an adequate defense is afforded without at least a rudimentary opportunity to make discovery. Except for a few scattered provisions requiring disclosure of SJ>ecified basic items,53 however, Iowa has no
statute either requiring, pennitting, or prohibiting general discovery
by defendants in criminal cases. This means that there is no such
thing as a discovery deposition in Iowa criminallaw.54 However, the
Iowa Supreme Court, Jike most state appellate courts,55 has recognized that the trial courts have the inherent power-indeed, in some
instances, the duty-to order that certain evidence in the state's possession be disclosed before trial in order to assure the defendant a
fair triaP 6 The court emphasized in · State v. Eads that the trial
courts are to exercise sound judicial discretion in compelling disclosure of evidence "when necessary in the interests of justice."57 Upon
appellate review alleging an abuse of the court's discretion, "the ultimate test against which our decision must be measured is that of a
fair trial. Defendant is entitled to no mO'te, and he must have no
less."58 Accordingly, th·~ trial court can abuse its discretion by ordering too much disclosure since "it is not only the defendant who is entitled to a fair trial. Society, too, represented by the prosecution, has
an equal right to one."5 ')
With these double-edged guidelines in mind, the supreme court has,
on a case-by-case basis, determined what must be disclosed, what cannot be disclosed, and what may, in the trial court's discretion, be ordered to be disclosed. ~rhe procedural vehicle triggering a disclosure
inquiry is the defendant's motion for a bill of particulars.60 This statutory motion may be made when the indictment, together with the
attached minutes of evidence, "fails to inform the defendant of the
particulars of the offense sufficiently to enable him to prepare his defense, or to give him such information as he is entitled to under the
Constitution of this state~ ...." 61 However, the trial court may order
the disclosure on its own motion, but the supreme court hfts held that
failure to do so may not constitute an abuse of discretion. 62
53 IoWA CoDE §§ 769.13, 77.2.4 (1973).
(minutes of testimony the state expects
to rely upon at trial); IowA CODE § 749A.4 (1973) (report of state criminalistics
laboratory); IowA CoDE § 7'{5.8 (1973) (copy of indictment or information).
54 State v. District Court, ~~3 Iowa 903, 910-12, 114 N.W.2d 317, 321-22 (1962).
55 See Annat., 7 AL.R.3d 8, 36-43 (1966).
5a State v. Eads, 166 N.W~:d 766, 769 (Iowa 1969).
57 Id.
ss I d. at 771 (emphasis added).
5o Id.
6o See IowA CoDE §§ 773.6, .7 (1973).
61 Id. § 773.6.
a2 State v. Berenger, 161 U.W.2d 798, 801 (Iowa 1968).
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The following have expressly been held by the Iowa Supreme Court
to be discoverable by the defendant as a matter of right, thus leaving
no discretion in the trial court to refuse to order their disclosure: (1)
an autopsy report, 63 (2) contents of documents the state intends to use
against the defendant, 64 (3) any physical evidence the state intends to
use against the defendant, 65 and (4) exculpatory evidence.66 The following, while possibly not discoverable as a matter of right, can properly be ordered, in the trial court's sound discretion, to be disclosed:
FBI laboratory reports, 67 photographs,68 copies of statements of the
state's witnesses,S 9 and the names of any informants relied upon by the
state.70 On the other hand, the trial court cannot order pretrial disclosure of police investigation reports,11 the names of investigating
officers,T 2 or any notes, memoranda, or correspondence constituting
63

State v. Eads, 166 N.W.2d 766, 772 (Iowa 1969):
Fundamental fairness requires the State to produce the report so that
defendant may prepare to meet its findings in an orderly and effectual
fashion.

6 ~ The defendant "is also entitled to know the contents of documents the state
intends to use against him." State v. White, 260 Iowa 1000. 1005, 151 N.W.2d 552,
555 (1967).
6 5 "[N]o reasonable rule justifies denial of an opportunity for defendant to
examine the physical: evidence the State expects to use against him." State v.
Eads, 166 N.W.2d 766, 771 (Iowa 1969).
66 Cf.
State v. Niccum, 190 N.W.2d 815, 826 (Iowa 1971). However, the defendant's request therefore was "too broad and general to be Sustained." Id.
sr State v. Eads, 166 N.W.2d 766, 773 (Iowa 1969): ''We hold the trial court's
order to produce these reports was a proper exercise of its discretion to assure
defendant a fair trial." Id.
68 See, e.g., State v. Niccum, 190 N.W.2d 815, 820 (Iowa 1971); State v. Galloway,
167 N.W.2d 89, 90 (Iowa 1969); State v. Eads, 166 N.W.2d 766, 774 (Iowa 1969).
6 9 State v. Eads, 166 N.W.2d 766, 774 (Iowa 1969):

We hold the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the State to
deliver copies of the statements of all witnesses expected to testify at
defendant's trial.
We do not foreclose the possibility that a defendant may be entitled to
a particular statement upon showing it is necessary to his proper defense.
70 State v. Battle, 199 N.W.2d 70, 71-72 (Iowa 1972); State v. Denato, 173 N.W.2d
576, 578-79 (Iowa 1970) (disclosure was not ordered in these cases, however).
71 State v. Eads, 166 N.W.2d 766, 774 (Iowa 1969):

We hold the [trial: court's] order requiring the State to produce copies of
police reports was an abuse of discretion . . . thereby depriving the State
of a fair trial.

But see State v. Mayhew, 170 N.W.2d 608, 613-14 (Iowa 1969) (in camera inspection by the judge after the officer testifies on direct with possible limited
turnover to the defendant for purposes of cross examination).
7 2 "[P]retrial discovery may be had in Iowa only for the production of specific
documents which are shown to be in existence." State v. Redding, 169 N.W.2d
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the prosecutor's "work p:mduct." 73

D. C<•mpetency to Stand Trial
Regardless of anything else that occurs during pretrial proceedings
the trial court must be sensitive to the possibility that the defendant
may not be competent to stand trial The Code provides that whenever a defendant appears :in any stage of a criminal trial and "a reasonable doubt arises as to his sanity," the proceedings must be suspended
and a jury trial had upon the question of his competency to stand
trial,7~ Quite unsurprisingly, although a defendant's failure to raise
the question of his own competency may be a factor to be considered
on review of a trial court's failure to consider the competency of that
defendant/ 6 the statute has been construed as imposing a mandatory
duty on the court "to act on its own motion if a doubt of defendant's
present insanity arises." 76 To aid the trial courts in. determining com788, 790 (Iowa 1969), citing State v. Kelly, 249 Iowa 1219, 1220-22, 91 N.W.2d. 562,
563-64 (1958).
73 See State v. Eads, 166 N.W.2d. 766 (Iowa 1969) where the court, in reference
to defendant's demands for pretrial discovery of statements made to police by
persons expected to be called as state witnesses at trial, stated:
• • • whether condemned. as "mere fishing expeditions," "attempts to
rifle the prosecutor's ille," or "requests for the State's work product,"
the overwhelming weight of authority is against such disclosure. Id.
at 774.
To the same effect is People v. Powell, 49 Misc. 2d. 624, 626, 268 N.Y.S.2d 380,
383 (Sup. Ct. 1965) :
With respect to the Pollet~ or District Attorney's notes, stenographic or
otherwise, of all such stau!ments ••• the Court is of the belief that such
subject matter would not be a proper subject for discovery and inspection ••.• Id.
This rule is more explicitly stated by the ABA project committee on criminal
justice standards:
Disclosure shall not be r-equired of legal research or of records, correspondence, reports or memoranda to the extent that they contain the
opinions, theories or conclusions of the prosecuting attorney or members
of his legal staff. ABA PROJECT ON Mnmlnrr.r STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL Jus:riCE, STANDARDS REr.A:riNG TO DiscoVERY AND PRoCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL §
2.6(a) (approved Draft 1970).
See also State v. Allison, 206 N.W.2d. 893 (Iowa 1973) (expert witness' books not
discoverable).
74 IowA CoDE

§ 783.1 (1973).
State v. Stoddard, 180 N.V1.2d 448, 450 (Iowa 1970).
1a ld. at 449; see Hickey v. District Court, 174 N.W.2d 406, 408-09 (Iowa 1970).
77 The supreme court gives great weight t0 the trial court's decision in this
regard, noting in Stoddard thai; the facts
76

should clearly suggest a <l!.Uestion of defendant's mental capacity before
we reverse the trial court for failing to determine whether a reasonable
doubt exists on his own motion. 180 N.W.2d at 452.
This is generally because the trial court has the advantage of observing the
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petency,77 the supreme court has formulated this three-part standard:
"defendant's mental capacity to appreciate the charge against him,
understand the proceedings, and conduct his defense." 78
Once a defendant's competency is questioned, the court abuses its
discretion in proceeding without first ordering a jury's determination
of whether there is a reasonable doubt about the defendant's competency to stand trial. Indeed, before accepti."lg a guilty plea, the court
must be possessed of "sufficient and satisfactory evidence" of the accused's mental capacity. 79 For example, the trial court in Hickey v.
District Courfl0 abused its discretion m accepting the defendant's
guilty plea without first ordering further inquiry into his sanity, even
though the defendant raised the issue for the first time on appeal.
The court-ordered presentence investigation report detailed Hickey's
past commitment to a mental hospital but did not indicate a discharge
therefrom. The supreme court held that there should have been a
direct evaluation of defendant's present state of mental health "before
the court could resolve the question of reasonable doubt as to defendant's mental capacity to enter a plea of guilty."81
When the trial court improperly proceeds with the trial rather than
commencing a separate proceeding to determine whether there is a
reasonable doubt about the defendant's competency, it is, in effect,
acting without jurisdiction over the defendant. 82 However, if the
defendant seeks to appeal the trial court's action, he must contend
with a presumption that the court retains jurisdiction, which presumption will only be rebutted if the defendant can show by a clear
preponderence of the evidence that the court abused its discretion by
acting illegally in proceeding further with the case.83 The consequences of a defendant's inability to sustain this burden are illustrated
in State v. Milford. 84 In that case, after the state rested, the defense
defendant first hand. See State v. McCollom,
525 (1967).
7SState v. McCollom, 260 Iowa 977, 987, 151
o£ course, relates only to a defendant's sanity
at the time o£ the crime. State v. Hamilton,
187 (1956).

260 Iowa 977, 987, 151 N.W.2d 519,

N.W.2d 519, 524 (1967). This test,
at time of trial and not his sanity
247 Iowa 768, 774, 76 N.W.2d 184,

A reading of the court's ruling on the motion gives the impression that
in so ruling, it was passing upon the ultimate fact of insanity rather than

upon the existence of facts insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt thereof. Id.
79Hickey v. District Court, 174 N.W.2d 406, 412 (Iowa 1970).
so Id. See also State v. Thomas, 205 N.W.2d 717 (Iowa 1973).
S1Jd. at 410; see State v. Bordorsky, 183 N.W.2d 170 (Iowa 1971).
82See Hickey v. District Court, 174 N.W.2d 406, 409 (Iowa 1970).
sssee id.
84186 N.W.2d 590 (Iowa 1971).
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counsel moved for mental examination of defendant. That motion
was denied, and on appeal, the supreme court noted that no evidence
was submitted to support the contention of defendant's alleged paranoia, uncooperativeness with his counsel, or of his hostility toward
the court and his attorney. Quite the contrary, the defendant thereafter effectively testified in his own defense, apparently with "no
difficulty in doing so."85 As a result, the actions of the trial court in
continuing the proceedings were ruled to be proper and not an abuse
of discretion.
Just as it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to improperly
continue the proceedings against a defendant whose competency has
been questioned, however, so too may it be an abuse for the court
simply to refuse to set a case for trial in such a situation. That is,
the law prescribes but one course of action-suspension of the proceedings only for a trial on the issue of competency. Thus, in State
v. Gaffney,86 the trial court's refusal to set aside its order continuing
the case until defendant became sane, while refusing to fix a time for
immediate trial either on the merits or on the competency issue, was
reversed.

E. Guilty Pleas
When a defendant decides to plead guilty rather than stand trial
and there is no reason to suspect his competency, the trial court :is
faced with the immediate question of whether to accept the proffered
plea or refuse it and order the defendant to stand trial In this regard,
there appears to be at :most a limited power in the trial courts to
accept a plea of guilty to a lesser offense over the prosecutor's objection. In what is apparerttly the only case directly on point, the Iowa
Supreme Court noted:
Where, as here, the court has no knowled~e other than the age of the defendant and accepts a plea over the objection of the county attorney we
are compelled to hold sud1 action is an abuse of discretion,87

Exactly what type of fac~tual situation, if any, could justify an Iowa
trial court in accepting such a plea :is not clear.
On the other hand, although there are no Iowa cases on point, at
least one federal court •:>f appeals has held that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in refusing to accept a defendant's plea of
guilty to a lesser offense.88 That court noted that the United States
Supreme Court has specifically held that a trial judge is not required
to accept every knowing and intelligent guilty plea and conversely
s5 Id. at 592.
sa 237 Iowa 1394, 1402-03, 25 N.W. 352, 354 (1946).
87
88

State v. Koeppel, 250 Iovra 1052, 1054, 97 N.W.2d 926, 927 (1959).
United States v. Melendrez-Salas, 466 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1972).
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that "[a] criminal defendant does not have an absolute right under
the Constitution to have his guilty plea accepted by the court."89
The courts' discretion in the method in which they receive guilty
pleas recently has been strictly confined through the federal constitutional doctrine promulgated by the United States Supreme Court in
Boykin v. Alabama.90 and resultantly adopted by the Iowa Supreme
Court in State v. Sisco.91 The Sisco guidelines require that whenever
an accused pleads guilty to a felony or an indictable misdemeanor, the
record must show that the trial court ascertained from the defendant
that he was entering such plea voluntarily, with an understanding of
the charge, and with knowledge of the consequences of his plea.92
Moreover, the record must show a factual basis for the charge and
for the defendant's guilt. Nevertheless, a trial court's interrogation
of a defendant "need not follow a ritualistic or rigid formula," as long
as there is substantial compliance with the Sisco guidelines.98
Once the trial court has accepted a plea, it may subsequently be
faced with the problem of deciding whether to allow the defendant to
withdraw it. Iowa trial courts are statutorily accorded almost absolute
discretion in determining whether to permit withdrawal of guilty pleas,
since the statute provides: "At any time before judgment, the court
ma.y permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn ...." 94 As the Iowa
Supreme Court has pointed out, this provision
does not state that the defe-ndant may withdraw [his] plea of guilty. The
word may refers to the authority of the court to permit such withdrawal:
• • . . [D]iscretion is lodged in the court and does not give a defendant
an absolute right to withdraw such plea.ss
ss Id. at 862, quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n.ll (1970).
90 395 u.s. 238, 242-44 (1969).
91169 N.W.2d 542, 550-51 (Iowa 1969).
92 Id. Prior to Sisco, the same standard for accepting a guilty plea was followed, but without the requirement that the determ:ination be made by the court
itself and that it be made as part of the record. See, e.g., State v. Kellison, 232
Iowa 9, 14, 4 N.W.2d 239, 242 (1942), see also State v. Thomas, 205 N.W.2d 717
(Iowa 1973).
93 State v. Bledsoe, 200 N.W.2d 529, 531 (Iowa 1972); accOTd, State v. Slawson,
201 N.W.2d 460 (Iowa 1972) (Sisco colloquy completed during the sentencing
colloquy is valid). But see State v. Clary, 203 N.W.2d 382, 383 (Iowa 1973) (woefully inadequate colloquy consisting solely of the judge stating for the record that
the defendant wishes to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter guilty plea, with
defendant so confirming) .
94IowA CoDE§ 777.15 (1973).
ssstate v. Krana, 159 N.W.2d 413, 415 (Iowa 1968) (emphasis added); accoTd,
State v. Weckman, 180 N.W.2d 434, 440 (Iowa 1970); State v. Hellickson, 162
N.W.2d 390, 395 (Iowa 1968). But see State v. Machovec, 236 Iowa 377, 381, 17
N.W.2d 843, 845 (1945):
We have heretofore held this statute and identical provisions of former
statutes give to a defendant an absolute right to withdraw a plea of
guilty at any time before judgment is entered in the record book. Id.
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Accordingly, the supreme court has held that "the [trial] court may
without abusing its disc:cetion refuse to permit its withdrawal" when
a valid guilty plea has been entered.96 This doctrine has even been
extended to a situation in which the defendant's motion for withdrawal
was asserted to be based upon "substantial defense to the charge."91
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Santo bello v. New
York08 could sharply curtail the courts' discretion in disallowing withdrawals of guilty pleas that were the product of broken plea bargains.00 Although Santobello's guilty plea to a lesser offense was pursuant to an agreement that the state would make no recommendation
as to sentence, an assistant prosecutor other than the one who had
negotiated the plea recommended the maximum sentence (which was
imposed). Discounting the fact that "the breach of the agreement was
inadvertent," 100 the Supreme Court said that when
oa State v. Krana, 159 N.W.;!d 413, 415 (Iowa 1968). A less mechanistic approach
is taken, for example, in Virginia where

the rule is that the withdrawal of a guilty plea by a defendant is within
the discretion of the trial court, but that it should be granted whenever
there is the least evidence that the ends of justice would best be served
by a plea of not guilty. :e:ggleston v. Slayton, 343 F. Supp. 221, 226 (W.D.
Va. 1972).
or State v. Krana, 159 N.W.2d 413, 415-16 (Iowa 1968). On the other hand, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court; has held that a lower court in fact abused its discretion in refusing to allow the withdrawal of a guilty plea motivated by defense
counsel's threat to withdraw from the case if defendant did not plead guilty.
Commonwealth v. Forbes,-- Pa. - - , 299 A~ 268, 270-71 (1973). The court
said:

These circumstances rendered involuntary appellant's decision to abandon his withdrawal request and continue with his original plea. What
plea to enter is a decisic·n which must be made voluntarily and intelligently by the accused • . . . A guilty plea . . . "induced by promises or
threats which deprive it of the character of a voluntary act, is void." Id.
In seeking to withdraw a guilty plea, timeliness is of the essence. Consequently, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea after judgment and sentencing is not
timely. State v. Whitehead, 163 N.W.2d 899, 901 (Iowa 1969). Moreover, the
Iowa Supreme Court has he1d that "a guilty plea should [not] be set aside as
involuntary in the absence of an allegation that defendant is in fact innocent."
Id. at 903. This view accorcb 'villi the Pennsylvania court's, at least in theory:
timely assertions of innocence offer a "fair and just'' reason for withdrawal Commonwealfu v. Forbes, supra,-- Pa. at--, 299 A~ at 272.
08404 u.s. 257 (1971).
oo Plea bargaining has been approved by the Iowa Supreme Court. State v.
Whitehead, 163 N.W.2d 899, £102 (Iowa 1969):

There is nothing wrong with the universal practice of using plea bargaining as a device for di:sposing of criminal cases. It is entirely proper
to grant concessions to a defendant who enters a plea of guilty when the
public interest is served thereby. Id.
100

404 U.S. at 262.
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a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled."lOl

The case was remanded to the state court, with the ultimate relief left
to the discretion of the state court which is in a better position to decide
whether the circumstances of this case require only that there be specific
performance of the agreement on the plea, in which case petitioner should
be resentenced by a different judge, or whether, in the view of the state
court, the circumstances require granting the relief sought by petitioner,
i.e., the opportunity to withdraw his plea of guilty.1o2

Santobello has already been interpreted by one federal court of appeals as requiring that a defendant be able to withdraw his guilty plea
if the plea was the product of plea bargaining followed by the court's
refusal to accept the prosecutor's agreed-upon sentence recommendation.103 Conceding that it is still within the court's sound discretion
"to determine whether the interests of justice will be served by accepting the prosecutor's recommendation," 104 the court of appeals ruled
that when the sentencing judge decides not to accept the government's
sentence recommendation made pursuant to a plea bargain, then "the
defendant should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea, particularly where, as here, there is no Government claim of prejudice or
harm."1os

Nevertheless, subsequent to Santobello> the Iowa Supreme Court
has held that during a guilty plea colloquy the trial court is not required "to question counsel regarding a plea arrangement."106 This
approach appears undesirable in light of the possibilities it engenders
for post-conviction attack on the plea if the bargained-for promises
are not kept.107 A more realistic approach has been proposed by the
Iowa Criminal Code Review Study Committee, which has recomlOl[d.
1oz Id. at 263.
l 03 United States ex rel. Culbreath v. Rundle, 466 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1972).
1o4 Id. at 734.
J.os Id. at 735; accord, People v. Barajas, 26 Cal. App. 3d 932, 103 Cal. Rptr. 405
(1972):
Where the prosecution repudiates its part of the plea bargain, the defendant's remedy is to move to withdraw his plea of guilty in the trial
court. Unless he makes such a motion in the trial court, he is precluded
from obtaining relief on appeal. Id. at 937, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
1os State v. Christensen, 201 N.W.2d 457, 459 (Iowa 1972).
107 The task force for the courts of the National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recently recommended abolition of plea
bargaining. NATIONAL ADVISORY COIIIM. ON CRillliNAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GoALs,
WoRKING PAPER FOR THE NATIONAL CoNFERENCE oN CRillliNAL JusTICE Standard 3.1,
at Ct. - 42 to 45 (1973). The Commission also recommended interim measures
to structure the transition period. Id. Standards 3.2-.8, at Ct.-46 to 64.
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mended that "the court shall require the disclosure of the [plea bargaining] agreement in open court at the time the plea is offered." 108
Then, if the court rejects the plea agreement, the defendant is afforded the absolute right to withdraw his guilty plea,109 and no reference to this withdrawn plea, nor to any of the plea discussions, can be
made at trial. 110
F. Dismissals
Iowa is one of several jurisdictions with statutory authority111 for a
trial court's dismissal of a pending prosecution on its own motion and
without the consent of the prosecutor.112 This power is to be exercised
only when the court :finds such dismissal to be in the furtherance of
justice,113 however, and under Iowa's particular statute, which also
authorizes the court to di:;miss cases upon the application of the county
attomey,114 no pending prosecution "shall be discontinued or abandoned in any other manner."115
A dismissal under this statute is "a bar to another prosecution for
the same offense if it is a misdemeanor"116 but not such a bar "if the
offense charged be a felony." 117 Nevertheless, "such power and discre1os Iowa Crim. Code Rev. Study Comm., Proposed Iowa Criminal Code, Iowa
R. Crlm. P. 9(2) (1973).
1oo Id. Rule 9(4).
no Id. Rule 9(5). The committee struck from a subcommittee proposal a ban
on the court participating in any of the plea discussions. See generally ABA
PROJECT ON Mnmltullt STANDAFllS OF CRDIUNAL JUSTICE, ST.A.."''DARDS RELATING TO THE
FuNCTION oF THE TiuAL JUDGE § 4.1(a) (Approved Draft 1972); Note, Judicial
Participation in Guilty Pleas--A Search for Standards, 33 U. PITT. L. REv. 151
(1971) (analyzing cases generally disapproving of pre-plea judicial ratification of
plea bargaining).
111 IOWA CODE § 795.5 (1973).
1 12 See F. MILLER, PRosEctr.L'ION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SusPECT WITH A
CRll\IE 334 (1970).
113Jd. See also IowA CODE § 795.5 (1973), requiring that the court state its
reasons therefor in the order of dismissal and thus that they be entered of record.
1 14 IowA CODE § 795.5 (197il). Iowa's procedure contrasts with that in some
jurisdictions in which the prosecutor "may dismiss the proceeding on his own
initiative." See MILLER, supru. note 112, at 14. Nevertheless, the requirement of
the trial court's consent for the dismissal appears to be little more than a formality in many jurisdictions. In fact,

[t]he majority of American courts have interpreted the common law to
mean that the prosecutor':; wish to dismiss the charge prevails regardless
of the wishes of the judge." Id. at 308 n.50.
115 IOWA
116 I d.;

CODE § 795.5 (1973).

cf. State v. Reinhard, 202 Iowa 168, 209 N.W. 419 (1926).

117 Id.; see State v. Gebhart, 257 Iowa 843, 849, 850, 134 N.W.2d 908, 909 (1965)
("the dismissal of the prior charge did not prevent the state from filing a second,
within the limits of the statute on limitations," where the first charge had not
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tion may not be exercised to harass a defendant nor to subject him to
repeated and unwarranted prosecution." 118 This type of dismissal statute has been liberally construed as "confer[ring] on the trial judiciary
the same kind of discretion to prevent prosecution even on sufficient
evidence [as that] normally held and exercised by prosecutors."m
Nevertheless, the courts cannot exercise this power arbitrarily. For
example, the Iowa Supreme Court120 has sharply denounced two municipal court judges' policy of dismissing all overloaded vehicle stmlmonses sua sponte because they questioned the wisdom of such a law
being enforced in their court. The supreme court admonished:
[J]ustice is not "furthered" by wholesale dismissals of cases with no opportunity for each side to be heard and for no better reason than that the
presiding judge thinks the offended statutes are unfair in their application.12l

Declaring that arbitrary dismissals are not in "the interest of proper
administration of the courts," the supreme court dictated that in subsequent dismissals "a fair opportunity for each side to present its case
must be afforded."122

G. Pretrial Evidentiary Motions
Although most questions of evidence are matters which are not dealt
with until the trial itself, the trial court can be called upon to rule on
some evidentiary matters before trial. Two of the major pretrial evidentiary motions are the motion to suppress and the motion in limine,123 both of which are discussed below.

1. Motion to Suppress
A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence is subject to
close scrutiny upon appellate review.124 This is because constitutional
issues are generally the guiding principles of law. The trial court
yet been timely brought to trial). Dismissal of a felony charge after swearing
of the jury, however, bars reprosecution, since the defendant has been put in
jeopardy. State v. V:F.W. Post 1856, 223 Iowa 1146, 1149, 274 N.W. 916, 917 (1937).
ns State v. Sefcheck, 261 Iowa 1159, 1168, 157 N.W.2d 128, 133 (1968).
119 Mn.r.ER, supra note 112, at 335.
1 20 In re Judges of Cedar Rapids Mun. Court, 256 Iowa 1135, 130 N.W.2d 553
(1964).
121 Id. at 1137, 130 N.W.2d at 555.
122 I d., 130 N.W.2d at 555.
12a While both of these ordinarily are pretrial motions, yet they both can be
made, under certain circumstances, during trial. See State v. Evans, 193 N.W2d
515, 518 (Iowa 1972) (motion to suppress); State v. Hollins, 184 N.W.2d 676 (Iowa
1971) (motion in limine).
12~ While the appellate review ordinarily is by appeal after final judgment, certiorari can be taken before trial when the disputed matter involves law questions
only and the supreme court thus would not be reviewing fact questions. In

1042

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

nevertheless is granted considerable leeway in deciding disputed fact
questions. This means, for example, that the supreme court ordinarily will accept the trial eourt's finding of fact that consent was given
for a warrantless search hut will interpose its own view as to whether,
as a matter of law, consent could be given under such circumstances.
For example, the supreme court said in State v. Shephard: 125
The question of whether consent was in fact given is a factual matter to
be determined by the trial court and where the evidence is conflicting
this court will accept the finding of the trial: court unless it is clearly unreasonable.

The supreme court also stated:
It is for the trier of fact to determine whether the consent was voluntary
or coerced. The evidence in this instance must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the stat~. We are to determine if the evidence so considered is sufficient to support the trial court's finding that [defendant]
gave his consent freely and voluntarily.12a

Appellate review thus is not concerned with evaluation o£ "contradictory factual questio:ns."127 The supreme court deems it "essential," however, that it make "an independent examination of the facts,
findings, and record in order to determine whether relevant constitutional standards have here been fully respected."128

2. Motion in Limine
An order granting a motion in limine, while not specifically authorized under Iowa's rules of criminal procedure, is considered to be
within the trial court's inherent power to reasonably control the trial
process so as "to insure a fair and just trial to each litigant."129 The
general purpose of such an order is to "prohibit disclosure of questionable evidence until the court during trial in the jury's absence has
been presented an offer an.d objection."130 Thus, it could be used during the voir dire of prospective jurors to prohibit the disclosure of
"prejudicial matters which may compel declaring a mistrial."131 HowState v. Holliday, the supreme court, noting that the instant petition by the
state presented only questions of law, disagreed with the defendant's contention
that
the ruling of the trial court [sustaining the defendant's motion to suppress] was within his judicial discretion, and was not in fact an illegal
ruling, such as to allow review by means of certiorari 169 N.W.2d 768,
770 (Io\va 1969).
12s 255 Iowa 1218, 1223, 124 N.W.2d 712, 715 (1963), quoting People v. Speice,
23 Ill. 2d 40, 45, 177 N.E.2d 233, 235 (1961).
12a Id. at 1222, 124 N.W.2d at 715.
127 State v. Spier, 173 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Iowa 1970).
12B[d.
12o State v. Johnson, 183 N.W.2d 194, 197 (Iowa 1971).
130
131

I d.
I d.
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ever, it "should not, except upon a clear showing, be used to reject
evidence."182
This is one of the few areas of the law in which the trial court need
not exercise its discretionary powers. Thus, the court can properly
refuse to even rule on the motion and such inaction merely "constitutes a denial of the motion."133 Moreover, "a denial of a motion in
limine (or failure to rule on the motion) cannot, in and of itself, constitute reversible error,"134 even though the supreme court subsequently determines the ruling was incorrect.135 This is because "[t]he
objectionable material has not yet reached the jury's ears. It may
never reach the jury."186 Then if this evidence is offered at trial, the
other party must object to its admission and thus "a proper record may
be made for review on appeal."137 In other words, "[r]elief must be
predicated on a record made during trial when the objectionable evidence is sought to be introduced."138 Even though the trial court's
denial of a motion in limine or its refusal to rule thereon may not be
subject to appellate scrutiny, however, the trial court's granting of
such a motion can result in reversible error even if no record is made
at trial.139 The court's rationale in one such case was:
[S]ince nothing occurred on the trial changing the admissibility or inadmissibility [of the objectionable evidence], plaintiffs were not required
to make a further offer of proof on trial to preserve the claimed error in
ruling on the motion in limine.140

The lesson from all of this appears to be that the trial court should
use its motion in limine powers cautiously, and especially so when the
resultant order would have the effect of excluding the evidence altogether.

H. Jury Trial
The Iowa criminal code contains several rather explicit provisions
governing the right of defendants to be tried by a jury rather than by
the court. Thus, once the decision has been made to go to trial, the
132 Id. See also State v. Tiernan, 205 N.W.2d 898 (Iowa 1973).
133 State v. Garrett, 183 N.W.2d 652, 655 (Iowa 1971).
134Jd.
135 "The overruling of the motion in limine, even though wrong, is not reverSible error." State v. Hinsey, 200 N.W.2d 810, 817 (Iowa 1972).
136 State v. Garrett, 183 N.W.2d 652, 655 (Iowa 1971).
187 State v. Johnson, 183 N.W.2d 194, 197 (Iowa 1971).
138 State v. Hinsey, 200 N.W.2d 810, 817 (Iowa 1972).
139 State v. Garrett, 183 N.W.2d 652, 655 (Iowa 1971).
140 Gustafson v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 183 N.W.2d 212, 214 (Iowa 1971). Although Gustafson was a civil case, the rule therein has been expressely made
applicable to criminal cases. See State v. Hinsey, 200 N.W.2d 810, 818 (Iowa
1972).
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court is faced with the problem of proper application of the trial-byjury provisions of the Code to the instant defendant. In the case of
felony prosecutions, this presents relatively little opportunity for the
exercise of discretion since all felony charges which are not disposed
of by a guilty plea must be tried before a jury141 notwithstanding ,a
defendant's request to be tried before the court only.142 Although
there is no absolute requirement of a jury trial on misdemeanor
charges, the defendant has a right to a jury trial on an indictable misdemeanor.
Prior to 1971, the Code did not have even this flexibility, and all
trials on indictable misdemeanors had to be by jury.143 This statutory
requirement was enforced in State v. Fagan1 « in spite of the fact that
the defendant, with the prosecutor's concurrence, had attempted to
waive what he felt was his right.'-,{ 5 The supreme court affirmed the
trial court's refusal to try the case without a jury, noting that the nonwaiver rule is founded "upon the authority of the legislature, under
the constitution, to mandate the manner in which prosecutions shall
be tried."146 The issue, in the supreme court's view, was "whether an
absolute provision of the law may be set aside, and a power which the
statute has withheld be conferred by agreement."147 Concluding that
"it cannot be done,"148 the supreme court essentially took the position
that a trial court cannot derive legislatively proscribed discretionary
powers through mutual agreement of the parties to waive the statutory
requirement.
In 1971 the legislature removed the requirement that trials for indictable misdemeanors he by jury and instead made the matter of a
jury trial a right of the defendant.149 This may be waived in writing
by the defendant, but he does not have an absolute right of waiver,
since before allowing the defendant to sign the waiver, the presiding
judge must determine that he is "fully aware of the fact that he is
waiving his right to a jury trial ..." 150 Once the judge has made this
141See IowA CODE § 777.16 (1973): "Issues of fact must be tried by a jury,
unless right to jury trial i:; waived by defendant pursuant to section 780.23."
The latter section is limited to waivers in indictable misdemeanor charges. Id.
§ 780.23.
14 2 "Defendant's waiver of trial by jury and request for trial by the court was
properly overruled." State v. Pilcher, 171 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Iowa 1969).
143 See IowA CODE § 777.16 (1971): "Issues of fact must be tried by a jury."
144190 N.W.2d 800 (Iowa :L971).
H5Jd,
146 I d. at 801.
147

Id., quoting State v. D.:mglass, 96 Iowa 308, 309-10, 65 N.W. 151 (1895).

148Jd.

140 See IowA CoDE § 780.23. (1973).
15o I d.
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determination, the defendant then "shall be allowed to sign the
waiver. • . ."151
There is no absolute right to a jury trial on nonindictable misdemeanors, but the statute allows either party to the prosecution to make
a written demand therefor.152 In light of interpretations of the statute
before its latest amendment/53 it appears that failure of either party to
demand a jury trial will operate as a waiver of the right to do so.
One peculiar area of the law in which the courts heretofore have
been allowed to proceed without benefit of a jury trial has been that of
punishment for contempt. 15 ~ Notwithstanding the fact that this crime
is an indictable misdemeanor/55 the Iowa Supreme Court has pointed
out:
The power to proceed summarily, without a formal indictment and without the intervention of a jury, to hear charges of contempt of court, and
to assess punishment upon those found guilty, has been an attribute to
all courts of record in every stage of the development of our system of
procedure,15G

The Iowa Supreme Court recently limited by implication the application of this rule to cases in which the maximum authorized punishment does not exceed imprisonment for six months.151 The court said
151Id.
152 Id. § 762.15 (1973).
153 State v. Baker, 203 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Iowa 1973):
We ..• elect to point out a jury trial may be waived . . . • Code set:tion
762.15 ... required defendant to demand a jury trial before any evidence
was taken. He made no such demand. He thereby waived any right to
a jury trial.
15~ IOWA CODE § 665.1 (1973).
155 See text accompanying notes 11-14 supra.
1 56 Newby v. District Court, 259 Iowa 1330, 1342, 147 N.W2d 886, 893 (1967),
quoting Jones v. Mould, 151 Iowa 599, 605, 132 N.W. 45, 48 (1911).
157 The Iowa Supreme Court noted in Sarich v. Havercamp, 203 N.W.2d 260,
268 (Iowa 1972), that Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968), and Baldwin
v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970), direct state courts "to look to the penalty
authorized for a particular offense in the determining whether it is serious or not
•••." 203 N.W.2d at 268. Duncan, applying the sixth amendment right to jury
trial to the states, held that "[c]rimes carrying possible penalties up to six
months do not require a jury trial if they otherwise qualify as petty offenses
. . . ." 391 U.S. at 159. Moreover, Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1969) held
that the "Constitution guarantees the right to jury trial in state court prosecutions for contempt just as it does for other crimes." Id. at 199-200. See also
Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966):

[W]e rule further that sentences exceeding six months for criminal contempt may not be imposed by federal courts absent a jury trial or waiver
thereof. Id. at 380 (emphasis added).
The Iowa Supreme Court also took note, 203 N.W.2d at 268, of the recommendation in the ABA STANDARDS FOR TRIAL BY JURY that the possibility of 6-months'
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in Sarich v. Havercamp 158 (a case involving 28 separate charges of
contempt):
We adopt the view the penalty involved, that is, the statutorily authorized
maximum penalty shall be the relevant criterion as to the determination
of a contemnor's right to a trial by jury, vis-a-vis the view the penalty
actually imposed shall be determinative of the question.Iso

In Iowa the maximum authorized penalty specified in section 665.4
for one act of contempt is six months' imprisonment. 160 Thus, there
is no right to a jury trial when the defendant is charged with only one
allegedly contemptuous act. The right attaches upon a multiple-count
indictment charging two or more separate acts. However, the defendant in the latter circumstance must still demand a jury trial in a timely
manner or he may waive his right thereto.

I. Severance
Because Iowa law permits joint indictments of two or more defendants,161 the trial court may be faced with a demand by a jointly indicted defendant for a separate trial. Except for offenses under the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act,16 2 the Code gives such a defendant an absolute right tiJ severance of a felony charge if he so requests.163 Thus, in a felony case, at least, nothing is left to the court's
imprisonment "should be the upper limit upon the definition of 'petty offenses' "
when determining the right to a jury trial. See ABA PROJECT ON MINillrolll:
STANDARDS FOR CRD\tiNAL JusnCE, TRIAL BY JURY § 1.1 (a), Comment, at 20-23 (Approved Draft 1968).
1os 203 N.W.2d 260 (Iowa 3.972).
lGD I d. at 268.
160 IOWA CODE § 665.4 (197:1).
161 IowA CoDE § 780.1 (197:l).
102 Id. §§ 204.1 et seq.
163 See id. §§ 204.408, 780.1. There is no right to a separate trial for any offense
under Iowa's Uniform Controlled Substances Act. Indictments under this act
may
join one or more persons as defendants who it is alleged violated the
same provisions in the same transaction or series of transactions and
which involve common questions of law and fact. Id. § 204.408.
However, the Act provides:
The court may grant a severance and separate trial to any accused person
jointly charged or indict·;d if it appears that substantial injustice would
result to such accused person unless a separate trial was granted. Id.
(emphasis added).
The Iowa Crl.minal Code Review Study Committee proposed no changes in either
the general severance statute or in the exception included in the controlled substances provision. See Iowa Criminal Code Rev. Study Comm., Proposed Iowa
Criminal Code, Iowa R. Crim. P. 6(4) (b) (1973). See also ABA PROJECT ON
MINnlroM STANDARDS FOR C!UN:INAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE FuNCTION
OF THE TRIAL JUDGE § 3.9 (Approved Draft 1972):
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discretion. In other cases, however, defendants jointly indicted "may
be tried separately or jointly, in the discretion of the court." 164 Because the severance statute expressly leaves the question of severance
in nonfelony cases to judicial discretion/ 65 the supreme court has
turned a deaf ear to appellants' contentions that a trial court has erred
in overruling their motions for separate trials.166
It should also be noted that the right to request severance in nonfelony cases does not rest exclusively in the defendant. On the contrary, the supreme court has interpreted the severance statute as
permitting the state as well as the defendant to make an application
for a separate trial on a nonfelony charge. This is illustrated in State
v. Marvin/ 61 where, following the joint indictment of A and B, the
state's key witness married A. Holding that the trial court had not
abused its discretion in granting the state's motion for separate trials,
the supreme court pointed out that the new husband "could not be a
witness against his wife, and if a separate trial could not have been
granted, the State would thus be deprived of its witness.168

J. Changing Venue
The Iowa Code lodges broad discretion in the trial courts when ruling on applications for change of venue.169 It provides:
The court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, must, when fully advised, decide the matter of the petition according to the very right of
it,170

Nevertheless, the supreme court has pointed out that this is "a judicial,
not a personal discretion, and if improperly exercised it may be reThe trial judge should order severance of offenses or defendants before
trial on his own motion whenever it appears reasonably required to insure the fairness of the trial or its orderly progress, if a severance could
be obtained on motion of a defendant or the prosecutor. Id.
164 IowA CoDE § 780.1 (1973).
165 Id. "[T]he statute (Rev. § 4789) is express that the defendants 'may be
tried separately or jointly in the discretion of the Court.'" State v. Gigher, 23
Iowa 318 (1867). The statute there in quesiton is identical, save for punctuation,
with the current version. Compare IowA CODE § 4789 (Rev. of 1860) with IowA
CODE § 780.1 (1973).
"In this there was no error, for the reason that the offense of which he
was charged was not a felony, and 'it was within the discretion o£ the
district court to refuse a separate trial." State v. Kirkpatrick, 74 Iowa
505, 506, 38 N.W. 380, 381 (1888).

16 6

Iowa 499 (1861) .
Id. at 502.
169 Actually, change of venue is a misnomer since it is the place of trial that
is being changed. See IowA CoDE § 778~ (1973). Venue as an element in proving the offense charged remains 'in the original county where the crime occurred.
110 IowA CoDE § 778.9 (1973).
16712

168
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viewed ••.•" 171 Moreover, the Code prese1ibes only two grounds for
changing venue: prejudice of the judge and excitement and prejudice
in the county. 172 The state can petition for a change only in felony
cases.173
The general rule is that an application proper on its face "makes a
prima facie case, which if uncontroverted entitles the applicant to the
change." 174 Nevertheless, failure of the other party to resist such application
does not rob the trial court of its discretion to determine, under the
record made, the necessity or advisability of a change of place for trial.111;

Indeed, although the statute is worded so as to impose an apparent
mandatory duty on the courts, it is not reversible error for the court
to fail to rule on an application, where the applicant goes to trial without insisting on a ruling.176
On appeal or certiorari,177 the movant ''has the burden of showing
the trial court abused i~; sound discretion in overruling the motion for
change of venue." 178 In determining when this burden is met, the
supreme court makes "an independent evaluation of the circumstances,"170 including eyamining any relevant media publicity "with
care."180 In making its own evaluation, the supreme court uses this
standard:
If the reasons given by the court for its action are clearly untenable or
unreasonable, if its action clearly amounts to a denial of justice, if clearly
against justice or conscience, reason, and evidence it has abused its discretion.1S1

Generally, the trial court's decision to deny a requested change of
171 State v. Niccum, 190 N.W.2d 815, 824 (Iowa 1971).
172IowA CODE§ 778.2 (1973). The state may only apply for change of venue
on the latter ground. Id. § 778.4.
173Id. § 778.1.
m State v. Hephner, 161 :rr.w.2d 714, 716 (Iowa 1968).
m State v. Loney, 163 N.W.2d 378, 383 (Iowa 1963).
110 State v. Hephner, 161 N.W.2d 714, 717 (Iowa 1968).
111 A trial court's order denying or granting a change of venue is reviewable
either on certiorari, with the proceedings stayed, as in HaT1ULCk v. District Court,
179 N.W.2d 356, 359 (Iowa 1970), and PollaTd v. District Court, 200 N.W.2d 519,
520-21 (Iowa 1972); or an appeal as an assignment of error requiring reversal, as
in State v. MeyeT, 181 Iowa 440, 448, 164 N.W. 794, 797 (1917). The supreme
court's review is de novo whether the question is raised "on certiorari in advance
of trial, or on direct appeal following judgment." State v. Elmore, 201 N.W.2d
443, 445 (Iowa 1972), overruling Harnack v. District Court, supra, as to this
point.
11BState v. Albers, 174 N.W.2d 649, 651 (Iowa 1970).
110 State v. Niccum, 190 N.W.2d 815, 824 (Iowa 1971).
1so State v. Loney, 163 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Iowa 1968).
1st State v. Niccum, 190 N.W.2d 815, 824-25 (Iowa 1971), quoting State ex Tel.
Fletcher v. District Court, 213 Iowa 822, 831, 238 N.W. 290, 294 (1931).
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venue will be upheld i£ the supreme court determines that there was
an inadequate showing o£ actu,al excitement or prejudice182 or that the
allegedly prejudicial published material was not "so potentially prejudicial that prejudice must be presum.ed."183 In order to avoid trying
the defendant "in the press"184 as in the celebrated Sam Sheppard
case,185 the general standard to be applied in determining whether
publicity surrounding a trial has been sufficiently prejudicial to warrant granting a change o£ venue is whether it has been £actual, noninfl.amm.atory,J-86 ordinary reporting o£ the incidents as they develop/ 87
without continued reiteration/ 58 and especially not just before trial.189
Such reports need not be absolutely correct; substantial accord with
the £acts is sufficient.190 Moreover, a court can properly refuse to
order a changing o£ venue even when there is publication o£ potentially
prejudicial material i£ the court determines that no "reasonable likelihood" existed that defendant could not get a £air trial because o£ this
publicity.191
1s2

State v. Davis, 196 N.W.2d 885, 889 (Iowa 1972).

183 Pollard v. District Court, 200 N.W.2d 519, 520 (Iowa 1972), incorporating by
refeTence ABA PRoJECT ON Mnm.roM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDAllDS
RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PREss § 3.2(c) (Tentative Draft 1968), which
reads:

A motion for change of venue or continuance shall be granted whenever it is determined that because of the dissemination of potentially
prejudicial material, there is a reasonable likelihood that in the absence
of such relief, a fair trial cannot be had. This determination may be
based on such evidence as qualified public opinion surveys or opinion
testimony offered by individuals, or on the court's own evaluation of the
nature, frequency, and timing of the material involved. A showing of
actual prejudice shall not be required. I d.

184 "The situation did not approach the continued and inflammatory publicity in
Sheppard or in Estes . . . . The articles were not infl=atory in tone • . . ."
State v. Davis, 196 N.W.2d 885, 889 (Iowa 1972).
185 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
186 State v. Davis, 196 N.W.2d 885, 889 (Iowa 1972).
187 "The publicity here was nothing more than ordinary reporting which always
accompanies any event such as this." State v. Albers, 174 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Iowa
1970).
188 ''The articles were not inflammatory in tone, and the subject was not pursued in subsequent issues of the papers." State v. Davis, 196 N.W.2d 885, 889
(Iowa 1972) .
189 "No adverse publicity from June 2 to the date of the trial [August 21], more
than eleven weeks later, is shown." State v. Loney, 163 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Iowa
1968). The media accounts "appeared about 8 months before trial." State v.
Albers, 174 N.W.2d 649, 651 (Iowa 1970).
190 See State v. Davis, 196 N.W.2d 885, 888 (Iowa 1972).
191 State v. Elmore, 201 N.W.2d 443 (Iowa 1972). Here,
one small portion of the news article made reference to a parole violation as the reason defendant was not at liberty on bond. The court found
that in all other respects the articles appeared to be simply statements
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Continuing media publicity of an inflammatory nature, coupled with
developments in another case, was the basis for the only Iowa Supreme
Court reversal of a cowoiction because of a trial court's denial of defendant's application for change of venue. In State v. Meyer,192 the
defendant had been jointly indicted with her son for murder of her
son's wife. The newspaper stories, which gave blow-by-blow accounts
of developments from the time of the murder until the defendant's
trial, were numerous and often inflammatory. The son was tried first
and was convicted of second-degree murder. There was broad detailed
reporting of the son's trial, with notations that the state would have
basically the same case against the mother when she was tried.193
Reversing the convictio:n for failure to change venue, the supreme
court admonished:
Though it might be possible to select twelve men who had no feeling or
bias against the defendant on entering the jury box, yet the trial was to
be had in the same com."nunity in which the other jurors found her son
guilty, under practically the same showing that the State intended to urge
against her.1s•

Another case further iUustrates that pretrial publicity must be evaluated in the context of related events rather than merely as to accounts focusing on the defendant. Pollard v. Dist:l'ict Court195 involved
a flood of publicity about a state audit of a city's accounts, with considerable media attentioJ:l. centered upon political bickering between
the state auditor and disgruntled city councilmen. Nevertheless, the
audit ultimately pointed to the defendant as the only wrongdoer among
the city employees.196 Sustaining defendant's writ of certiorari follow.ing the trial court's refusal to change the venue, the supreme court
pointed out that it could not "realistically isolate Mrs. Pollard and her
publicity from the audit and its publicity."197 The court continued:
When the spotlight's glare comes to a rest on a certain individual in a
matter of large public interest involving widespread and intensive publicity of a prejudicial nature, the test is whether a 'reasonable likelihood'
exists that the voir dire jury examination or a continuance will not be
sufficient to allow a fair triaL19S

That the state is also entitled to a change of venue in order to reof fact, and conclude after an examination of the newspaper accounts
and hearing the testimony offered, that there was an insufficient showing
of excitement and prejudke in the community against the defendant so as
to prevent his receiving a fair trial. Id. at 445.
102131 Iowa 440, 164 N.W. 794 (1917).
1oa I d. at 442-46, 164 N.W. at 795-96.
1o4 I d. at 448, 164 N.W. at 7!!7.
1os 200 N.W.2d 519 (Iowa 1972).
1os I d. at 520.
101 Id. at 521.
lOSJd.
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ceive a fair and impartial trial was made clear in State ex rel. Fletcher
v. District C'ourt.199 This was a 1931 case in which the supreme court
sustained the state's pretrial writ of certiorari following the trial
court's refusal to order change of venue. Informations charging conspiracy and false pretenses arising out of the same series of transactions had been filed against 26 defendants. Following acquittal of the
first defendant in a highly publicized trial, the state alleged local excitement and prejudice against the prosecution and moved for change
of venue for the remaining cases. Noting the journalistic notoriety
accorded the highly attended cases, the supreme court said that the
state is entitled to a fair trial beginning with the calling of the jury
from a community absent excitement and prejudice against the prosecution. 200 Otherwise, the state would be ''handicapped from the
start"201 by unfair obstacles.
The pinnacle of judicial discretion in this context was reached in
Harnack v. District Court/02 in which the Iowa Supreme Court upheld
the trial court's order changing venue to a county outside the judicial
district in spite of the clear statutory mandate that such a change
"must" be made to a county in the same district. 203 Noting that the
judicial districting scheme in the Iowa Code needed revision,2° 4 the
supreme court said that one- or two-county judicial districts rendered
literal application of the statute impossible. Rather, it felt constrained
to give a liberal construction to the statute so as to give effect to the
legislative intent and thus "protect an accused's right to a fair and impartial tria1." 205 Despite these sentiments, however, the court based
its decision on
the rule that when procedural legislation governing change of venue conflicts with basic constitutional rights to speedy trial by an impartial jury,
to the extent the legislative enactment deprives accused of due process
of law, such legislation must yield.2os

On the other hand, the supreme court affirmed another trial court's
order denying a change of venue to a county outside the judicial district, in State v. Cunha. 201 Conceding that the court could have exercised its inherent powers to transfer the case outside the district "in
order to insure a speedy, impartial trial," 208 the supreme court held
213 Iowa 822, 829, 238 N.W. 290, 293 (1931).
2oo Id. at 823, 833-35, 238 N.W. at 291, 295-96.
2o1 Id. at 835, 238 N.W. at 296.
202179 N.W.2d 356 (Iowa 1970).
2oa I d. at 360-61; IowA CoDE § 778.10 (1973).
204179 N.W.2d at 361. Cf. IowA CoDE § 602.18 (1973).
205 Id., citing Turner v. State, 87 Fla. 155, 162-63, 99 So. 334, 336 (1924).
2os I d. at 361.
2o1193 N.W.2d 106, 110 (Iowa 1972).
2os I d.
199
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that failure to do so did not constitute reversible error on the record
before it. The court noted that, other than the defendant's affidavit,
the record was devoid of evidence of excitement or prejudice in the
adjoining county to wh:.ch venue was transferred as opposed to the
county where the crime was committed.209
Once it has been determined that venue will be changed, the decision as to the new situs lies in the trial court's sound discretion. 210
As the supreme court p:>inted out in Harnack: "A defendant on motion for change of venu·~ does not have a right to select a particular
county for his trial." 211 All the defendant or the state is apparently
entitled to is a change o:f venue to a county in which he or it can get
a fair trial, that is, one where the objectionable excitement or prejudice is lacking.

K. Continuance
Several statutory provisions establish guidelines for the courts to
follow in granting or denying continuances before trial. 212 One such
provision is inextricably bound up in the defendant's right to a speedy
trial. 213 Although the Code provides that:
If a defendant indicted for a public offense, whose trial has not been
postponed upon his application, be not brought to trial within sixty days
after the indictment is found, the court must order it to be dismissed.•.214

the defendant's right to a dismissal is not absolute, for the court has
the authority, for "good cause ... shown" to refuse to dismiss the
case215 and may, in its discretion, order the case continued for a maximum of 90 days. 216
Two other provisions relate to possible continuances to allow the
defendant to readjust his defense following notification of alterations
I d. at 109.
Harnack v. District Court, 179 N.W.2d 356, 360 (Iowa 1970).
211 Id.
2oo
210

212 Among

these are the relevant rules of civil procedure. The provisions
of the Code of civil prc•cedure relative to the continuances of the trial
of civil causes shall apply to the continuance of criolinal actions • • • •
IowA CODE § 780.2 (1973).

213 For a more detailed di~.cussion of the right to "speedy justice" and the impact of the sixth amendment on Iowa criminal law see State v. Gorham, no. 59/
55433 (April 25, 1973) and State v. Morningstar, 207 N.W.2d 772 (Iowa 1973);
Dunahoo & Sullins, Speedy .Tustice, 22 DRAKE L. REV. 266 (1973).
214 IowA CoDE § 795.2 (1972.). A somewhat similar provision exists as to failure
to indict in a speedy manner. Id. § 795.2.
21u I d. § 795.2.
216 Id. § 795.3.
See also P...BA PROJECT ON MlNIMullt STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JusncE, STANDARDS RELA'l'ING TO THE FuNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE § 1.4 (Approved
Draft 1972) : "The trial judge has the obligation to avoid delays, continuances and
extended recesses, except for good cause."
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in the state's case. The right to a continuance because of an amendment of the charge is qualified, however, by the statutory mandate
that: "[N] o continuance ... shall be granted because of such amendment unless it is made to appear that defendant should have additional
time to prepare for trial because of such amendment." 217 On the other
hand, the defendant appears to have an absolute right to a continuance,
upon request, when the state files additional minutes of testimony and
the defendant has not been given timely notice of this proposed additional testimony. 218 By the same token, the state is entitled to a continuance of up to 4 days when the defendant files notice of an alibi or
insanity defense less than 4 days before the case is set for trial. 219
Another ground for continuance relates to a specific disclosure duty
of the state. If any report of the state criminalistics laboratory is not
given to the defendant at least 4 days before trial, "such fact shall be
grounds for a continuance."220 This rule applies "whether or not such
findings are to be used in evidence against him." 221
The defendant is entitled under the Code to at least 3 days in which
to prepare for trial after entry of his plea.222 Beyond this 3-day minimal period, however, the question of either party obtaining any additional time after the scheduled trial date rests in the sound discretion
of the trial court.223
The trial court's discretion in granting or denying continuances is
"very broad," 224 and this decision "rests largely in the sound discretion
of the trial court." 225 The breadth of this discretion is apparent from
the statement, in State v. Elliston/ 26 that the trial court's ruling on a
motion for continuance "will not be interfered with on appeal unless it
211 IowA CoDE § 773.47 (1973).
21s See I d. § 780.10-.12. For a discussion of whether, in the trial court's discretion, addition testimony can be given at trial by state's witnesses whose
names were not endorsed on the indicbnent and for whom the four-day notice
before trial requirement was not given see text accompanying notes 392-404 infra.
219 IOWA CODE § 777J.8 (1973).
22o Id. § 749A.4.
221Id.

22 2 Id. § 780.3.
22s This, of course, is subject generally to constitutional and statutory guarantees of speedy indicbnent and speedy trial. For an example of an abuse of discretion in requiring a defendant to go to trial within 14 days of her indicbnent,
without adequate opportunity to locate known but unavailable witnesses for
her defense, see People v. Bain, 4 lli. App. 3d 442, 443-44, 280 N.E.2d 776, 777
(1972).
224State v. McNeal, 261 Iowa 1387, 1393, 158 N.W.2d 129, 133 (1968).
22s I d. at 1392, 158 N.W.2d at 133; accord, H. UNDERHILL, TREATISE ON THE LAw OF
CRIMINAL EviDENCE § 456, at 433-34 (4th ed. 1935) (the granting or denying of a
continuance is a matter of judicial discretion, with relief on review only if "there
has been a palpable abuse of that discretion to his disadvantage").
226159 N.W.2d 503 (Iowa 1968).
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clearly appear that the trial court has abused his discretion, and an
injustice has resulted therefrom."221 In Elliston, the trial date was set
for 9 calendar days after the defendant's plea, but the defendant did
not employ counsel until the day before trial. Immediately before
trial was to commence, the defendant moved for a continuance. 228 In
upholding the trial court's refusal to grant the continuance, the supreme court implied that orderly administration of the court's business
is a factor to be considered:
Here trial had been set for more than a week, at least 15 night working
police officers were pres·~nt to testify and other defendants involving the
same incident were present and ready for trial.229

Another consideration noted by the court was that the defendant had
not acted in a timely manner, since the defense counsel could have
made the motion for a continuance on the day he was employed instead
of waiting until the day of trial.
The supreme court has also countenanced the trial court's denial of
a continuance where the defendant has failed to comply with the statutory requisites therefor. In State v. MeN eal/30 the defendant had
been granted a continuance on his assertion that his three alibi witnesses were unavailable. 231 Upon granting a second continuance, the
trial court asked for "supporting medical testimony, affidavits or documents,"232 as required by the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure,233 to substantiate the defendant's claim that his key witness was still too ill to
appear in court to testify in his behalf. A requested third continuance
was denied "because nothing in support thereof had been producecl." 23 ~
221 Id. at 509, quoting State v. Maupin, 196 Iowa 904, 908, 192 N.W. 828, 830
(1923) (emphasis added). Standards for determining when a defendant has
suffered an injustice are suggested in H. UNDERHILL, supra note 225, § 456, at 93536:
A refusal to grant a continuance, which results in [1] depriving the accused of his right to a fair and impartial jury trial, or [2] his right to
procure and compel the attendance of witnesses, or [3] the opportunity to
be represented by counsel, or [ 4] to have a reasonably full opportunity
to consult with counsel, or [5] to have a reasonable time to prepare for
his defense, may constitute reversible error. Id.
22s Whether the time allowed counsel for a defendant for preparation for
trial is sufficient will de:9end upon the nature of the charge, the issues
presented, counsers familiarity with the applicable law and the pertinent
facts, and the availability of material witnesses. Stamps v. United States,
387 F.2d 993, 995 (8th Cir. 1967), quoting Ray v. United States, 197 F.2d
268, 271 (8th Cir. 1952).
220 159 N.W.2d at 509.
23o 261 Iowa 1387, 158 N.W.2d 129 (1968).
231 Id. at 1389, 158 N.W.2d at 130.
2a2 Id. at 1391, 158 N.W.2d at 132.
233IowA R. Crv. P. 183(b).
234 261 Iowa at 1392, 158 N. W.2d at 132.
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Affirming, the supreme court noted that the record "fails to show compliance with the rules for a continuance" and further that "such discretion as to continuance on the part of the trial court is very broad." 235
On the other hand, the supreme court in State v. Conley 236 upheld
the trial court's ordering of a continuance requested by the state on
the day trial was set to commence. 237 In support of its application, the
state filed an affidavit alleging that its chief witness, being out of state,
had not appeared, thus rendering the state unable to proceed to trial.
This was considered a valid reason for granting the continuance.
Moreover, the application was not rendered ineffective because the
state failed to follow the statutory requirement therein that the substance of the expected testimony of the absent witness be set out in
the affidavit. 238 Requiring this of the state, which must attach the proposed testimony of its witnesses to the information,239 "would have
necessitated a repititious account of her testimony with respect to
which the defendant had already been apprised." 240 In the final analysis, the supreme court could find "no prejudice to the defendant in
the court's order sustaining the State's motion for continuance."241
Conversely, the supreme court has held that the state also has the
right to have its interests protected from undue prejudice. In an early
case,242 the defendant had requested immediate trial following entry of
his plea. The trial court overruled the state's motion for a continuance until the next day, which motion was supported by an affidavit,
stating that the state was unable to have its key witness ready to testify, and accordingly dismissed the case when the state was unable to
proceed.2 ~ 3 Reversing the judgment, the supreme court noted that
"[a] higher degree of diligence could scarcely have been exercised" by
the state in preparing its case and securing attendance of its witnesses.2H Accordingly, since "the State, as well as the defendant, was
entitled to a reasonable opportunity to procure its witnesses and be
prepared for trial," 245 the denial of the continuance was an abuse of
discretion and the supreme court had no choice but to overrule it. 2~ 6
235 I d. at 1393, 158 N.W.2d at 133.
236176 N.W.2d 213 (Iowa 1970).
2 3 7 Id. at 214-15.
23SSee IowA R. CIV. P. 183(b).
289 IOWA CODE § 769.4 (1973).
2~o 176 N.W.2d at 215.
241Jd.
2~ 2

State v. Painter, 40 Iowa 298 (1875).

243 I d. at 298-300.
2H Id. at 300.
245 Id.
246 I d.
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L. Amendment of Charge
Unlike the original charging process, in which the court plays only
a minimal role, 217 the process of amending the formal charge, whether
an indictment or information/48 requires a court order. Because the
statutory authoricy for ordering an amendment is stated in permissive
rather than mandatory terms, 249 this decision lies in the sound discretion of the trial court.250 There are statutory guidelines as to the general classifications of permissible and nonpermissible amendments,
however. Amendments "may" be ordered "to correct errors or omissions in matters of form or substance,"251 thus leaving it to the court's
discretion to refuse to order an authorized amendment. On the other
hand, an amendment "shall not" be ordered when it will have "the effect of charging the accused with an offense which is different than
the offense which was intended to be charged in the indictment [or information] ...." 252
Although an amendment may have been permissible at the time it
was ordered, the fact that it was granted opens the door to subsequent
developments which Ipay result in reversible error. For example, an
amendment may have l1een orderly and timely when allowed, but
error may result if the court fails to grant a continuance where "it is
made to appear that defendant should have additional time to prepare
for trial because of such amendment." 253 Moreover, as a condition
precedent to the granting of an otherwise permissible amendment, the
defendant or his. attorney "shall be served [with a copy thereof] ...
and an opportunity given the defendant to resist the same," 254 and it
may be reversible error to subsequently refuse to strike the amendment if service is not perfected.255
m. CoNDUCT OF THE TniAL
The next step in the trial process, indeed the focus of almost every
247 See Contemporary Studies Project: Perspectives on the Administration of
Criminal Justice in Iowa, 57 ZowA L. REv. 598, 605-09 (1972).
2•s The same amendment rule applies to both indictments and informations.
IOWA CODE§ 769.12 (1973).
2•9 "The court may ... ord·=r the indictment [information] so amended .•.•"
Id. § 773.43.
2 6 0State v. Crutcher, 174 N.W.2d 449, 452 (Iowa 1970) (amendment during trial
of case).
2 61 IowA CoDE§ 773.43 (1973); see State v. Miller, 259 Iowa 188, 190, 142 N.W.2d
394, 396 (1966) (typographical error can be corrected by amendment).
2G2 IowA CoDE § 773.46.
2G3 Id. § 773.47.
2G4 I d. § 773.44.
2GG See State v. Hyduck, 21{JI Iowa 736, 736-37, 231 N.W. 451 (1930) (reversible
error to refuse to strike an amendment when application to amend is made before trial and the defendant i:; neither served with a copy thereof nor given an
opportunity to resist it).
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facet of the pretrial nianeuverings discussed above, is the trial itself.
However, it is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss every opportunity the judge has to exercise his discretion during trial. One
area, especially, that of making evidentiary rulings and controlling the
examination of witnesses, has commanded innumerable multi-volume
treatises, and will not be discussed herein. 256 Rather, this section will
be more selective than comprehensive, and will focus on selected
problem areas that are illustrative of difficulties faced by the litigants
and the court itself in setting the parameters within which the trial
court may exercise its discretion.

A. Order in the Courtroom
Perhaps the logical place to begin the discussion of the trial process
is with an examination of the trial court's inherent power to maintain
decorum in the courtroom, a power essential to ensure that the trial
proceeds in an orderly manner. Generally, courts have an almost unlimited power to protect their orderly procedures. As succinctly
stated by the United States Supreme Court:
It is essential to the proper administration of criminal justice that d!gnity,
order, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our country. The :flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary standards
of proper conduct should not and cannot be tolerated.257

As a general rule, therefore, a trial judge's courtroom rules, and his
reasonable actions in defense thereof, appear to be beyond reproach
when they "bear a reasonable relationship to contemporary conditions
and ought to be imposed only after there is a reasonable foundation
for the need of any rule." 258
The ABA Standards on the Function of the Trial Judge state this
general principle as a positive duty of the court: "The trial judge has
the obligation to use his judicial power to prevent distractions from
and disruptions of the trial." 259 Nevertheless, these Standards exhort
tempered actions:
If the judge determines to impose sanctions for misconduct affecting the
trial, he should ordinarily impose the least severe sanction appropriate
to correct the abuse and to deter repetition. In weighing the severity of
a possible sanction for disruptive courtroom conduct to be applied during
the trial, the judge should consider the risk of further disruption, delay
2 56 For a more detailed and exhaustive discussion of the rules of evidence in a
criminal trial see, e.g., B. GEORGE, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON EvmENCE IN
CRIMINAL CASES 119-32, 321-32 (1973) ; H. RoTHBLATT, HANDBOOK OF EvmENCE FOR
CRIMINAL TRIALs (1965); 3 F. WHARTON, WHARToN's CRIMINAL EvmENCE §§ 835-900
(R. Anderson ed. 1955) •
257 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970).
25BPeck v. Stone, 34 App. Div. 506, 507, 304 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884 (1969).
259 ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE FuNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE § 6.3 (Approved Draft 1972).
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or prejudice that might result from the character o£ the sanction or the
time of its imposition.2ec•

The courts' inherent powers to preserve order in the courtroom
may, under certain limited circumstances, even transcend constitutional rights, such as th•a defendant's right to a public trial. 261 However, this rather sweeping authority must only be exercised in the face
of individual circumstances necessitating strong corrective measures.
It is clearly improper for the court to act arbitrarily in the guise of
o
preserving order in the courtroom.
The balancing of interests between the court's need to act to protect the orderly process of the trial, on the one hand, and the right of
the defendant to a public trial, on the other, was exhaustively discussed by the Iowa Supreme Court in State v. Lawrence,262 a case in
which the public was excluded from the courtroom during the reading
of the instructions to the jury. The starting point in the court's analysis of whether the public can properly be excluded from a trial was
its recognition that the constitutional right to a public trial "has never
existed as a rigid, inflexible straight jacket upon the courts."263 Instead, this right has been generally viewed as being
subject to the inherent power of the court to limit attendance as the conditions and circumstancEs reasonably require for the preservation o£
order and decorum in the courtroom, and to reasonably protect the rights
of parties and witnesses.2e4

Accordingly, a judge may, in his discretion, ''exclude anyone from the
courtroom who does not conduct himself properly."265 Conversely,
however, spectators who do conduct themselves properly may not constitutionally be "excluded from any major portion of a trial." 266 To do
so constitutes "arbitrary exclusion" which fails to meet the constitutional guarantee of a public trial. 267
Applying these principles to the facts in Lawrence, the supreme
court reversed the conviction because it could find no necessity for the
exclusion of the public in order to preserve order and decorum in the
courtroom. 268 Indeed, it appeared in Lawrence that the public was excluded as a result of a mistake or misunderstanding on the P<l!t of the
bailiff, who evidently overreacted to the judge's directive during a recess to not permit ingress or egress of spectators during the court's
2eo Id.
2o1 See 19 DRAKE L. REV. 204·, 205 (1969).
202167 N.W.2d 912 (Iowa 19EI9).
2oa Id. at 914.
204ld.
205 Id.
200 Id. at 915.
201 Id.
2os Id. at 916.
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subsequent reading of the instructions. 269 While the judge's directive
was a proper exercise of his discretion, the bailiff's total exclusion of
the public was arbitrary. Because the state failed to overcome the
implied prejudice resulting therefrom, the supreme court reluctantly
reversed the conviction.270
The most sensational aspect of the courtroom decorum issue involves the defendant who consistently disrupts the trial proceedings.
While the Iowa Supreme Court has not yet faced this problem, t..lte
United States Supreme Court has formulated some guidelines for the
exercise of the trial court's discretion.
In Illinois v. Allen/11 the Court said:
[t]here are at least three constitutionally permissible ways for a trial
judge to handle an obstreperous defendant like Allen: (1) bind and gag
him, thereby keeping him present; (2) cite him for contempt; [or] (3)
take him out of the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly.272

The Court left it to the trial court to determine which of the above
alternatives, if not others, is followed in a particular situation.273
Consistent with the Allen guidelines, the ABA Standards Relating
to the Function of the Trial Judge provide:
A defendant may be removed from the courtroom during his trial when
his conduct is so disruptive that the trial cannot proceed in an orderly
manner. Removal is preferable to gagging or shackling the disruptive
defendant. If removed, the defendant should be required to be present
in the court building while the trial is in progress, be given the opportunity of learning of the trial proceedings through his counsel at reasonable intervals, and be given a continuing opportunity to return to the
courtroom during the trial upon his assurance of good behavior. The removed defendant should be summoned to the courtroom at appropriate
intervals, with the offer to permit him to remain repeated in open court
each time.2 H

Similarly, it is suggested in the ABA Standards Relating to Trial by
Jury that physical restraint of the defendant (or witnesses) should occur only when "reasonably necessary to maintain order" and that the
jurors accordingly should be instructed that "such restraint is not to
be considered in assessing the proof and determining guilt." 275
Despite the flexibility that AUen accords the trial court, it is advisable for the court to exercise its powers with care, for at least one
state appellate court has reversed a conviction because a trial court
269

21o

Id.
Id. at 919.

u.s. 337

271 397
2 72 Id. at

(1970).

343-44.
21a See id.. at 347.
2u ABA PRoJECT ON Mnm.ro1.t STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTICE, STANDARDs RELATING TO THE FuNcTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE § 6.8 (Approved Draft 1972).
2 75 ABA PRoJECT oN M:rNn.ro:M STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY § 4.1 (Approved Draft 1968).
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took premature remedial actions under the Allen standards. 276 The
trial court, upon observing a scuffie in the courtroom between the defendant and four depu1ies, ordered shackling and gagging of the defendant for the trial, although the scuffie had occurred prior to convening of court. 277 During the trial, however, there was no disruptive
or unruly behavior, and accordingly both the shackles and gag were
removed, but only after a substantial portion of the trial had been
completed. 278 Reversing the conviction, the appellate court held that
the Allen standards did not authorize the trial judge to act without
first warning the defendant, at trial, to abstain from obstreperous behavior and then only if the defendant subsequently flouts this order.279
In other words, mere "potentially disruptive" conduct is not enough
to justify shackling and gagging a defendant. 280

B. 'l'he Jury Selection Process

In addition to the trial court's general obligation to maintain decorum, it has innumerable, more highly structured responsibilities that
are no less crucial to the conduct of the trial. One such duty is that
of overseeing the jury SE!lection process, an area in which its discretion
is almost as unfettered as it is in maintaining order in the court.
1. Drawing the Jury

In Iowa, jury selectio:n is done on a random basis with the clerk of
court called on to "prepare and deposit in a box separate ballots containing the names of all persons returned or added as jurors."281 From
this box, the clerk is to select 16 names, but the court may, in its discretion, decide to wait for the return of the entire jury panel before
directing the drawing of the prospective jurors for another case.282
Thus, while "litigants ordinarily are entitled to have the names in the
drum of all the then-serving and available jurors," the supreme court
nevertheless has held that a litigant "is only entitled to a fair and im276Jones v. State, 11 Md. App. 686, 693-94, 276 A.2d 666, 670 (1971).
277 Id. at 688, 276 A.2d at 667.
278 I d. at 688-89, 276 A.2d at 668.
210 I d. at 694, 276 A.2d at 6'10.
2so Various aspects relating to another alternative, citation for contempt, are
discussed elsewhere in the Article. See text accompanying notes 149-60 supra.
See generally ABA Pao.n:CT ON M1::NnlroM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE FuNcTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE § 7.1-.5 (Approved Draft
1972).
2Bl!owA R. CIV. P. 187(a); see IowA CoDE § 779.1 (1973).
2s2 IowA R. CIV. P. 187. '!'he rule provides in part:
Before drawing [of the trial jury] begins, either party may require that
the names of all jurors be called, and have an attachment for those absent
who are not engaged in other trials; but the court may wait for its return
or not, in its discretion.
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partial jury" rather than to "any particular jurors." 283 Consequently,
jury selection can proceed although some names drawn for a previous
jury "inadvertently" are not replaced in the drum "and no harm is
shown to have occurred."284

2. Scope of the Voir Dire Examination
Once the jury panel has been drawn, the litigants have the right,285
as interpreted by the supreme court, "to examine prospective jurors on
voir dire in order to enable them to select a jury composed of persons
qualified and competent to judge and determine the facts in issue without bias, prejudice or partiality."286 The scope of counsels' examination "cannot be governed by fixed rules, but is subject to the sound
discretion of the trial court," the exercise of which will not be interfered with on appeal "unless abuse is shown." 287 The trial court accordingly can grant wide latitude to counsel in their voir dire examination provided, of course, that counsel do not use the examination as
a convenient forum for placing inadmissible or prejudicial evidence
before the jury. 288 Within these strictures, counsel essentially are
free to discuss practically anything relevant and can even attempt to
curry favor with the jurors.289
State v. Jones, 193 N.W.2d 509, 513 (Iowa 1972).
I d.
285 Elkin v. Johnson, 260 Iowa 46, 49, 148 N.W.2d 442, 444 (1967).
But see
People v. Crowe, lOS Cal. Rptr. 359, 506 P.2d 193 (1973) (voir dire can be confined, in the court's discretion, to examination by the judge with requested written questions submitted by counsel). Id. at 375-78, 506 P.2d at 199-202. See also
ABA PROJECT ON Mnm.roM STANDAIU>S FOR CRllln:NAL JUSTICE, STANDAIU>S RELATING
TO THE FuNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE § 5.1 (Approved Draft 1972):
283

284

The judge should initiate the voir dire examination by identifying the
parties and their respective counsel and by referring to the charge against
the accused, and by putting to the prospective jurors questions touching
their qualifications, including impartiality, to serve as jurors in the case.
The judge should also permit such additional questions by the defendant
or his attorney and the prosecutor as he deems reasonable and proper.
286EJkin v. Johnson, 260 Iowa 46, 49, 148 N.W.2d 442, 444 (1967), citing 31 AM.
JUR. Jury§ 136 (1967), 50 C.J.S. Juries§ 2756 (1947). But see State v. Cunha,
193 N.W.2d 106, 110-11 (Iowa 1972) (no error in trial court's granting of state's
pretrial motion in limine to prevent defense attorney from asking questions on
voir dire about prospective jurors' knowledge of jucy verdict in defendant's
accomplice's case).
2S7Elkin v. Johnson, 260 Iowa 46, 50, 148 N.W.2d 442, 444 (1967).
288 For example, the prosecutor may not imply that the defendant plans to
exercise his constitutional right not to testify. See State v. LaMar, 260 Iowa 957,
965-66, 151 N.W.2d 496, 501 (1967) (record not preserved here, however).
289 See Anderson v. City of Council Bluffs, 195 N.W.2d 373, 378 (Iowa 1972)
(not an abuse of discretion to permit plaintiff's counsel in civil case to ask
prospective jurors, "is there anybody on the panel who is going to have a hardship of l::Ome kind, a personal hardship, if they are selected to serve as a juror in
this case?").
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Traditionally, one aspect of this flexibility has been a broad range
of judicial discretion in detennining the scope of voir dire as to the
possible racial prejudic.:s of prospective jurors. This discretion was
sharply curtailed by the United States Supreme Court recently in
Ham v. South Carolina. 29 ° Claiming that the possession--of-marijuana
offense with which he was charged was nothing but a ruse to enable
the police "to get him," the defendant, a black civil rights worker, requested the judge to utilize voir dire to ask prospective jurors two
specific questions relating to racial prejudice against Negroes. 291 Declining to do so, the trial court instead asked three general questions
about bias, prejudice, or partiality as prescribed in the state statute.292
In reversing, the Supreme Court held that "the Fourteenth Amendment required the judge in this case to interrogate the jurors upon the
subject of racial prejudice."293
Nevertheless, the high court agreed that the trial judge
was not required to put the question in any particular form, or to ask
any particular number of questions on the subject, simply because requested to do so by petitioner,294

In other words, despite the fact that due process demanded that certain questions be asked, the trial court was afforded a "broad discretion"296 as to the form and number of those questions. In addition, the
Court agreed that the trial judge's refusal on voir dire "to inquire as
to particular bias agairu.t beards, after his inquiries as to bias in general, does not reach th•: level of a constitutional violation." 296 The
Supreme Court reasoned:
2oo
2

93 S. Ct. 848 (1973).

91 These were:

1. Would you fairly try this case on the basis of the evidence and disregarding the defendant's race? 2. You have no prejudice against negroes?
Against black people? You would not be influenced by the use of the
term "black"? ld. at 84!) n.2.
292 These

included:

1. Have you formed or expressed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, Gene Ham?
2. Are you conscious of any bias or prejudice for or against him?
3. Can you give the State and the defendant a fair and impartial trial?
Id. at 850 n.3.
293JcJ.. at 850. The Court noted that its holding in Aldridge v. United States,
283 U.S. 308 (1931) which reversed a negro's conviction for the murder of a
white policeman because of the trial court's refusal to interrogate prospective
jurors about any racial prejudice, "was not expressly grounded upon any constitutional requirement." 93 S. Ct. at 849-50. See also United States v. Rivers,
468 F.2d 1355, 1357 (4th Cir. 1972) (harmless error rule applied to violation of
Aldridge v. United States).
294 93 S. Ct. at 850.
29G Id. at 851, citing Aldric1ge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 310 (1931).
296Jd.
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Given the traditionally broad discretion accorded to the trial judge in
conducting voir dire, . . . and our inability to constitutionally distinguish
possible prejudice against beards from a host of other possible similar
prejudices, we do not believe the petitioner's constitutional rights were
violated when the trial judge refused to put this question.297
Another aspect of the trial courts' broad voir dire discretion is evidenced by their relatively unrestricted right to rule on motions for
segregated, individualized voir dire of the jury panel. In this regard,
no Iowa case has been found in which it has been successfully alleged
that a court has erred in refusing to order such voir dire nor has the
supreme court condemned the granting of such an order. 298 In State
v. Elmore/ 09 for example, the defendant claimed that pretrial excitement and prejudice against him were engendered by a "constant barrage"300 of stories in a local newspaper and over a local radio station.
Declining to order segregated voir dire, the trial court also restricted
counsel's freedom to ask what the prospective jurors had read or
heard. Instead, each prospective juror was asked, in the others' presence, if he had read or heard any news accounts of the incident in
issue, and, if so, if he had formed an opinion as to the defendant's
guilt or innocence. The trial court based this approach on the theory
that "the real issue was whether any of the prospective jurors has
formed or expressed an opinion . . . which would prevent them from
being fair and impartial jurors." 301 Affirming, the supreme court noted
that "[a] wide discretion must be left to the judgment of the trial
court"302 in dealing with these situations. Conceding "[t]here is merit
in the American Bar Standards . . . that under some circumstances
each juror should be examined out of the presence of other jurors," 303
the court nevertheless reiterated that "this has never been the practice in Iowa." 304
By way of contrast, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has reversed
a defendant's conviction because of the court's refusal to order separate voir dire for each juror outside the hearing of other jurors in a
case involving a barrage of inflammatory pretrial publicity with strong
297 Id. Similarly, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has refused to
accord an absolute right for a defendant in an abortion case to have prospective
jurors questioned about any religious prejudices which could affect their decision-even though the Roman Catholic Church takes a strong stand against
abortion. Commonwealth v. Kudish, 289 N.E.2d 856, 858-59 (Mass. 1972).
zgsSee State v. Cunha, 193 N.W.2d 106, 112 (Iowa 1972).
299 201 N.W.2d 443 (Iowa 1972).
3oo Id. at 444.
301 Id. at 446.
302 I d., quoting Holub v. Fitzgerald, 214 Iowa 857, 859, 243 N.W. 575, 576 (1932).
3os State v. Elmore, 201 N.W.2d 443, 446 (Iowa 1972), quoting State v. Albers,
174 N.W2d 649, 652 (Iowa 1970).
304Jd.
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racial overtones.305 A few weeks before the trial, the defendant was
arrested for attacking a police officer during a scuffie at a city council
meeting. 306 The sensationalist reporting of that incident included the
banner headline: "BLACK MOB BEATS TOP COP KELLY," 307 and
defendant, a black militant, was singled out in this and other accounts
of the incident. Determining that the court's refusal to order segregated voir dire was an abuse of its express authority to do so,308 the
supreme court reversed, saying:
When there is present m a case inflammatory pretrial publicity which
creates the possibility that a trial could be prejudiced, there are exactly
those circumstances pre:;ent which require each juror to be questioned
out of the hearing of the other jurors.so9

In addition, this approach would facilitate the development of possible
challenges for cause based upon the specific infonnation that each
juror retained. This approach appears more plausible than that taken
in ElmoreJ which, in effe,~t, allows each juror to detennine if he is prejudiced. The Elmore approach precludes the possibility of a defendant
being able to challenge a juror for what he had retained, since the
juror is not required to answer what he had heard or read.
3. Challenges for Cause
Once the jurors have 'been examined, trial courts have "a large, but
not unlimited, discretion." 310 under the Iowa Code311 in ruling upon
challenges of prospective jurors for cause. Thus, for example, a court's
denial of a defendant's <:hallenge for cause has been affinned where
the challenged juror admitted knowing both parties involved and having heard the case discussed, but nevertheless pledged to give each
party a "fair deal." 312 Likewise, it is within the trial court's C4scretion to refuse to disqualify a prospective juror who admits that he
might have fonned some opinions about the case, but indicates he will
listen to all of the evidence before actually making up his mind.313
In marked contrast to 1he limits placed on the court's power to deny
a motion to strike for cause, its power to permit striking for cause appears to be essentially unlimited. For example, the defendant in State
v. Grove 314 claimed that the reason he waited until filing a motion for
305 Commonwealth v. Johru;on, 440 Pa. 342, 351-52, 269 A2d 752, 757 (1970).
2oa I d. at 344, 269 A.2d at 75:J.
307 Id., 269 A.2d at 753.
sosPursuant to PA. R. CRillt. P. 1106(b), voir dire "may be conaucceu beyond
the hearing and presence of other jurors." 440 Pa. at 352, 269 A2d at 757 (emphasis added).
aoo 440 Pa. at 352-53, 269 A2d at 757.
310 State v. Beckwith, 242 Iowa 228, 232, 46 N.W2d 20, 23 (1951).
311 See IowA CoDE § 779.5 (1973).
312 State v. Sommer, 249 Iowa 160, 175-76, 86 N.W2d 1l5, 124-25 (1957).
313 State v. McClain, 256 Iowa 175, 182, 125 N.W.2d 764, 768 (1963).
314171 N.W.2d 519 (Iowa 1969).
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a new trial to challenge jurors for cause was that any timely challenge
would have been unavailing since his particular objection, that five of
the jurors had served on the jury on defendant's other charge, would
not come within any of the statutory grounds for dismissal for cause.m
Rejecting this contention, the supreme court said:
We do not take such a restricted view of that section. It would be strange
i..'ldeed if the trial court were powerless to prevent before trial a known
injustice which could later be the basis for granting a new trial.'116

Accordingly, trial courts "should use the utmost caution in overruling challenges for cause in criminal cases where there appears to be a
fair question as to their soundness." 317 In this regard, the supreme
court
see[s] no occasion in the ordinary administration o£ the criminal law in
this state for the close rulings on the qualifications of jurors . . . . Although a ruling may be technically right, if it must be so doubtful as to
raise a fair question as to its correctness, it is far better to give the accused the benefit of the doubt .•..318

4. Peremptory Challenges
There is also considerable discretion in the way the court permits
the parties to make their peremptory challenges.319 As a guiding
principle, the right to exercise any unused peremptory challenges continues until the jury is sworn. In State v. Brown,S 20 the supreme court
opined:
We think the court might very well permit a party to exercise his right
at any time before the jury is actually sworn, provided such party is acting in good faith, and not with intent to gain advantage, or to delay the
trial of the cause.s21
·

Because there was no rule of court, statute, or decision supporting the
defendant's contention that consecutive waivers of peremptory challenges by both parties amounted to acceptance of the jurors already in
the box, the supreme court in Brown held that the trial court was free
to exercise its discretion in deciding to permit the state to subsequently
exercise a peremptory challenge rather than having to use one of its
strikes.322 Because the trial court, from its vantage point, "thought
I d. at 519-20.
Id. at 520. The supreme court continued: "Actually the trial court has considerable discretion in acting on challenges to prospective jurors. We believe it
is easily broad enough to have justified the excuse of these jurors upon proper
challenge." Id.
3 17 State v. Beckwith, 242 Iowa 228, 238, 46 N.W.2d 20, 26 (1951).
3 1 8 I d. at 238-39, 46 N.W.2d at 26, quoting State v. Teale, 154 Iowa 677, 682, 135
N.W. 408, 410 (1912).
319 See IowA CoDE § 779.10 (1973).
320 253 Iowa 658, 113 N.W.2d 286 (1962).
321 I d. at 665, 113 N.W.2d at 291.
322 Id. at 665-66, 113 N.W.2d at 291; see IowA CoDE § 779.11 (1973).
3 15

31 6
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the prosecutor did not a•::t in bad faith nor for the purpose of delaying
the trial," 323 the supreme court refused to intervene. Accordingly, absent any bad faith, it should be an abuse of discretion for a trial court
to refuse to allow the taking of peremptory challenges after consecutive waivers by the opposing parties.824

5. Excusing a Juror
Once a juror has been accepted by both parties he can still be excused from serving if the court so chooses. The supreme court has
said that the statutory E!Xemptions from jury service "are not exclusive"326 and accordingly, the trial court can even discharge a juror who
offers strictly personal reasons to being sworn onto the panel.326 The
exercise of this discretionary power "will not be interfered with unless
it is clearly shown to have been abused to the actual prejudice of the
complaining party." 327 Indeed, "it will be presumed, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that the action of the court was based upon
sufficient grounds."32s
6. ImpaneUing Alternate Jurors
The courts have exprE!SS statutory authority to impanel one or two
alternate jurors,820 but tb.e exercise of this power rests strictly in the
court's discretion. 330 Nevertheless, the impanelling of at least one alternate juror would seem to be in the interest of sound administration
as a protection against losing a juror through illness 331 or other sufficient cause. 332
7. Sequestration of the Jury
Upon swearing of the jury or at any time thereafter during the trial,
the court may order it sequestered.333 The decision to permit the
jury to separate or to have them kept together throughout the trial is
a matter resting in the trial court's discretion,33 !l and the statute no
323 253 Iowa at 666, 113 N.W.2d at 291.
324 Indeed, the supreme court has held erroneous a trial court's ruling that
one party's waiver of his first peremptory challenge constituted a waiver of his
remaining challenges. State v. Hunter, 118 Iowa 686, 690, 92 N.W. 872, 873 (1902).
s2u State v. Critelli, 237 Iowa 1271, 1280, 24 N.W.2d ll.3, 118 (1946).
32o Id., 24 N.W.2d at 118.
327 Id. at 1281, 24 N.W.2d at 118.
328 I d., 24 N.W.2d at 118.
320 IowA CoDE § 779.18 (19'13).
330 1946 REPORT OF ATrY. Gm~. OF IoWA 211, 212.
331 See IowA CODE § 780.18 (1973).
332 Cf. State v. Coffee, 18:! N.W.2d 390, 395 (Iowa 1970) (bias displayed by
juror during recess in trial).
333 IowA CODE§ 780.19 (197a); see State v. Albers, 174 N.W.2d 649, 653-55 (Iowa
1970) (sequestration of jury during its deliberations).
334 IowA CODE § 780.19 (1!}73); see State v. Lowder, 256 Iowa 853, 864, 129
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longer requires the court to sequester the jury upon either party's request.335 The court's election presumably would be subject to scrutiny
only upon a strong showing of actual prejudice to the party who unsuccessfully sought sequestration or separation.336

C. Motion for a Mistrial
Another instance of the trial court's continuous responsibility to supervise and control the conduct of the trial process involves the motlon
for a mistrial, which may be made at any time during the trial. The
purpose of the motion is to terminate the instant proceeding, without
barring retrial, whenever it becomes apparent that the defendant cannot or will not get a fair trial because the jury-or individual jurorshas been exposed to prejudicial matter. 337
Perhaps the most common ground for granting such a motion is
prosecutorial misconduct. 338 It must be emphasized, however, that not
N.W.2d 11, 18 (1964); cf. ABA PROJECT ON Mnm.roM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STANDARDS RELATING TO THE FuNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE§ 5.2 (a) (App.
Draft 1972) :
The trial judge should take appropriate steps ranging from admonishing
the jurors to sequestration of them during trial, to insure that the jurors
will not be exposed to sources of information or opinion, or subject to
influences, which might tend to affect their ability to render an impartial
verdict on the evidence presented in court.
335 For an example of how the statute sharply limited judicial discretion before
its amendment in 1969 see State v. Giudice, 170 Iowa 731, 742, 153 N.W. 336, 340
(1915):

This statute permits the separation of the jury at any time before the final
submission of the cause to them "except where one of the parties objects
thereto." . . . Upon the request of either party, the jury must be kept
together, and it is error not to do so."
The phrase "except where one of the parties objects thereto" was deleted in
1969. See IowA ConE § 780.19 (1966).
33 6 See generalLy State v. ~owder, 256 Iowa 853, 129 N.W.2d 11 (1964). In that
case, some of the jurors sat on other juries during the 1 month continuance
granted in the midst of Lowder's trial The supreme court, noting that the
defendant never objected to separation of the jury, concluded:

No matter of prejudice of any nature appears in the record by reason of
the service in civil cases of some of the members of the jury on defendant's trial. Appellant's counsel contends prejudice is presumed from
the facts herein. Prejudice can only be presumed if it appears clearly
that some substantial rights of defendant have been transgressed • . • •
The record does not disclose that a substantial right of defendant was
denied him. Id. at 863-64, 129 N.W.2d at 17 (citations omitted).
State v. Wright, 203 N.W.2d 247, 251 (Iowa 1972).
The presiding judge of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals "estimates that
at least 60 percent of the cases that come before his court involve a claim of
prosecutorial misconduct, although he adds that only occasionally is the claim
well founded." Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct, 50 TEx. L. REV. 629, 631 (1972).
337
33 8

1068

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

all prosecutorial misconduct will support a motion £or a mistrial.
Rather, it is only that misbehavior which "appears to [be] so prejudicial as to deprive defendant of a fair trial." 339 In making its determination of whether the prosecutorial misconduct is such that a mistrial should be declared, the trial court is afforded substantial leeway,
and its decision will not. be interfered with "unless it clearly appears
there has been a manifest abuse of such discretion." 34 ° Clearly, however, the discretion is not unbounded.
It mm:t be utilized fairly and impartially, not arbitrarily, by application of

relevant legal and equitable principles to all known or readily available
facts of a given issue or cause to the end that justice may more nearly
be effectuated.an

Within these parameters, even when the trial court agrees that a
mistrial might otherwise be ordered, it is still free, as a general rule,
to take some alternative action. The most common palliative measure
is to order the objectionable matter stricken £rom the record and to
admonish the jury, specifically and clearly,342 to disregard it. The supreme court has said repeatedly:
Ordinarily the striking of improper testimony cures any error . . • . Only
in extreme instances where it is manifest that the prejudicial effect of the
evidence on the jury remained, despite its exclusion, and influenced the
jury is the defendant denied a fair trial and entitled to a reversal.34 3

The court "may exercise its discretion on its own motion to strike
evidence it deems erroneously admitted,'' 344 notwithstanding the defendant's contention that the court's sua sponte action "placed undue
emphasis on the testimony and was prejudicial error."345 However, it
appears that a trial court should not order a mistrial on its own motion
where the defendant does not consent thereto. 346
330 State v. Barton, 258 Iowa 924, 931, 140 N.W.2d 886, 891 (1966); accord, State
v. Schmidt, 259 Iowa 972, 980··81, 145 N.W.2d 631, 636 (1966) .
MO State v. Hephner, 161 N.W.2d 714, 721 (Iowa 1968).
341 State v. Vickroy, 205 N.W.2d 748, 751 (Iowa 1973).
342 State v. Coffee, 182 N.W.2d 390, 392 (Iowa 1970).
343 State v. Peterson, 189 N.W.2d 891, 896 (Iowa 1971).
aH State v. Shimon, 182 N.W.2d 113, 115 (Iowa 1970).

345
346

Id.
See United States v. Horn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971):

The Perez doctrine of manifest necessity stands as a command to trial
judges not to foreclose the defendant's option until a scrupulous exercise
of judicial discretion leads. to the conclusion that the ends of public justice
would not be served by a continuation of the proceedings.
See also People v. Gardner, 1!)5 N.W.2d 62, 70 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972):
We believe that a trial court's declaration, sua sponte, of a mistrial cannot be grounded on "a scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion" where
under the circumstances of the case it fails to consult the defendant before summarily aborting the proceedings.

1973]

JUDICIAL DISCRETION

1069

This strike-and-admonition approach is inappropriate when the objectionable evidence has constitutional undertones, however; a mistrial
is mandated as a matter of law in such situations. In the recent case
of State v. W are,S 41 the defendant's oral confession was introduced at
trial before it became known during cross examination that the confession had been obtained in violation of the defendant's so-called
Miranda rights. 348 Although the testimony was thereupon stricken
and a comprehensive admonition was given the jurors to not consider
it, the supreme court reversed. In so doing, it proposed the following standard:
[P]rejudice inherent in the constitutionally proscribed evidential display
of defendant's inculpatory statement [is] not dissipated by trial court's request that the jury disregard it.s49

This principle apparently applies also to the use of the defendant's
tacit admissions, for the Iowa Supreme Court has also said:
[W]e now hold, evidential use of "tacit admissions" by an accused offends
the [self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment] and is therefore no
longer permissible in criminal trials within this jurisdiction.s5o

Another way that the trial court can deal with a mistrial situation,
under certain circumstances, is to deny the motion and permit the
examination to continue in order to show the context of an otherwise
highly prejudicial remark. As a general rule,
reference to a defendant's prior criminal record is frequently so prejudicial as to require a mistrial, but it does not follow that mere mention
thereof always dictates that result.s51

Accordingly, it was properly within the trial court's discretion in
State v. Kendrick to allow the state "to show the entire transaction." 352
On cross examination, the defense attorney had elicited from the
police officer that the defendant had remained free overnight before
being arrested and then had implied that the police obviously had
considered the defendant to be trustworthy. On redirect, the officer
noted that the defendant had a "past record." Overruling the defendant's motion for mistrial, the trial court then allowed the prosecution
to bring out the entire conversation in which the officer had said that
he had been reluctant to leave the defendant free overnight because
of his "past record." With the benefit of this additional information,
the trial court had sufficient basis to deny the motion for mistrial

347 205 N.W2d 700 (Iowa 1973).
348 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
349 State v. Ware, 205 N.W.2d 700, 705 (Iowa 1973).
s5o State v. Kelsey, 201 N.W.2d 921, 927 (Iowa 1972).
351State v. Kendrick, 173 N.W.2d 560, 562 (Iowa 1970).
35 2 Id. at 563.
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The courts generally accord wide latitude to counsel in their arguments to the jury. Accordingly, the prosecutor
is entiUed to some latitude in analyzing the evidence admitted in the trial,
and he may draw conclusions and point out permissible inferences and
weaknesses in ... testimony.asa

The trial court still has "the duty to see that the arguments are kept
within proper bounds," however. 354
One recent case355 provides an example of an abuse of discretion in
refusing to order a mistrial because of prosecutorial misconduct both
in the opening and the closing arguments. In the opening argument,
the prosecutor said he knew the defendant was guilty. The supreme
court said "he improperly commissioned himself an expert witness,
then exceeded his prerogative as such by expressing an impermissible
opinion as to defendant's guilt."356 On closing argument he undertook
to inflame the passions of the jurors by "inferentially urging the jurors
to place themselves and members of their families in a hypothetical
position of peril created by a drunken, car operating defendant." 357
Both of these arguments were countenanced by the trial court, which
not only refused to orde.r a mistrial, but also refused to admonish the
jury to disregard these remarks. It appears, however, that even an
admonition would not h6.ve sufficed since the supreme court observed:
"Prejudice flovving therefrom is sel£.evident."358
The Iowa Supreme Court's express adoption of one section of the
ABA Standards Relatins.T to Fair Trial and Free Press359 recently in
State v. Bigley360 has removed one aspect of the trial courts' discretion
in matters of interrogati.J:1g jurors concerning the prejudicial effect of
in-trial publicity. Until Bigley, the Iowa rule was that the decision
whether or not to interrogate the jurors rested in the sound discretion
of the trial court. 861 Indeed, the court's refusal to do so was upheld
in Bigley, and the new rule given only prospective application.862 In
Bigley, the trial court examined the improper newspaper account but
refused the defendant's request that he question each juror about itbecause of the court's earlier standard admonition to the jury not to
ass State v. Wesson, 260 Iowa 331, 340, 149 N.W.2d 190, 196 (1967).
as4 I d., 149 N.W.2d at 196.
~r.s State v. Vickroy, 205 N.W.2d 748 (Iowa 1973).
3so Id. at 751.
357 Id.
3ss Id.
35D ABA Pnon:cT oN Mnmlvnr STANDARDS FOR CRII\IINAL JusTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAm TRIAL AND FREE PRESS § 3.5 (f) (Approved Draft 1968).
360 202 N.W.2d 56 (Iowa 1972).
:3° 1 I d. at 57.
362 Id. at 58.
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discuss the case or to read accounts of it, as well as because there was
no evidence that this admonition had been violated. 363
In all trials begun after November 15, 1972, however, the trial court
must interrogate each juror, outside the presence of the others, upon
the motion of either party, and may do so upon its own motion. This
examination "shall take place in the presence of counsel, and an accurate record of the examination shall be kept." 364 The test for excusing
a juror challenged for such exposure is governed by standard 3.4 (b)
of the fair trial-free press guidelines.
Guidelines for excusing jurors exposed to prejudicial publicity occurring during trial were also adopted in Bigley, with the supreme
court once again looking to the ABA Standards. These standards
leave little to the court's discretion in deciding a challenge for cause.
For example, a juror "shall be excused" if he is exposed to material
which would have required declaration of a mistrial were that evidence introduced at trial. 365 Likewise, a juror who states that he will
be unable to overcome any prejudicial conceptions engendered by
this extrajudicial publicity "shall be subject to challenge for cause no
matter how slight his exposure." 366 Moreover, a juror who was exposed to and remembers reports of inadmissible incriminatory matters
"shall be subject to challenge for cause without regard to his testimony as to his state of mind." 367 On the other hand, if a juror is
exposed to and remembers admissible (but extrajudicial) evidence or
inadmissible evidence that is not highly prejudicial, his acceptability
"shall turn on whether his testimony as to impartiality is believed." 368
In that connection, if he has formed an opinion then he "shall be
subject to challenge for cause unless the examination shows unequivocally that he can be impartial."369 Whether or not a showing of unequivocality has been made presumably would be left to the sound
discretion of the trial court, but in making this determination, the
trial courts must consider "[b] oth the degree of exposure and the ...
juror's testimony as to his state of mind...." 370

D. Amendment of Charge
The Code permits the trial court to order amendment of the indict363
364

I d.
I d.

at
at

57.
58, citing ABA

PROJECT oN

Mnm.ruM

STANDARDS FOR CRil\IINAL JusTICE,

3.5(£) (Approved Draft 1968).
Mnmlrm.t STANDARDS FOR CRil\IINAL JUSTICE,
AND FREE PRESs§ 3.4(b) (Approved Draft 1968).

STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS§
36G I

d., citing ABA

PROJECT ON

STANDARDs RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL
366
367

Id.
Id.

368Jd.
3GU

Id.

s1o I d.
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ment or information during the trial. 871 Whether to do so is left to
the trial court's discretion, but it nevertheless can only act on the
state's motion, 372 and then only "to correct errors or omissions in
matters of form or suhstance."373 In no instance can it order an
amendment which would have the effect of charging a new offense. 374
Amendments ordered during trial most commonly become necessary
in order to conform the charge to the proof adduced from testimony
at trial. However, they are also made before introduction of any
evidence, as, for example, to allege the specific manner or mode of
the commission of the offense charged,375 to strike surplusage from the
charge,376 or to substitute the name of the true owner of the property
involved. 311 Regardless of whether they are ordered before or during
trial, however, as long as the court confines the amendments to the
correction of errors or omissions, its decision to allow amendment will
not, absent special circumstances, be an abuse o£ discretion.
However, the court's characterization of the effect of a particular
amendment as doing nothing more than correcting errors or omissions
is subject to appellate review. The court may also abuse its discretion,
in certain circumstances, by ordering an otherwise proper amendment
but refusing to grant the defendant a continuance to respond to it.318
State v. Young 379 is an illustration of a trial court's properly ordering an amendment even though it destroyed one of the defendant's
theories of the case. The amendment corrected the date of the alleged
rape to conform the charge to the proof. The defendant theretofore
had been prepared to prove that the apartment where the alleged rape
took place was not leased by prosecutrix on the date listed in the
county attorney's information, but this defense was rendered worthless
by the amendment because she had leased the apartment by the subsequent date. The supre~me court remarked:
While it must have bEen disappointing to see this defense evaporate
when the date was correeted, the state is not bound to an incorrect date
because defendant could have shown the crime could not have occurred
on the original date.sso

The court conceded, however, that the situation "might have been

See IowA CoDE §§ 773.43-.47 (1973).
See id. § 773.43.
373 I d.
au I d. § 773.46.
37o State v. Crutcher, 174 N.W.2d 449, 451-52 (Iowa 1970).
370 State v. Bruno, 204 N.W.:!d 879 (Iowa 1973).
377 State v. Osborn, 200 N.W.2d 798, 807 (Iowa 1972).
378 See IowA CODE § 773.47 (1973); see text accompanying notes 431-438 infra.
370 172 N.W.2d 128 (Iowa 1969).
3BO I d. at 129-30.
311
a12
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different" 381 if the defendant could have established an alibi for the
corrected date but "had no opportunity to do so because of the belated
amendment." 382 The defendant had made no such claim, however.
If he had, the supreme court suggested that the proper remedy would
have been the granting of a continuance.383
In order for the amendment to be impermissible on its face, it must
have the effect of charging a new offense. An appellant who either
cannot show prejudice because of the court's refusal to grant him a
continuance thereafter, or one who was in fact granted a continuance,
thus must assert that the amendment had such an effect. This argument has been successful, for example, when the information was
amended during trial to change the offense from forgery to uttering
a forged instrument,384 as well as when the amendment changed an
indictment to charge second offense OMVUI instead of first offense
OMVUI.ass
Because the Code merely provides that an amendment may be
ordered "during the trial," 386 the question is left open as to how far
along in the trial process an amendment may be ordered and still be
"during the trial." Amendments ordinarily are made some time during, or at the close of, the state's case. Whether or not an amendment
can be ordered at the close of all evidence has not been decided by
the Iowa Supreme Court. This would appear to be possible, but only
where the need for the amendment has been occasioned by evidence
adduced in the defendant's case.
Parenthetically, it is arguable that it would be an abuse of discretion
for a court, during any stage of the pretrial or trial process, to refuse
to order an amendment that clearly does nothing more than correct
the form of substance of the indictment or information. Because of
the defendant's qualified right to a continuance following the ordering
of such an amendment, 387 the court could protect the defendant from
being prejudiced thereby, while at the same time protecting the interests of the state.

E. Continuances
Continuances may be granted during trial in the court's discretion
rather than as a matter of right. 388 Thus, the court's decision to grant
381

Id. at 130.

382 Id.

see IowA CODE § 780.12 (1973).
v. Hancock, 164 N.W.2d 330, 334-36 (Iowa 1969).
385 State v. Herbert, 210 Iowa 730, 731, 231 N.W. 318 (1930).
38s IowA CODE § 773.45 (1973).
387 Id. § 773.47.
3sssee IowA R. Crv. P. 182-84; IowA CoDE§ 780.2 (1973).
383 I d.;

384State
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or deny a requested continuance is likely to be upheld on review
unless the appellant can demonstrate not only that the court acted
arbitrarily, but also that its actions were prejudicial.
One common ground :for seeking a continuance is that of unavailability of witnesses. When the trial court determines whether to grant
a continuance on such a basis, two principal questions are presented
for the court's determination. These are whether the movant has
demonstrated due diligence in attempting to secure the missing witness' attendance and whether this witness' testimony would be material to the movant's case. These two principles coalesced in State v.
King,339 in which the supreme court approved the half-day continuance during trial that wru granted the state because its expert witness,
an FBI agent, was testifying in another case.390 The supreme court
concluded:
Certainly the one-half day continuance to enable a witness to attend trial
was not unreasonable and did not in and of itself deny defendant due
process.391

On the other hand, the supreme court has upheld a trial court's
denial of a continuance to permit the defendant to belatedly interpose
an alibi defense. 392 After the state had rested, the defendant filed
notice that he was going to rely on an alibi defense. He moved for
a 4-day continuance to permit the state the same time to prepare for
this new development, just as if the standard 4-day notice had been
given before trial. 393 Afiirming the trial court's refusal to utilize a
continuance during trial to offset the defendant's failure to meet a
statutory pretrial requisite, the supreme court said, "We also think
the language of the [alibi-notice] statute clearly means the notice
must be filed before commencement of the trial." 394 This statement
appears a bit too broad or generalized, since it is possible that the
defendant would not turn up an alibi witness until after the trial has
started. A better approa·ch would be to follow the same procedure
as that for allowing testimony by additional state's witnesses (whose
names were not endorsed on the indictment nor included in a pretrial
4-day notice of additional testimony). 395
In State v. ,Moline, 396 for example, the prosecutor learned of new
state's witnesses during the voir dire examination of jurors. 397 He
389191 N.W.2d 650 (Iowa 1971).
390 I d. at 657.
391 I d.
392 State v. Rovnick, 245 Iowa 319, 324-25, 60 N.W.2d 529, 531-32 (1953).
393 I d. at 322, 60 N.W.2d at 5HO; see IowA CoDE § 777.18 (1973).
394 I d. at 324, 60 N.W.2d at 531.
39G See IowA CoDE§§ 780.10-.12 (1973).
aoa 164 N.W.2d 151 (Iowa 196H).
307 Id. at 155.
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then filed a motion for leave to introduce additional testimony under
section 780.11,398 which generally requires a two-pronged showing that
the evidence is so newly discovered as to permit insufficient time for
the state to give the standard 4-day pretrial notice of additional testimony and that diligence has been shown in attempting to discover
such evidence in a timely fashion. 399 The state is required "to show
the same diligence as is required to support a motion for a continuance,"400 and determination of the state's diligence is a matter in which
the trial court has wide discretion.401 Indeed, the supreme court has
said,
Matters concerning due diligence are so much in the discretion of the trial
court that we cannot say the ruling was improper. We will not interfere
unless an abuse appears.402

The defendant has an absolute right to a continuance if the court
grants this motion. 403 Upon the defendant's failure to elect a continuance, the witness is then allowed to testify when called.404

F. Motion for a Directed Verdict
The defendant commonly makes a motion for a directed verdict at
the close of the state's case and, if unsuccessful, then again at the close
of all the evidence. No error can be predicated on the court's failure
to sustain the motion when made at the close of the state's case.405 The
court may, of course, sustain the motion and terminate the case at
that time.
If the court overrules the defendant's motion for a directed verdict,
and the jury returns a verdict of guilty, it must be determined on
appeal whether there was sufficient evidence in the record to generate
a jury question on "each essential element of the crime."406 In making
the initial determination, the trial court is to consider whether the
evidence, both direct and circumstantial/07 "raise [s] a fair inference
of guilt"408 and it is not enough that the state's evidence merely
398Jd.

399 IowA CoDE § 780.11 (1973).
4oo 164 N.W.2d at 155.
401 Id. at 156.
4 0 2 State v. Gilliland, 252 Iowa 664, 669, 108 N.W.2d 74, 77 (1961).
403 IowA ConE § 780.12 (1973).
404Jd.

4° 5 State v. Tokatlian, 203 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Iowa 1972).
40 GState v. Williams, 179 N.W.2d 756, 758 (Iowa 1970).
407 A special problem arises whenever the state is relying solely on circumstantial evidence, in that this evidence "must be entirely consistent 'l.vith defendant's guilt and wholly inconsistent with any rational hypothesis of defendant's
innocence .... " Id. at 760 (reversal of conviction because of error in denying
motion for directed verdict).
4os Id. at 758.
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"raise[s] a suspicion, speculation or conjecture."409 If the court finds
"there is substantial evidence reasonably tending to support the charge
the issues should be submitted to the jury."410 If not, then the courl
should direct a verdict of acquittal as a matter of law.
Determination of the sufficiency of the evidence thus is essentially
a matter for the fact finder, whose function it is "to decide disputed
questions of fact and to draw permissible inferences therefrom...." 411
This determination is subject to review only to the extent of determining whether there was a substantial basis for the court's determination.
In making this limited review, the supreme court views the evidence
"in the light most favorable to the state" and "consider[s] only the
supporting evidence whether contradicted or not." 412 Thus, the trial
court's determination is binding unless the supreme court concludes it
"is without substantial support in the evidence or is clearly against the
weight thereof."413

G. Reopening the Record
One way the trial court can properly avoid immediately directing a
verdict when it determines that there is insufficient evidence in the
record is to order reopE>ning of the record to give the state an opportunity to correct such defect. Additionally, this privilege would also
apply to the defendant who prematurely rests his case. "[A]llow[ing]
a litigant to reopen aft•:!r he has rested" 414 is another area in which
trial courts are accorded broad, but structured, leeway. 415 While the
Rules of Civil Procedure416 authorize the courts to reopen the record,
the supreme court has added: "[E]ven in the absence of statute we
could see no tenable ground for denying existence of inherent court
power to order reopening in the furtherance of justice."417 Nevertheless, reopening is structurally confined by statute to correction of "an
evident oversight or mistake," and must be done before "final submission of the case." 418 Moreover, the court is empowered to impose "such
terms as it deems just" when ordering a reopening of either party's
case. 410
<I09Id.
410 I d.
4 11 State v. Wesson, 260 Iowa 331, 334, 149 N.W.2d 190, 196 (1967).
412 State v. Bruno, 204 N.W.2d 879, (Iowa, 1973).
413 State v. Wesson, 260 Iowa 331, 334, 149 N.W.2d 190, 192 {1967).
m State v. Mason, 203 N.W.2d 292, 295 (Iowa 1972).
416 "We have allowed wide leeway in reviewing discretion of trial court in
permitting a case to be reopened." Id.
no IowA R. CIV. P. 192.
417 State v. Mason, 203 N.W.2d 292, 298 (Iowa 1972).
418 IowA R. CIV. P. 192.
U9Id.
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The Iowa Supreme Court has encouraged reopenings when necessary for a full and complete hearing on the matter, and has said:
But it must not be forgotten that the primary purpose of the trial was
neither the acquittal nor the conviction of the defendant, but to ascertain
with the requisite degree of certainty the truth of the matter charged in
the indictment. To that end, as a general rule, all competent and material evidence was admissible.420

Put differently, the supreme court believes that no <:onvicticn or acquittal should be based on false or mistaken testimony "when the mistake is discovered before the case is closed and submitted."421
Reopenings have been upheld on appeal where necessary: to establish proof of venue; 422 to correct testimony on direct examination; 423
to reiterate previous testimony after the judge indicated he did not recall any evidence on a particular aspect of the case; 424 and to allow a
witness to clarify his previous testimony.425 Reopenings have also
been approved for introduction of an exhibit into evidence after a
proper foundation therefore was laid during the state's case but the
exhibit was not introduced because of mere oversight/26 as well as for
reintroduction of an exhibit into evidence after a determination that
the state had prematurely offered such evidence during its case.427
The breadth of judicial discretion in permitting reopening of the
record was demonstrated in State v. Thomas,428 in which the state was
permitted to reopen after completion of the defense counsel's closing
420State v. Thomas, 158 Iowa 687, 692, 138 N.W. 864, 865 (1912).
421 Id. at 692, 138 N.W. at 866.
422 State v. Anderson, 209 Iowa 510, 514, 228 N.W. 353, 355 (1929).
423 State v. Thomas, 158 Iowa 687, 690, 138 N.W. 864, 865 (1912).
424State v. Martin, 199 Iowa 643, 647, 200 N.W. 213, 215 (1924).
4 25 State v. Mason, 203 N.W.2d 292, 295-96 (Iowa 1972); accord, State v. Shean,
32 Iowa 88 (1871) (permissible to recall witness whose previous testimony was
"misunderstood by the court, counsel or jury'' or "when counsel differ as to the
evidence given, and the court is unable to determine the precise statements of
the witness.") Id. at 93.
426 State v. Moreland, 201 N.W.2d 713 (Iowa 1972). The supreme court noted
that the Moreland situation was remarkably similar to a case in which the Tenth
Circuit stated:
The government first presented expert testimony relating to the chemical composition of the drug. A chain of custody was established from
the time of seizure of the drug until the time it was brought into court.
The jury heard testimony concerning the article and saw it. The only
thing remaining to he done before the drug was admissible in evidence
was for the prosecution to offer it. Nothing in the record indicates that
the government's £allure to do so was the product of anything other than
mere inadvertence. Under these circumstances, we are unable to say
that the trial court abused the wide discretion committed to it with respect to permitting a party to reopen after resting. United States v.
Keine, 424 F.2d 39, 40 (lOth Cir. 1970).
2
4 7 State v. Johnson, 162 N.W.2d 453, 456-57 (Iowa 1968).
428 158 Iowa 687, 138 N.W. 864 (1912).
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argument. 429 The recalled state's witness thereupon corrected her
previous testimony as to the date that certain events occurred.430
After receipt of this con·ected testimony, however, the judge permitted
the defense counsel to make another closing argument. The supreme
court affirmed, notwithstanding the defendant's contention that he was
prejudiced because of his undue emphasis in the original closing argument that he could not possibly have committed ·the crime since his
alibi witnesses placed him elsewhere on the incorrect date. 431
State v. Edwards 432 illustrates that timeliness of a motion for reopening the record is al:;o an important factor to be considered in ruling thereon. In that bootlegging case, which was tried to the court,
the state moved to reopen on the day following the submission of the
case, when the court was about to render its decision. The county attorney claimed he previously was unaware of the availability of the
proffered evidence concerning illegal transportation, but the court refused to reopen the rec:ord, and subsequently acquitted the defendant.433 Upon a state's appeal, the supreme court affirmed, noting:
To reopen the case at this juncture would be to open up the case to a
retrial, rather than to a momentary correction of a mistake or oversight.
It cannot be assumed tl:at such testimony would go undenied. It might
become necessary to seco·k additional witnesses on the issue.434

The one instance in which the Iowa Supreme Court has found an
abuse of discretion in this area involved a refusal (in a civil case) to
order reopening of the record. 435 Both parties had rested at the end
of the day, and upon the court's convening the ne>..i: day the appellant
asked leave to reopen the case for the purpose of cross examining certain witnesses regarding statements contained in records appellant had
discovered the night before. 436 Noting that "[d]ue diligence must always be shown11437 to discover evidence sought to be introduced in
12o Id. at 690, 138 N.W. at 865.
1ao I d. at 691, 138 N.W. at 865.

I d. at 693, 138 N.W. at 866.
205 Iowa 587, 218 N.W. 266 (1928).
433 I d. at 588, 218 N.W. at 277.
434 Id. at 591, 218 N.W. at ~;78; cf. Schipfer v. Stone, 205 Iowa 328, 218 N.W. 568,
rehearing denied and opinion modified on anothe-r point, 219 N.W. 933 (Iowa
1928) (notation in this case of abuse of discretion in refusing to order reopening
of case where further examination would have taken but a few minutes).
435 Schipfer v. Stone, 206 l:>wa 328, 218 N.W. 568, rehearing denied and opinion
modified on another point, 219 N.W. 933 (1928).
43o Id. at 331, 218 N.W. at 570.
437 Id. at 331, 218 N.W. at !)70; cf. State v. Edwards, 205 Iowa 587, 218 N.W. 266
(1928):
·131
432

The only showing of diligence and excuse for failure to offer the testimony at the trial was that the county attorney did not know that such
evidence was available. But the captain of police . . . did know it. Id.
at 591, 218 N.W. at 268.
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such an application, the supreme court determined there was an abuse
of discretion in the court's refusal to reopen this case since there was
such a showing of diligence.438 Moreover, the supreme court seemingly put another condition on reopening, namely, that the evidence
sought to be introduced must be material, since it noted: "The showing
of materiality was sufficient ...." 439

H. Judicial J>.letice
The taking of judicial notice of certain facts is a second way in which
the trial court, under certain circumstances, can avoid directing the
verdict because of insufficiency of evidence relating to an essential element of the crime charged. One of the most common uses of judicial
notice at this stage of the proceedings is in the setting of venue, when
the testimony itself does not establish that the alleged events occurred
in the county where venue lies.
Because venue is a jurisdictional element which the state must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt, judicial notice must be more restrictively used in this situation than it is generally. That is, while the
taking of judicial notice during trial operates to establish a fact without the production of evidence, the taking of judicial notice in venue
situations is much more limited in scope. The state's case has already
been closed and the taking of judicial notice must be founded on the
evidence in the record. This may be accomplished if the courts take
"notice" that a certain city is within that county and thus raise the
evidence to the level necessary to generate a jury question on venue.
A condition precedent to this taking of judicial notice, of course, is the
existence of testimony in the record placing the events in or near that
city or other well-known landmark.440 The supreme court has noted
that:
[T]he application of judicial notice is more and more becoming a matter
resting in the sound judicial discretion of the trial court with the real test
being whether sufficient notoriety attaches to the fact involved, so as to
make it safe and proper to assume its existence without specific proof.441

The general standard for determining whether or not judicial notice
of venue can be taken was expressed in State v. Conley:
This court has repeatedly held courts will take judicial notice of the
geography of the state and a witness need not testify in words that the
crime was committed in the county in question, but that such fact, if
fairly inferable from the testimony given, is sufficient to carry the question
of venue to the jury.442
438 206 Iowa at 332, 218 N.W. at 570.
439 Id., 218 N.W. at 570.
440 State v. Cameron, 254 Iowa 505, 508, 117 N.W.2d 816, 818 (1962); State v.
Brooks, 222 Iowa 651, 652-54, 269 N.W. 875, 876-77 (1936).
441 State v. Ladd, 252 Iowa 487, 490, 106 N.W.2d 100, 101 (1960).
442176 N.W.2d 213, 215 (Iowa 1970).
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As to the quantum of direct or circumstantial evidence which is required as a foundational basis, the supreme court has said:
[T]he state can generate a jury question on the issue of venue by producing evidence which is either direct or circumstantial from which it
may be inferred. No positive testimony that the violation occurred at a
specific place is required, it is sufficient if it can be concluded from the
evidence as a whole that the act was committed in the county where the
indictment is found. Circumstantial: evidence may be and often is stronger
and more convincing than direct evidence.
. . . If, from the facts and evidence, the only rational conclusion which
can be drawn is that tl:.e crime was committed in the state and county
alleged, the proof is sufficient.. ,443

That the Iowa Supreme Court does not leave the matter of setting
venue by judicial notice entirely to the trial court's discretion has been
made clear in at least two cases, in which no towns, geographical
boundaries, or discernible places were mentioned. Instead, the testimony in one case444 merely named certain st-reets and buildings without locating them in a city or the county. Reversing the conviction on
the issue of the trial court's erroneous taking of judicial notice, the
supreme court determin•~d that the mere naming of streets and buildings was an insufficient foundation to support the trial court's locating
them by inference in the county where the crime was alleged to have
taken place. The court pointed out that in establishing venue by inference, it is necessary that "the place where the offense was committed was identified as being in a certain town, or within a certain
distance of a town within the county."445 Likewise, the supreme court
said in the second case: "We do not take judicial notice of the location
of banks or their names in various places."446
It is arguable that, in certain circumstances, the trial court must
take judicial notice and that refusal to do so would constitute an abuse
of discretion. Such an extreme approach should only be taken in instances where the alleg;ed site of the crime is clearly within the
county, as where the witness expressly testifies that the events occurred within the city limits of Des Moines but neglected to add that Des
Moines is in Polk County. Although the supreme court has never
been faced with this issue, the conclusion finds some support in the
language of cases in which the supreme court has upheld the trial
court's taking of judicial notice. For example, the court has said:
"Where the fair inference under the testimony is that the crime
was committed within the county, a jury question on venue is presented."441 The court has even stated:
State v. Wardenburg, 261 Iowa 1395, 1403, 158 N.W.2d 147, 152 (1968).
State v. Brooks, 222 Iowa 651, 653, 269 N.W. 875, 876 (1936).
HG I d. at 653, 269 N.W. at 8.76.
44G State v. Cameron, 254 Iowa 505, 508, 117 N.W.2d 816, 818 (1962).
H7 State v. Stumbo, 253 Iowa 276, 279, 111 N.W.2d 664, 665 (1961) (emphasis
added).
443

4H
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[W]here a witness locates the place of the commission of a crime at a certain number of miles in a certain direction from a city or town, the court
shall take judicial notice that such point falls within or without the
boundaries of the county in which the crime is charged to have been
committed.44S

IV.

JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN THE JURY STAGE

Once the prosecution and defense have rested, the trial enters the
jury stage, the period during which the jury considers the evidence
presented and attempts to return a verdict. In this stage of the trial
process, the court has the duty to properly instruct the jury and submit the case to it for deliberation. In addition, the court has the continuing duty during the jury's deliberations to exercise proper discretion in taking whatever actions it deems necessary to protect the propriety of the jury process and assure that justice is done.

A. Instructing the Jury
The trial court has the duty to instruct the jury as to the points of
law applicable to the evidence developed as part of the record in the
instant case. 449 This must be done fairly and impartially, but with an
adequate explanation of the principles concerning the issues that are
essential to proper submission of the case.450

1. Evidentiary Basis
The trial court has no authority to give an instruction on a matter
for which no evidence at all was introduced at trial. This happened
recently in State v. Mays, 451 in which the jury was given an instruction on aiding and abetting although there was no evidence that "anyone else had anything to do with the crime." 452 Reversing the conviction for breaking and entering, the supreme court explained that the
unwarranted instruction "opened up to speculation participation by
others, without any proof of such participation."453 Because this
situation fell under the principle that "an instruction submitting an
issue unsubstantiated by evidence is generally prejudicial," it did not
matter to the supreme court that "under the evidence, defendant was
the only one who could possibly be convicted of committing the

448 State v. Caskey, 200 Iowa 1397, 1398, 206 N.W. 280, 281 (1925) (emphasis
added).
449 For examples of such jury instructions, see IOWA STATE BAR Ass'N SPECIAL
COMlll. ON UNIFORM COURT INSTRUCTIONS, IOWA UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS Nos.
1.2, 1.4 (1960).
450 State v. Cunha, 193 N.W.2d 106, 111 (Iowa 1971).
451204 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1973).
452 I d. at 864.
453 I d. at 865.
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crime."464 The mere possibility of jury speculation was enough to
warrant a reversal. 405
The trial court has some discretion in deciding whether to submit
an instruction on the defendant's affirmative defense, but this discretion is limited to a determination of whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant such an instruction. Once the court determines that
there is such evidence, the instruction must be given. In State v.
Broten, 456 for example, the supreme court held that an instruction on
self-defense
is not required in every case involving an argument or pushing such as
we have here. It is only when the evidence. taken as a whole, raises a

substantial issue of self··defense that an instruction on the subject need
be given.457

In the same case, the supreme court indicated that the standard of
review of the decision not to give the requested !instruction may be
somewhat more stringent than is usually the case in matters involving
the exercise of discretion, since it said that it would give the record
"careful examination to determine if the denial of the defendant's
request was justified."458 In Broten, however, the only applicable evidence indicated that the defendant was the aggressor and thus, since
self-defense was not available to him as a defense, the court's refusal
to give the instruction was proper.

2. Lesser Included Offenses
The trial court also .has some discretion in deciding whether to
submit instructions on lesser included offenses.459 Under a new standard announced recently by the Iowa Supreme Court, "the evidence
of the case must be considered in determining whether one offense

I d.
I d. Under certain circumstances, however, the trial court can give an instruction on aiding and abetting another in the coillililision of an offense even
though the defendant was specifically charged, instead, as the principal perpetrator and the latter was th1l state's theory of the case at trial Upholding such
an instruction in State v. Hamilton, 179 N.W.2d 369 (Iowa 1970), the supreme
court noted that
454
4GG

the pos~ibility of the wrongful act having been committed by the defendant's companion LeE.• was interjected into the case by the defendant
himself while testifying in his own behalf. Id. at 371.
176 N.W.2d 327 (Iowa 1970).
mId. at 831.
4GSJd.
4GO If the court, under the (•vidence, would be justified in directing a verdict
for either one of said offenses, then said offense need not be submitted.
State v. Pilcher, 158 N.W.2d 631, 634 (Iowa 1968).

456
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is includable within another." 460 Pursuant to this standard, " 'the
evidence must justify the submission of the included offense,' " 461 and
i£ there is such an evidentiary justification, then it is reversible error
to fail to instruct the jury on the appropriate lesser offenses.462
Accordingly, i£ the trial court determines that there is " 'no evidence
from which the jury could find the defendant guilty of the included
offense, then such included offense need not be submitted.' " 463 Conversely, it is also permissible to refuse to give a lesser included offense
instruction i£ the evidence shows that the defendant is clearly guilty
of the offense charged or is not guilty of any offense.464

3. Theories of the Case
The court has somewhat more discretion in deciding whether to
give a party's requested instruction concerning his theory of the case
than it does with either the affirmative defense or the lesser included
offense. Accordingly, it is proper for a court to refuse to give an
instruction that a "defendant's action in turning himself in to the law
enforcement officials [is] evidence of innocence."465 Similarly, the
trial court can refuse a defendant's request to call the jury's attention
to the fact that the defendant had not confessed nor made any other
admission of guilt. 466 Nor does the court have to instruct the jury
that the state, although contending that the defendant had attempted
an armed robbery, did not introduce a gun into evidence. 467 These
matters can be left to the parties' arguments. 468
Notwithstanding this latitude, the court must be careful that it
remains impartial in determining what it will tell the jury concerning
either party's theory of the case. Thus, the instructions given the jury
should not argue the case for either side or call special attention to matters of evidence thought to be favorable to one party, at least without
mention of related matters favorable to his adversary.469

Neither can the court give instructions casting doubts upon a party's
evidence or motives. Rather, it must confine itself to outlining the
law and leave the matters of weighing the evidence and determining
the credibility of the witnesses to the jury free from any judicial
460 State v. Hawkins, 203 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Iowa 1973).
461 Id.
462 See State v. Pilcher, 158 N.W.2d 631, 633 (Iowa 1968).
463 State v. Hawkins, 203 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Iowa 1973), quoting State v. Marshall, 206 Iowa 373, 375, 220 N.W. 106 (1928).
464Jd.; see State v. Franklin, 163 N.W2d 437, 440 (Iowa 1968).
465 State v. Cunha, 193 N.W2d 106, 111 (Iowa 1971}.
466 State v. Gillespie, 163 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Iowa 1969).
467 Id.
468 I d.
469 Id.
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suggestions. 470 For example, in State v. McCarty/ 11 the trial court
committed reversible error by instructing that "[t]be evidence of an
alibi should be scanned with caution."472 The supreme court concluded that this type of instruction
none too subtly suggest[s] that evidence of alibi is easily manufactured
and is, therefore, singling out one facet of the record evidence for special
mention, and invades the province of the jury in its function as sole judge
of the credibility of all of the witnesses.473

4. Cautionary Instructions
The g1vmg of a particularized cautionary instruction is another
action that "rests largely in the discretion of the trial court," 4 H and
the supreme court has indicated that a general instruction for the jury
to act impartially, without bias, sympathy, or prejudice in favor of or
against either party/75 should be sufficient "in almost all instances."476
It is up to the trial court, in its discretion, to determine if "something
arise[s] during the trial which might indicate a need for a specific
instruction ..•." 477 Thus, in the absence of special circumstances, it is
proper for a court to refuse to give a black defendant's proffered instruction that the law is the same for blacks and whites, 478 since there
is no general requirement that a court instruct the jury on "all matters
which might incite prejudice against a defendant in specific areas."479
One major exception to this general rule leaving cautionary instructions to the trial court's discretion is the matter of jury instructions
concerning prior felony c·onvictions of defendants who testify in their
own behalf. Although it is clear that if a defendant admits, on crossexamination, that he has been convicted of one or more felonies prior
to the instant prosecution, such an admission may be used "to impeach
the witness and for no other purpose."480 However, until the recent
decision of State v. May~:,481 it was not clear whether a court had to
give an instruction to thE~ jury to that effect. In :Mays, however, the
supreme court made it clear, albeit in dictum, that, prospectively from
HO See generally IowA STAi'E BAR Ass'N Sl'ECIAL CoMM. oN UNIFORM CoURT INSTRUCTIONS, IowA UNIForu.t JuRY INsTRUCTION No. 1.3 (1960).
471179 'N.W.2d 548 (Iowa 1£170).
472 Id. at 553.
473 I d.
See generally IowA STATE BAR Ass'N Sl'EC:U..L Coli!Jit. ON UNIFORM CouRT
INSTRUCTIONS, IOWA UNIFORM ,TURY INSTRUCTION No. 1.5 (1960).
414 State v. Shepard, 255 Io·;va 1218, 1231, 124 N.W.2d 712, 719 (1964).
47G IowA STATE BAR Ass'N SI•ECIAL Col\IJ\t, ON UNIFORM CoURT INsTRUCTIONs, IowA
UNIFORllt JURY INSTRUCTION No. 1.6 (1960).
476 State v. Shepard, 255 Iowa 1218, 1231, 124 N.W.2d 712, 720 (1964).
mId., 124 N.W.2d at 720.
11s I d. at 1230-31, 124 N.W.2d at 719.
HoId. at 1231, 124 N.W.2d at 719-20.
4SOState v. Anderson, 159 N.W.2d 809, 812 (Iowa 1968).
481 204 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1973).
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February 21, 1973, "such an instruction must be given by trial courts
on their own initiative."482
5. Verdict-Urging Instructions

It is also proper, although not required, for a court to give a verdicturging instruction,483 provided the court does not in any way imply
what the verdict should be.484 In State v. Hackett/' 85 the trial court
cautioned the jurors that '~[a]n inconclusive trial is always highly
undesirable," and that they should "not hesitate to re-examine [their]
own views and change [their] opinions if convinced it [sic] is erroneous."486 The supreme court approved this admonition, noting that
because the instruction was given to the jury before it began deliberating, the charge was "not subject to the abuses said to attend the giving
of an 'Allen' charge,"487 the so-called "dynamite" charge given to
deadlocked juries to encourage them to reach a verdict.488

B. Jury Deliberations489
Once the trial court has instructed the jury and committed the case
to it for deliberation, it is still under a continuing duty to supervise
the conduct of the trial and ensure the integrity .of the jury process.
To this end, it must be continually aware "that the jury is to be above
suspicion and that any practice which brings its proceedings under
suspicion is to be prohibited."490 However, concomitant with this
responsibility, it must also recognize the general rule that "misconduct
482 I d.
4 83

at 867.

See IOWA STATE BAR Ass'N SPECIAL CoMM. ON UNIFORM COURT INSTRUCTIONS,

IowA UNIFOIU\1 JURY INSTRUCTION No. 1.1 (1960). A verdict-urging instruction as
part of the original instructions is endorsed in ABA PRoJECT ON MINIMm.t STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY § 5.4(a) (Approved Draft 1968). Included in the commentary thereto is the statement: [I]t is
most appropriate for the court to instruct the jury initially as to the nature of its
duties in the course of deliberations, and section 5.4(a) so provided. Id., Comment.
484 See geneTally IowA STATE BAR Ass'N SPECIAL CoMM. ON UNIFORM CoURT INSTRUCTIONS, IOWA UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTION No. 1.3 (1960).
485 200 N.W.2d 493 (Iowa 1972).
486 Id. at 496.

487 Id.
488

But see text accompanying notes 515-29 infra.

489 See

ABA PROJECT ON Mnmro1.t STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTICE, STANDARDS
RE:r.ATING TO THE FuNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE § 5.12(a) (Approved Draft 1972):
The trial judge should provide assistance to the jury during deliberation
by permitting materials to be taken to the jury room and responding to
requests to review evidence and for additional instructions, under appropriate safeguards as provided in ABA Standards, Trial by Jury §§ 5.1,
5.2 and 5.3. Id.

490 State

v. Carey, 165 N.W.2d 27, 29 (Iowa 1969}.

1086

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

with respect to the jury, whether it be by litigant, counsel, or officer
of the court, will not be grounds for a new trial unless prejudice is
shown."491
State v. Carey 492 is an example of a case in which a conviction was
reversed because of the appearance of possible improper influence on
the jury. The bailiff had placed a sign in the jury room: "Coffee will
be furnished in the jury room by the county clerk and the county
attorney." 493 It appeared that the county attorney had intended to
make the coffee available to anybody in the courthouse and that the
sign had been placed the:re without his consent or knowledge. Although
absolving the county attorney of any misconduct, the supreme court
felt that "the result unfortunately is nevertheless the same. As far
as the jury was concerned, coffee was furnished with the compliments
of the prosecutor for the State."494 The supreme court reiterated: "All
blandishments, or apparent blandishments, all attempts to ingratiate
one side or the other with the jury must be prevented."495 The fact
that only a cup of coffee was involved in Carey was immaterial, "for
tomorrow something of perhaps greater value might be tendered." 496
The fact that the conduct was innocent was also considered immaterial. The effect would be the same on a juror or a member of the
public as if it had been "an intentional attempt to secure favor" with
the jurors.497 Thus, a defendant's conviction was reversed in State v.
Faught, 498 where the sheriff and his deputy, both of whom had been
key state's witnesses at the trial, transported the jurors during their
deliberations from the jury room to a restaurant where they visited
with the jurors both before and during the meal. Recognizing there
was no allegation of intentional wrong, the supreme court nevertheless pointed out:
it was imperative that the verdict be based solely on the evidence and the
court's instructions. To permit the sheriff and his deputies, under the
facts here, to associate with the jurors after the case was submitted, before, during and after the evening meal, was not conducive to this end.499

Not every outside contact with the jurors during their deliberations
necessitates a new trial, however. In State v. Bruno,S00 for example,
the record indicated that the sheriff "may have spoken to one of the
401 Id.
402165 N.W.2d 27 (Iowa 1£69).
403 I d. at 28.
404Id. at 29.
405 Id. at 30.
406 I d.; see State v. Neville, 227 Iowa 329, 331-32, 288 N.W. 83, 84-85 (1939).
407165 N.W.2d at 30.
498 254 Iowa 1124, 120 N.W.2d 426 (1963).
4oo Id. at 1134, 120 N.W.2d at 432.
uoo 204 N.W.2d 879 (Iowa 1973).
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jurors" while unlocking the door to the jury room, but "there was no
further contact between the sheriff and the jury."501 Affirming the
defendant's conviction, the supreme court said:
While the sheriff's conduct was objectionable and avoidable, his slight encounter with the jurors does not appear to constitute the requisite conduct that gives rise, or appears to give rise, to the kind of "doubt or disrespect" indicating prejudice.5o2

As a part of its aforementioned eontin:uing supervisory responsibilities, it is proper for the trial court to make periodic inquiries of the
jury to determine whether they are making progress towards reaching
a verdict. The Iowa Supreme Court takes the position that a trial
court properly can inquire "as to whether there is ariy likelihood the
jury can reach a verdict,'' after the jury has been deliberating "for
some time." 503 It also recognizes, however, that "too many inquiries
in a short period of time might raise an inference of undue pressure
and amount to an abuse of the trial court's discretion." 504 State v.
McConnell505 indicates that reversible error on this point requires an
affirmative showing that the court's inquiries resulted in an unfair
trial The supreme court noted, for example, that "there were no
affidavits of jurors which even suggested they were aware of the
court's concern as to the time of their deliberation." 506 Accordingly,
since no prejudice was shown, there was no basis for overturning the
defendant's conviction.
In addition to inquiring of the jury whether they are making progress toward reaching a verdict, the court, in its discretion, may give
additional instructions while the jury is deliberating.507 However, this
can only be done "in the presence of or after notice to counsel," and
the entire procedure is governed by the same rules applicable to the
giving of instructions prior to jury deliberation.508
Both the correct and incorrect ways to give additional instructions
have been illustrated in recent decisions of the Iowa Supreme Court.
In State v. Broten,509 the jury requested an additional instruction after
deliberating for some time. The instruction was given after defense
counsel had examined it for any objections as to its content. The
supreme court affirmed, overruling the defendant's principal contention

Id. at 885.
502 Id.
50 3 State v. McConnell, 178 N.W.2d 386, 390 (Iowa 1970).

501

504[d.

505 Id. at 390-91.
sos Id. at 390.
soT IowA R. Crv.

P. 197.
50S[d.
509176 N.W.2d 827 (Iowa 1970).
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that the court had forestalled its discretion to give this additional instruction because it refused to include it in the original instructions. 510
In marked contrast, ti.J.e judge in State v. Grady 511 recalled the deliberating jury himself and gave an additional instruction, without notifying the defendant or his counsel. 512 Reversing, the supreme court said
this procedure deprived the defendant of his right of personal presence
at his trial.m Noting 1hat the additional instruction was given after
10 hours of jury deliberation and that a verdict of guilty was reached
within an hour thereafter, the supreme court determined that "the
conduct described is so tainted with suspicion as to constitute prejudicial error requiring a new trial." 5 u
One particular type of additional instruction deserves special attention since it is given to a deadlocked jury.515 The so-called Allen or
"dynamite" charge516 is used to urge a jury to break its deadlock and
thus to reach a verdict by encouraging each dissenting juror, in no
uncertain terms, to rea~:sess his position with a view to adopting the
position held by the majority jurors, if such can be done without violating individual conscience.517 Although some appellate courts have
recently condemned its ·use, m the Iowa Supreme Court recently rea£!i10 Having concluded undt~r this record [that the defendant] was not. entitled to an instruction on self-defense, the failure to permit him to
argue that issue before the jury was in no way prejudicial to him. Id. at
832.
UU183 N.W.2d 707 (Iowa :l971).
51 2 Id. at 709.
513Id. at 710; see IowA ConE § 777.19 (1973).
m 183 N.W.2d at 710.
515 For an example of such a jury instruction see IowA STATE BAR Ass'N
SPECIAL Cor.mt. ON UNIFORM CoURT INSTRUCTIONS, IOWA UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS
No. 1.1 (1960). But see the restrictive language in ABA PROJECT ON Mnm.ror.!
STANDARDS FOR CRDIID-lAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE FuNCTION OF THE
TRIAL JUDGE§ 5.1l(b) (Approved Draft 1972):
The court may recall the jury after they have retired and give them
additional instructions in order: (i) to correct or withdraw an erroneous
instruction; (ii) to clarify an ambiguous instruction; or (iii) to inform the
jury on a point of law which should have been covered in the original
instructions. Id.
The standard in § 5.12 (b) leaves no doubt:
In dealing with what appears to be a deadlocked jury, the trial judge
should avoid instructions which imply that a majority view is the correct
one, by complying with ABA Standards, Trial by Jury § 5.4. Id. §
5.12(b).
61 6 See Allen v. United Sta·:es, 164 U.S. 492, 501-02 (1896).
517State v. Quitt, 204 N.W.:?d 913 (Iowa 1973).
5 1SSee Evans v. State,- Ark.--, 478 S.W.2d 874, 875-76 (1972). See also
ABA PROJECT ON Mnur.ror.r STANDARDS FOR CRDIIINAL JusTicE, STANDARDS RELATING
'1'0 TRIAL BY JURY § 5.4(b) (Approved Draft 1968). This definitive statement is
made in the commentary accompanying § 5.4(a):
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firmed, in State v. Qu,itt, that the giving of the Allen charge, followed by a conviction, does not per se deprive the defendant of a fair
trial. Instead, the trial court "has considerable discretion in determining whether it should be given ...." 520 However, once the court
has given the Allen charge, the supreme court will determine after the
fact whether the giving of this instruction was appropriate, based upon
its subsequent effect. The ultimate test upon appellate review is
519

whether the giving of a verdict-urging instruction [after the jury bas hegun its deliberation] forced or helped to force an agreement, or merely
started a new train of real deliberation which ended the disagreement.521

This means that the trial court, in exercising its discretion to give
the instruction, must give special consideration to the length of the
deliberation at this juncture. If the duration has been extraordinarily
lengthy at the time that a deadlock is reported, the trial court should
carefully consider whether the length of the deliberation can be attributed to any special circumstances, such as complexity of the issue,
amount of the evidence to be considered, a jury's request for additional instructions ori substantive points, or whether it stems from a
substantial dispute over the correct inferences to be drawn from the
evidence submitted. If the latter, the court should be reluctant to
give the Allen charge because of its potential for "browbeating" those
jurors who happen to be in the minority, however reasonable their
position may be. This cautious approach is advisable in light of the
supreme court's observation in State v. Pierce522 that:
[W]here the disagreement is of more than ordinary and usual duration,
and after the giving of such an instruction as this, a verdict is reached in
a time short in comparison with the duration of the disagreement, a presumption arises that the instruction was prejudicial; that, . . . • there
should be a reversal where in such circumstances, "there is no competent
evidence in the record to indicate that the jurors . • . were brought to a
final agreement resulting in a verdict, other than through the coercive
influence of this instruction, and the long hours of involuntary servitude
to which they were subjected, with the tentative suggestion of longer
confinement in the event they failed to agree."523

Upon appeal, "each case must be decided on its own circumstances."52 ~
One factor the supreme court considers is "the total elapsed time between the giving of the verdict-urging instruction and the return of
[T]he Advisory Committee has concluded that the [Allen charge] should
not be given to a jury which has been unable to agree after some deliberations. Id. § 5.4(a), Comment.
519 204 N.W.2d 913 (Iowa 1973).
520 I d. at 914.
521 Id.
522178 Iowa 417, 159 N.W. 1050 (1916).
523Id. at 427, 159 N.W. at 1055 (citations omitted).
524 State v. Quitt, 204 N.W.2d 913, 914 (Iowa 1973).
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the verdict." 625 In Stat~~ v. Quitt, this period was approximately 4
hours, and the supreme court concluded that this "rather demonstratively negatives" any suggestion of coercion since this interval "indicates the jury gave additional consideration to the record before a
verdict was reached." 626
The specific content o£ the verdict-urging instruction can also be
crucial. The supreme court has "intimated strongly" that such instructions are erroneous at t:he time they are given if "their language
(1) indicates an intention to coerce into agreement, or (2) suggests
that the jury would be kept together until it agreed." 527 However, the
language in the Iowa Bar's Uniform "verdict-urging" instructions,
which was approved in State v. Quitt/ 28 refers to "the desirability of
agreement if possible," a:; well as the direction for the jury to retire
to the jury room "and try to arrive at a verdict." 529
The special considerations attending the use of the Allen charge
aside, the general problems of marathon jury deliberations are a
matter left to the trial court's sound discretion. The length and lateness of deliberation are c~ontrolled neither by statute nor by judicial
fiat. Instead, the trial court can exercise its discretion in the particular circumstances as to both "the total length of jury deliberation"
and "the length of deliberation without normal time to sleep and
rest."aso Nevertheless, th,e supreme court, reversing the conviction in
State v. Albers,531 has opi:.'led that "unreasonably late deliberations by
a jury are not conducive to a fair trial." Thus refusing to leave the
matter entirely in the trial court's discretion, the supreme court laid
down this guideline: "Th•e criterion is not the number of hours which
a jury uses in deliberatio.n, but the conditions under which such deliberation takes place."532
525 Id.
526 Id.
527 State v. Pierce, 178 Iowa 417, 424, 159 N.W. 1050, 1054 (1916).
628 204 N.W.2d 913 (Iowa 1973).
52o See IowA SrATE BAR Ass'N SPECIAL Col\m. ON UNIFOror CoURr INsraucrroNs,
IowA UNIFORllt JURY !NSl'RUCl'ION No. 1~ (1960).
530State v. Albers, 174 N.W.2d 649, 653 (Iowa 1970).
531Jd. at 655; accord, State v. Kittelson, 164 N.W.2d 157, 167 (Iowa 1969).
632174 N.W.2d at 653, quoting State v. Green, 254 Iowa 1379, 1387, 121 N.W.2d
89, 93 (1963). By way of contrast with State v. Albers, the supreme court in two
civil cases has upheld the trial court's exercise of their discretion in granting
new trials because of late-hour deliberations of the jury. See Kracht v. Hoppner, 258 Iowa 912, 140 N.W.2d 913 (1966); Coulthard v. Keenan, 256 Iowa 890,
129 N.W.2d 597 (1964). In a related development, the supreme court has held
(in a civil case) that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring
the jury "to deliberate into Sunday before being discharged." While not recommending deliberation on Sunday, the court noted that such practice seemed
statutorily permissible. Lesserlhop v. Norton, 261 Iowa 44, 57, 153 N.W.2d 107,
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Subject to the concurrence of both the defendant and the state, the
trial court, in its discretion, can excuse a juror during deliberation
even though this results in submitting the case to less than a statutorily prescribed full jury. As pointed out by a federal appellate
court:
The defendant here did not waive • . . his right to a unanimous verdict.
He did have a unanimous verdict. His waiver, knowingly and advisedly
given, was of his right to a jury of 12.533

Similarly, the Iowa Supreme Court has declared it
settled doctrine in this State that a defendant in a criminal action, with
the consent of the State and court, may waive a statute enacted for his
benefit.534

Although such an expeditious procedure has been followed most
commonly when a juror has become ill,535 it has even been allowed
when a juror, while not disclosing how the jury was leaning, reported
that he was the primary holdout and would not change his mind. 536
This latter case, however, may not be persuasive in Iowa, since the
juror was dismissed pursuant to a federal procedural rule permitting
the parties to stipulate to a jury of less than 12 at any time before its
rendition of verdict.537

C. Taking the Verdict
Once the jury has returned a verdict, either party may have the jury
polled before the court accepts the verdict.538 The court must do so,
if either party requests it, and the statutory scheme provides that
"each member thereof shall be asked whether it is his verdict." 539
Nevertheless, in light of State v. McConnell,540 the trial court seemingly is granted some latitude in the way it actually polls the jury. In
McConnell, rather than addressing the jurors individually, the court,
on its own initiative following the defense counsel's decision not to poll
the jury, addressed the jury as a body: "Is this your unanimous verdict? I£ so, raise your right hand." 541 Because it was clear that every
115 (1967). The statutory authorization for such a practice can be derived from
IowA CODE § 605.18 (1973).
5 33 United States v. Vega, 447 F.2d 698, 701 (2d Cir. 1971).
534State v. Kaufman, 51 Iowa 578, 579, 2 N.W. 275, 275-76 (1879).
535 See State v. Browman, 191 Iowa 608, 633, 182 N.W. 823, 833-34 (1921); State
v. Kaufman, 51 Iowa 578, 2 N.W. 275 (1879).
536United States v. Vega, 447 F.2d 698, 700-01 (2d Cir. 1971).
537 Id. at 701; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b).
538 IowA CODE § 785.15 (1973).
539 Id. If any jury member answers negatively, "the jury must be sent out
for further deliberation." Id.
540 178 N.W.2d 386 (Iowa 1970).
541 I d. at 390.
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juror raised his hand, the supreme court considered the polling requirement "substantially complied with." 642 However, the court added
that the defense couns·=l had apparently waived any irregularity, so
it is not clear that the supreme court will uphold "substantial com·
pliance" in all circumstances.
D. Rendering Judgment on a Verdict of Not Guilty

Upon the jury's retmn of a verdict of not guilty and the court's acceptance thereof (following the polling of the jury, if any), the court
"must render judgment of acquittal immediately."548 If, however, the
jury's verdict of not guilty is based upon a finding of insanity, this fact
must be stated in the verdict.544 The trial court is then authorized to
determine whether a defendant acquitted on this ground should be
commited to a mental institution. The court may do this if it finds that
defendant's discharge would be "dangerous to the public peace and
safety."545 This determination is made by the court without the requirement of a jury trial.S 46 This determination is essentially one of
fact, and the supreme court does not interfere with the determination
made so long as the trial court shows some factual basis therefore. 547

V. JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND PRESEN'XENCE APPLICATIONS
In contrast with the requirement that a court enter a judgment immediately upon acceptance of a verdict of not guilty, if the defendant
has been convicted, upon a plea or verdict~ the court is required by
statute to fix a time for pronouncing judgment. 543 The statutory waiting period between conviction and sentencing permits the defendant to
file any presentence motions he desires, and also gives the court an
opportunity to obtain a presentence report. In this section, we will
discuss the presentence motions a defendant may file. The presentence
report, being an integral part of the sentencing process itself, is dis-

Id.
IowA CoDE § 789.1 (19:13).
544 I d. § 785.19. This special verdict form is one of the few exceptions to the
standard general verdict fc•rms (of either "guilty'' or "not guilty'') prescribed
by law. I d. § 785.1; see State v. Fagan, 190 N.W.2d 800, 802-03 (Iowa 1971) (proper for trial court to refuse to submit requested verdict form of "not guilty because of entrapment'').
545 IowA CoDE § 785.19 (W73).
546 The constitutionality o.f the nonjury trial proceeding was upheld in Hansen
v. Haugh, 260 Iowa 236, 244-47, 149 N.W.2d 169, 174-75 (1967).
541 State v. Allan, 166 N.V7.2d 752, 759 (Iowa 1969). The court's :finding is influenced by a presumption that insanity, once established, continues until the
contrary is shown by the party asserting a return to sanity. Id. at 758.
548 IowA CODE § 789.2 (1973); see notes 611-15 infra and accompanying text.
u42

543
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cussed in the immediately following section, "Judicial Discretion in
the Sentencing Process."549

A. Bill of Exceptions
As a prelude to, or concomitant with, the filing of any presentence
motions, either the defendant or the state may file a bill of exceptions. 550 This bill, which may also be used to lay a foundation for a
subsequent appeal or application for postconviction relief, is designed
"to make the proceedings or evidence appear of record which would
not otherwise so appear." 551 Because "it is not necessary to except to
any action or decision of the court so appearing of record," 552 the bill
of exceptions is applicable only when either party wishes to have heretofore unrecorded oral evidence made part of the record. 553 Because
the general practice is not to record the voir dire examination of prospective jurors,554 the opening and closing argument of counsel,555 or
the polling of jurors after the verdict/ 56 any assignment of error based
upon incidents or rulings during these proceedings will not be considered unless the objectionable portion thereof is made part of the record
through such a bill (or a bill of bystanders) .557 Neither an affidavit
by counse!S 58 nor by the official court reporter559 is sufficient.
Although the bill of exceptions allows the incorporation into the
record of allegedly objectionable evidence, it serves only that purpose
and is not an after-the-fact curative measure that can be substituted
for the party's failure to object to an alleged impropriety in a timely
manner. In State v. Horsey, 560 for example, the defendant waited unSee notes 622-56 infra and accompanying text.
CODE § 786.3 (1973).
786.1.
552 I d. § 786.2.
5 53 For the grounds for exceptions see id. §§ 786.3, .4.
One such ground for
exception is the court's alleged improper action "[i]n deciding any matter of
law, not purely discretionary on the trial of the issue." I d. § 786.3 (4).
55 4 See State v. LaMar, 260 Iowa 957, 965, 151 N.W.2d 496, 501 (1967).
555 See State v. Horsey, 180 N.W.2d 459, 460 (Iowa 1970).
5 5 6 See State v. Morelock, 164 N.W.2d 819, 823 (1969).
557 State v. Hemrick, 62 Iowa 414, 414-15, 17 N.W. 594 (1883):
5 49

550 IowA
551 I d. §

The only way oral evidence introduced on the trial of a cause can be
preserved and identified, for the purposes of an appeal to this court, is
by a bill of exceptions, signed by the trial judge.
But see IowA ConE § 786.6 (1973) (bill of bystanders).
55s State v. LaMar, 260 Iowa 957, 966, 151 N.W.2d 496. 501 (1967).
The alleged objectionable remarks cannot be regarded as a part of the
record when set out simply in an affidavit attached to a motion for new
trial. The language alleged to be objectionable should be presented in
a bill of exceptions.
559

See State v. Hemrick, 62 Iowa 414, 17 N.W. 594 (1883).
N.W.2d 459 (Iowa 1970).

56o 180
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til filing a motion for new trial to bring to the court's attention the
matter of misconduct by the prosecutor in the unrecorded closing
argument. The defendant set out the objectionable part of the argument in his bill of exceptions, but he made no objection at trial. The
trial court overruled the defendant's motion for new trial and the ruling was affirmed on appeal. The supreme court said:
We have permitted alleged impropriety in final arguments to be set out
in this fashion. • . . However . . . the fact that such matter may become
part of the record by way of bill of exceptions does not eliminate the
necessity for having made proper objection at the time the error allegedly occurred.5Gl

The only opportunity for the exercise of judicial discretion in relation to the bill lies in the trial court's decision whether to sign it. The
Code provides that the eourt "shall sign it if true," 562 thus leaving the
court some latitude if it is not convinced of the truth of the matters
set out in a bill presented for its signature. When the court refuses
to sign the bill of exceptions, the moving party can substitute a bill of
bystanders/ 63 which must be signed by at least two attorneys or other
officers of the court or 'by two or more disinterested bystanders.564
It is not clear what effect the trial court's refusal to sign the bill of
exceptions will have in every case, but the fact that the court refused
to sign was given some consideration in State v. Horsey. 565 The defendant set forth in a bill of exceptions the objectionable remarks by
the prosecutor in closing arguments, but the court refused to sign it.
The defendant then pro,::eeded on a bill of bystanders-which must
state that the judge refused to sign the bill of exceptions.566 Commenting on the trial court's refusal to sign the bill of exceptions, the supreme court said:
Neither can we disregard the fact that there is serious disagreement over
the language actually used [in the closing arguments]. The trial court
refused to sign the defendant's bill of exceptions. . . . Quite obviously
court and counsel were at odds over the accuracy of the recitations in the
661Jd. at 460 (citations omitted); accord, State v. LaMar, 260 Iowa 957, 967, 151
N.W.2d 496, 502 (1967) :

Defendant made no objections when the incident occurred. Objections to
claimed improper conduct in argument must be made at the time. They
are too late when raised for the first time in motion for new trial.
562 IowA CoDE § 786.5 (1978) (emphasis added).
563Jd. § 786.6.
564Jd.

The bill cannot be signed and sworn to by an attorney for the defense
after the judge's refusal to do so. State v. LaMar, 260 Iowa 957, 967, 151
N.W.2d 496, 502 (1967).
u6u180 N.W.2d 459 (Iowa 1S70).
u66 IowA CODE § 786.6 (1973).
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bill. This is, at best, an unsatisfactory record to ask our acceptance of
defendant's disputed version of what was argued.567

B. Motion in Arrest of Judgment

Unlike the bill of exceptions, which serves an essentially appellate
purpose, that is, to clarify and amplify the existing trial record with a
view to prosecuting an appeal, there are several presentence motions
on which a trial court may be called to rule which serve primarily to
give the court an opportunity to correct any alleged errors while the
case is still at the triai level. One such motion is the motion in arrest
of judgment, an application to the trial court that no judgment be rendered upon the verdict or plea of guilty. This motion may be made
by the defendant, either before or after judgment. The trial court
shall grant it "when upon the whole record no legal judgment can be
pronounced."568 In addition, the court may arrest the judgment sua
sponte on the same grounds. 569
It is immaterial that the statute authorizing the motion contains no
specific grounds delineating the situations where "no legal judgment
can be pronounced," since this is a matter of law determinable generally through other statutory guidelines and case law. For example,
the supreme court has said:
Thus if upon the whole record here it is determined, as defendant contends, that the plea of guilty was not voluntarily entered, but was procured by undue influence, coercion and fraud, no valid judgment or sentence could be pronounced herein.570

On the other hand, the motion in arrest of judgment "cannot be sustained upon the grounds which would be grounds for demurrer." 571
Thus, the remedy in situations of this type is an appeal from the final
judgment. In other words, a motion in arrest of judgment is too late
for the defendant to raise such issues as defects in the· presentment of
the indictment.572
In making its determination whether "no legal judgment can be pronounced," the court is given some latitude. As a starting point, the
defendant's motion "must point out wherein the deficiency exists."578
Assuming that the alleged ground is sufficiently particularized, the
court must then determine whether this ground would, as a matter
567180 N.W.2d at 461.
568 See IowA CoDE § 788.1 (1973). "The motion may be made at any time before
or within ninety days after judgment." Id. § 788.2. For a discussion of the
peculiar aspects of a motion in arrest of judgment made after judgment see text
accompanying notes 759-67 infra.
569 IowA CoDE § 788.3 (1973).
570State v. Bastedo, 253 Iowa 103,107,111 N.W.2d 255,257 (1961).
571 State v. Bading, 236 Iowa 468, 472, 17 N.W.2d 804, 807 (1945).
572 See id., 17 N.W.2d at 807.
573 State v. Stennett, 220 Iowa 388, 395, 260 N.W. 732, 736 (1935).
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of law, constitute a bar to pronouncement of legal judgment. If the
court decides that it would not, then the motion must be overruled
and final judgment ente!red.674 If, on the other hand, the trial court
determines that the motion does raise an issue which is a proper
ground for barring pronouncement of a legal judgment, the court
would abuse its discretion by overruling the motion without first holding a hearing, if requested, to permit the defendant to present evidence
in support of his contentions,575
Once the controverted. matters have been adequately placed before
the trial court, it can 1hereupon exercise its discretion in deciding
whether the evidence indicates that no legal judgment can be pronounced.576 If it overrules the motion, appellate review of its action
is quite limited, since the supreme court confines its task on appeal
to determining "only whether there is substantial evidence supporting
the findings and conclusions reached by the trial court . . . ."577 On
the other hand, if the trial court concludes that no legal judgment can
be entered, then it has no discretion; under the statute, it must grant
the motion. 578 After granting it, the trial court must arrest the entering of the judgment of conviction, and, in its discretion, after arresting the judgment, order that the defendant be "held to answer the
offense in like manner as upon a preliminary examination,"579 which
574 This decision is appealable, even without the entry of the final judgment.
See State v. Alverson, 105 Ic•wa 152, 156, 74 N.W. 770, 771 (1898). See also text
accompanying notes 576-84 infra.
57u See State v. Hellickson, 162 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Iowa 1968); State v. Bastedo,
253 Iowa 103, 106, 111 N.W.2d 255, 257 (1961). The state must also be -afforded
an opportunity to rebut the defendant's evidence. However, the fact that the
state offers no resistance to a defendant's motion in arrest of judgment "does not
mean defendant's testimony stands alone or uncontroverted." State v. Hellickson, supra, at 394.
n1a State v. Rinehart, 255 Iowa 1132, 1138, 125 N.W. 2d 242, 246 (1963):

These matters were placed before the court at the time of the hearing
on the motion in arrest of judgment. That it found them 'vithout merit
is shown by the fact that motion was denied. In such circumstances, the
trial court's findings of fact are binding upon us.
577 State v. Hellickson, 162 N.W.2d 390, 394 (Iowa 1968); accord, State v. Bastedo, 253 Iowa 103, 107, 111 N.W.2d 255, 257 (1961):

If the court accepts and considers the competent and material testimony
introduced and, after weighing the same, finds it is either sufficient or
insufficient to sustain the burden of proof necessarily devolved upon applicant, that determination is usually binding upon us.
578 IOWA CODE § 788.1 (1973).
579Id. § 788.4. In State v. Alverson, 105 Iowa 152, 74 N.W. 770 (1898), the record showed that the trial court sustained the motion in arrest of judgment
and ordered the defendant held to appear before the next grand jury.
The ruling on the motion put an end to all proceedings on that indictment . . . . [T]he ruling did operate to discharge the defendant from
further prosecution in the pending case •..• Id. at 156, 74 N.W at 771.
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could lead to recharging and reprosecution.
Because an order in arrest of judgment "serves to place a defendant
in the same situation or position as he was before commencement of
the prosecution,"580 the court cannot make its arrest of judgment
operate as an acquittal. 581 This was done in State v. Deets,582 and the
supreme court declared that the trial court's entry of a post-conviction
judgment of acquittal "was totally void and of no legal force or effect
because not permitted by law."583 Accordingly, the case was remanded "for entry of lawful judgment . . . ."584
C. Motion for a New Trial
In contrast to the trial court's rather limited discretionary authority
in ruling on a motion in arrest of judgment, it has considerable discretion in ruling upon a motion for a new trial,S 85 especially when the
motion is heard by the judge who presided at the trial. 586 This motion,
which can only be made by the defendant,587 must be made before
judgment.588 When a new trial is granted, the parties are placed "in
the same position as if no trial had been had," 589 except that a new
trial on the same indictment is specifically authorized for "re-examination of the issue in the same court before another jury."590
The trial court can grant a new trial only on one or more of eight
statutorily enumerated grounds. These include: (1) in a felony prosecution, trial without the defendant's presence; (2) out-of-court
580Stat.e v. Deets, 195 N.W.2d 118, 123 (Iowa 1972).
means that relief in the trial court from a verdict of guilty (or guilty
plea) is limited to arrest of judgment, .a new trial, or postconviction relief. Id.
at 124.
5s2 195 N.W.2d 118 (Iowa 1971).
sss I d. at 125.
584 Id.
5 85 State v. Wheelock, 218 Iowa 178, 182, 254 N.W. 313, 316 (1934):
581 This

The matter of granting a new trial for alleged misconduct of counsel
and the many incidents that happen in the trial of a case is peculiarly
within the discretion of the trial court.
586 State v. Benson, 247 Iowa 406, 410, 72 N.W.2d 438, 440 (1955).
5S7IowA ConE§ 787.2 (1973). In civil cases, on the other hand, either party
can file a motion for a new trial and the granting of a new trial can be reversed
upon appeal with the case remanded for reinstatement of the verdict and judgment in favor of the appellee. See Lind v. Schenley Industries, 278 F .2d 79, 88-90
(3d Cir. 1960); accord, Meyer v. Noel, 206 N.W. 290 (Iowa 1925) (not officially
reported) (burden on appellant, in attempting to get overturned a motion granting a new trial, to show that the lower court's action was not warranted under
any of the grounds specified in the motion).
588 IOWA ConE § 787.2 (1973).
589 Id. § 787.4.
590 Id. § 787.1. Cf. note 579 supra.
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receipt, by the jury, of unauthorized evidence; (3) juror misconduct;
(4) use, by the jury, of unauthorized means to reach a verdict; (5)
misdirection of the jury on a material matter of law by the court; (6)
verdict contrary to the law or evidence; (7) re.t."Usal, by the court, to
properly instruct the jury; and (8) failure of the defendant to receive
a fair and impartial trial "from any other cause."591 Most of the multitudinous issues which can be raised under the guise of one or more
of these eight categories are discussed on an individual topical basis
elsewhere in this Articl•:, but three others are included here for illustrative purposes.

1. Newly Discovered Evidence
One ground on which a motion for a new trial may be based is that
newly discovered evidence has come to light which has a bearing on
the question of the defendant's guilt. The problem of newly discovered evidence bears on the question of whether the defendant has
received a fair and impartial trial, 502 and although such motions "are
not favored in the law and should be closely scrutinized and granted
sparingly,"593 the trial court hearing such a motion is afforded wide
discretion, the exercise of which will not be interfered with unless "it
is reasonably clear that such discretion was abused." 594
In determining whether to grant a motion for new trial because of
newly discovered evidence, the trial court must determine
"whether [the new evidence] is sufficient to justify the trial court, in the
exercise of legal discretbn, in concluding there is a reasonable probability of a different result upon another trial."sos

In effect, the trial courf; must determine whether the new evidence
adds anything that is both new and materially different than the evidence introduced at trial.

2. Mati;ers Inhering in the Verdict
Influence on the verdic-t through juror misconduct is another ground
which can support a motion for a new trial, and it is "within province
of the [trial] court to deny a new trial for such alleged misconduct." 596
I d. § 787.a.
State v. Compiano, 261 Iowa 509, 516, 154 N.W.2d 845, 849 (1967).
5os Id., 154 N.W.2d at 849.
uo1 Id. at 515-16, 154 N.W.2d. at 849.
505 Id. at 520, 154 N.W.2d at 851, quoting Westergard v. Des Moines Ry., 243
Iowa 495, 500, 52 N.W.2d 39, 43 (1952).
5oo State v. Reynolds, 201 Iowa 10, 13, 206 N.W. 635, 636 (1925); see State v.
White, 205 Iowa 373, 376, 217 N.W. 871, 872 (1928):
!lOl

502

We have held ... that statements of fact [made] by a juror during deliberation, bearing on a material issue in the cause and made of the
juror's personal knowledge, constitutes error that will vitiate the verdict.
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Limiting this discretion, however, the supreme court has held that
jurors' affidavits cannot impeach a verdict.597 Nor can it be shown
"in such [a] manner, to avoid the verdict, that a juror did not assent to
it, misunderstood the com·fs instrnctions or the testimony, was unduly
influenced by statements of fellow jurors, was mistaken in his calculations or judgment, or other matters resting alone in the juror's breast.
These all inhere in the verdict."59~

In one case, for exa..rnple, some jurors took an unauthorized inspection
of an area material to the case and then discussed it in the jury room.
The trial court held a hearing after three other jurors filed affidavits
to this effect, but overruled the defendant's motion for new trial.590
In reviewing, the supreme court said that "[c]ertainly if this discussion had been prejudicial to defendant, it would have been set out in
the affidavits," 600 thus it was not an abuse of discretion to refuse the
new trial motion.

3. Instructions to the Jury
The third ground for a new trial which we will consider is the
contention that the jury was improperly instructed.601 The supreme
court has interpreted the Code602 as permitting a defendant in a criminal case to raise this objection for the first time in a motion for a
new trial. In State v. Lelchook,603 for example, the supreme court
reversed a trial court's refusal to grant such a motion because the
instruction improperly omitted a material matter of law. Even where
the instruction complained of does materially misstate the law, however, the defendant has no absolute right to have his motion for a
new trial granted:
[T]his right is subject to exceptions. [It] may expressly be waived, or if
the instruction was correct as given but not as explicit as the defendant
might have desired, he is required to request an additional instruction
before the jury is charged.604

4. Appellate Re-view
Appellate review of the trial court's refusal to grant a new trial is
597

State v. Washington, 160 N.W.2d 337, 340 (Iowa 1968):

It is not competent to show by statements of jurors what influenced the
verdict. That is a matter of opinion which inheres in the verdict. See
also State v. White, 205 Iowa 373, 376, 217 N.W. 871, 872 (1928).

598State v. Washington, 160 N.W.2d 337, 340 (Iowa 1968), quoting State v.
Brown, 253 Iowa 658, 671, 113 N.W.2d 286, 294 (1962).
599 State v. Little, 164 N.W.2d 81, 82-83 (Iowa 1969).
600 I d. at 83.
601 See text accompanying notes 449-89 supra.
602 IowA ConE § 787.3 (1973).
603186 N.W.2d 655, 655-57 (Iowa 1971).
so4 State v. Hamilton, 179 N.W.2d 369, 371 (Iowa 1970).
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limited in scope, and the defendant must overcome a presumption in
favor of the court's ac:tion. 605 This burden is "heavy,"606 since the
trial comt's finding on conflicting evidence, being a matter within the
court's discretion, is controlling on appeal if there is sufficient factual
basis upon which the court could have made the challenged finding. 607
The supreme court's most definitive statement in this regard is found
in State v. Compiano: 60 s
The rule is finnly established that to be entitled to a new trial as a matter
of law, the rulings of the trial: court must appear to have been so prejudicial as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. However, a fair trial does
not necessarily mean a perfect trial.•. .We 'TIULY disagree with the trial
court on close questions of this nature, but must uphold its ruling if not
clearly erroneous.

The court continued:
Although defendant's ccounsel attacked the court's stated reasons for this
disbelief, and it seems some of those reasons would not be proper, we
are bound by the rule that if the court could properly find as it did, its
ruling must stand.ooo

Nevertheless, the supreme court has said it " 'will interfere more
oos For example, the supreme court has said that the burden is on the appellant to show an abuse of judicial discretion in refusing to grant a new trial. To
carry this burden, he must disclose and prove facts which would have- seen
sufficient to sustain the trial court's action had the motion for a new trial been
granted. Hutchinson v. Fort Des Moines Community Services, Inc., 252 Iowa 536,
540, 107 N.W.2d 567, 570 (1961) (a civil case).
ooa State v. Benson, 247 Iowa 406, 410, 72 N.W.2d 438, 440 (1955):
Defendant's burden here is heaVY. In order to obtain a reversal of the
trial court's action in overruling his motion for a new trial, he must show
clearly that counsel ..• was so incompetent ••• as to make the proceeding a farce and mockery of justice, or that it so prejudiced him that substantial justice was not done.
eor State v. Ebelsheiser, 2-t! Iowa 49, 60, 43 N.W.2d 706, 713 (1950):
There was no such impropriety or error nor did the court abuse its discretion in overruling the motion. There was a disputed question of fact
involved and the trial court's decision, upon conflicting evidence, is controlling.
This standard applies also to disputes over the existence of evidence, as illustrated by State v. Robinson, 183 N.W.2d 190, 192 (Iowa 1971). In Robinson,
the defendant, moving for a new trial, contended that the verdict was contrary
to the evidence because there was no evidence in the record to rebut the defendant's testimony that he had in fact given some notification. The supreme court,
affirming the denial of the motion for new trial, concluded:
There is considerable evidence which, if believed, would establish that
defendant deliberately avoided giving the department head such notification . . • . Id. (emphasis added).
oos251 Iowa 509, 521, 154 N.W.2d 845, 852 (1967) (emphasis added).
ooo Id. at 520-21, 154 N.W.2cl at 851.
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readily with a verdict, because contrary to the weight of evidence, in
a criminal case than in a civil case.' " 610

VI.

JUDICIAL DIScRETION IN THE SENTENCING PRocEss

Assuming the defendant's presentence motions, if any, have been
resolved in favor of the state, the trial court must then proceed to the
sentencing stage.

A. Time for Judgment After Conviction
No fixed maximum time after conviction is statutorily prescribed in
Iowa for the imposition of sentence. Instead, section 789.2 merely
places specific minimum time limitations on the sentencing process by
providing that after conviction the court
must fix: a time for pronouncing judgment, which must be at least three
days after the verdict is rendered, if the court remains in session so long
.•. but in no case can it be pronounced in less than six hours after the
verdict is rendered, unless defendant consents thereto.en

As the above quoted por-tion of the statute indicates, a convicted defendant who prefers "to get it over with" may waive his right to the
6 hour minimum period between conviction and sentencing.612 Indeed,
although the supreme court has discouraged such practice,613 a defendant may even plead guilty and be immediately sentenced at his
arraignment, if he so requests.614 Once the defendant has requested
immediate sentencing however, he has the burden, on appeal, of
establishing that "the disposition of his case with such dispatch is a
circumstance entitling him to prevail in [his application for postconviction relief] ." 615
At least in part because there is no set time when a sentence must
be imposed, the widespread practice of deferred sentencing upon a
plea of guilty developed among Iowa trial courts, starting in 1964.616
610 State v. Carlson, 224 Iowa 1262, 1265, 276 N.W. 770, 772 (1937), quoting State
v. McKenzie, 204 Iowa 833, 834, 216 N.W. 29, 30 (1927).
611 IOWA CODE § 789.2 (1973).
s12 See State v. Rinehart, 255 Iowa 1132, 1140, 125 N.W.2d 242, 247 (1963) (waiver
to avoid undesirable publicity drawing crowds to separate sentencing proceed-

ing).
613

State v. Kephart, 202 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Iowa 1972). In that case, the court

said:

We cannot conclude here the trial court acted improperly, although arraigning the defendant, accepting his plea, and imposing sentence all
at one hearing and on the same day is not a procedure that should be
followed. Id.
State v. Rinehart, 255 Iowa 1132, 1140, 125 N.W.2d 242, 247 (1963).
State v. Kephart, 202 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Iowa 1972).
616 See Contemporary Studies Project: Perspectives on the Administration of
Criminal Justice in Iowa, 57 IowA L. REv. 598, 612-13 (1972).
614

615
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Under deferred sentencing, the trial court would accept the defendant's guilty plea but would not enter the judgment or impose sentence. Instead, the court would set sentencing for some time in the
future and place the defendant on probation in the interim. Following
the defendant's successful completion of probation, the court would
allow withdrawal of the guilty plea and the case would then be dismissed. Upon violation of probation,' however, the court would enter
a judgment of guilty a:nd proceed to impose the sentence.
This practice was rec:ently declared invalid in State v. Wright 611 on
the ground that there was no statutory authority for it. Since a
court's authority to defer imposition of a criminal sentence "is not
inherent but is regulat•;!d by statute and can only be exercised in accordance with the terms of the statute,"618 and since Iowa's probation
statute619 "refers only to a suspended sentence and has no application
to a deferred sentence," the supreme court concluded that the trial
court was "without judicial power to defer imposition of sentence and
place defendant, who had been convicted by plea of guilty, on probation...." 620
R Presentence Hearing

Although the Wright case invalidated the use of deferred sentences
as an alternative method of sentencing, it specifically approved the
practice of deferring pronouncement of judgment for other purposes.
In discussing section 789.2, the opinion said that a court
has judicial power to defer the pronouncement of judgment for the purpose of hearing and determining motions for a new trial or in arrest of
judgment or for such 1·easonable time as may be necessary to complete
[a presentence investigation),621

The Iowa Supreme Court considers it the trial court's duty "to ascertain any and all facts that would assist in the proper exercise of
its discretion in :fixing defendant's sentence, whether in or out of the
record." 622 Accordingly, the court has said:
The trial court and we on review should weigh and consider all pertinent
matters in determining proper sentence, including the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, defendant's age, character and propensities and chances of his reform. The courts owe a duty to the public
as much as to defendant in determining a proper sentence. The punishment should fit both the crime and the individua1.a2::
202 N.W.2d 72 (Iowa 1972).
Id. at 76.
019 IOWA CODE § 247.20 (1973).
o2o 202 N.W.2d at 79. But see ch. 295, [1973] Iowa Acts (deferred sentencing
authorized).
021 Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
o22 State v. Kendall, 167 N'.W.2d 909, 911 (Iowa 1969); State v. Myers, 241 Iowa
670, 672, 42 N.W.2d 79, 80 (1950).
023 State v. Cupples, 260 Iowa 1192, 1197, 152 N.W.2d 277, 280 (1967).
011

618
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In ascertaining the facts necessary to ensure that the punishment
does "fit both the crime and the individual," a trial court need not
rely solely on a formal presentence investigation and report. Although this is the "recommended" method, the supreme court observed
in State v. Patterson624 that the sentencing court can discharge its
duty of informing itself "as to matters important to the proper exercise of its sentencing discretion" in other ways. For example, it was
held, in State v. Myers,62 s that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the county attorney at a presentence hearing to
read a statement by the sheriff concerning the latter's investigation of
the facts surrounding the defendant's commission of another offense
subsequent to the entry of his guilty plea on the instant charge. Approving the trial court's actions, the supreme court said:
In exercising that discretion it is not error for the court to ascertain any

and all facts that will assist it in the proper exercise of that discretion,
whether it [sic] be in or out of the record.G26

Although a presentence report is not required, the supreme court
frequently alludes to any such report when reviewing the severity of
a sentence or the refusal to grant probation. For example, the observation was made in State v. Brace: ccThe presentence report was certified to us as part of the record and has been helpful in comprehending
the reasons for the sentence imposed." 62i Thus, a trial court would
be well advised to order such a report in those cases where there is
good likelihood that a severe sentence will be imposed on a crime with
a broad-ranged penalty or that probation will not be granted. 628
The Iowa Criminal Code Review Study Committee has proposed
changing the law to make the ordering of a presentence investigation
mandatory when the offense is a felony. 629 A better approach may
161 N.W.2d 736, 737 (Iowa 1968).
241 Iowa 670, 672, 42 N.W.2d 79, 80 (1950).
626 I d., 42 N.W.2d at 80.
6 27 181 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Iowa 1970). This was in accordance with the ABA
PROJECT ON Mnmlnmt STANDARDS FOR CRn.tiNAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES § 2.3, at 42 (Approved Draft 1968) .
6 28 See generally United States v. Warren, 453 F.2d 738, 744 (2d Cir. 1972):
624
625

It would be wise . . . for trial judges, in those rare cases in which they
dispense with the pre-sentence report, to state on the record the reasons
for failing to make use of a tool which has proven helpful in individualizing and thus improving the sentencing process. Such a requirement
will provoke thought about the decision to bypass this potentially valuable step in the criminal process.
G2 9 Iowa Criminal Code Rev. Study Comm., Proposed Iowa Criminal Code, ch.
3, § 103 (1973). The nature of the investigation is spelled out in detail in section
104:

Whenever a presentence investigation is ordered by the court, the investigator shall promptly bquire into the characteristics, circ=tances,
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be to assure the defendant's right to have such an investigation made,
but to permit him to waive this right. In its discretion, the court
would still be free to order one to prevent the defendant from concealing an undesirable past. A recent Michigan case630 illustrates
the folly of a mandatory, no-exceptions statute. In that case, the
sentencing judge erred in pronouncing sentence without ordering a
presentence report, even though the defendant himself did not want
one. 631 By way of contrast with such an inflexible approach, a federal
appellate court632 has held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by skipping a presentence report where the defendant did not
want one, in spite of the circuit rule of "adopting a restrictive view of
the trial judge's discretion to impose sentence without taking advantage of presentencing procedures." 633
When a presentence :report is prepared, the Iowa Supreme Court
prefers to leave the scope of inquiry concerning a proper sentence in
the hands of the sentencing judge. 634 Positing that "sentencing procedures are governed by different evidentiary rules than the trial itself," the supreme court, in State v. Cole,S 36 said that the sentencing
judge should obtain "the fullest information possible concerning the
defendant's life and characteristics" and thus he should not be denied
"an opportunity to obtain pertinent information by requirement of
rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to
the trial." 636 Thus, as the United States Supreme Court has noted,
presentence reports "may rest on hearsay and contain information
bearing no relation whatever to the crime with which the defendant
is charged."637 Accordingly, the Iowa Supreme Court concluded in
Cole:
Defendant may not successfully challenge the soundness of the trial court's
discretion even though involved therein were conclusions or matters not
ordinarily admissible.oas
needs, and potentialities O:)f the defendant; his criminal record and social
history; the circumstances of the offense; the time defendant has been
in detention; and the harm to the victim, his immediate family, and the
community. All local and state mental and correctional institutions,
courts, and police agencies shall furnish to the investigator on request
the defendant's criminal record and other relevant information. With the
approval of the court, a physical examination of the defendant may be
ordered, or the defendant. may be committed to a psychiatric facility for
an evaluation of his personality and mental health. The results of any
such examination shall b(~ included in the report of the investigator.
o3o People v. Amos, 202 N.VT.2d 486 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972).
o31Jd. at 489.
632 United States v. Spadoni, 435 F .2d 448 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
633 Id. at 449.
03 4 State v. Cole, 168 N.W.2d 37,42 (Iowa 1969).
03G I d.
o3o Id. at 40, citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
oa7 Gregg v. United States, 394 U.S. 489, 492 (1969).
6as 168 N.W.2d 37, 41 (Iowa 1969).
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Once the trial court has obtained a presentence report, it is assumed
that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the court used the
report in a proper manner and did not consider anything "based only
upon rumor or at a stage prejudicial to the defendant." 639 There are
some limits on the kind of information that may be considered by the
court in setting the punishment, however. The United States Supreme
Court in United States v. T'UCker,640 while conceding that the presentence inquiry can be "broad in scope, largely limited either as to the
kind of information [considered], or the source from which it may
come," nevertheless held that a sentence cannot be based, even in
part, upon "misinformation of constitutional magnitude." 641 In T'UCker,
the tainted information utilized by the sentencing court in its decision
to impose the statutory maximum penalty included two prior felony
convictions obtained when defendant was unconstitutionally denied
his right to assistance of counsel.642
There is no federal constitutional requirement for disclosure of the
contents of a presentence report,S 43 nor is there such a requirement
under Iowa law. Nevertheless, the Iowa Supreme Court, in State v.
Delano,644 without judicially imposing such a procedural rule, made
several references to statutory and case law in other states and to
model legislation that either afford disclosure as a matter of absolute
right or that qualify the right to disclosure only in deference to the
need to maintain a probation officer's coD:fidential sources.645 It concluded:
As a note of caution it has been suggested "Kent ... and Specht ••• read
together, seem to indicate that some fonn of hearing or opportunity to

63 9 State v. Delano, 161 N.W.2d 66, 71 (Iowa 1968); accord, State v. Cooper, 161
N.W 2d 728, 732 (Iowa 1968).
640 404 u.s. 443 (1972).
64J. Id. at 446-47.
6 4 2 Id. at 444. At least one lower federal court has construed Tucke-r strictly,
refusing to apply it to an applicant who had not made a Tucker-type argument
until after Tucke-r was announced. Mitchell v. United States, (N.D. Fla., Nov.
7, 1972), noted in 12 CRIM. L. RPTR. 2304 (1973).
64 3 Gregg v. United States, 394 U.S. 489, 492 (1969):
''Pre-sentence reports are
documents which the rule does not make available to the defendant as a matter
of right." Accord, Thompson v. United States, 381 F 2d 664, 666-67 (lOth Cir.
1967) (due process of law not violated by government's refusal to disclose presentence investigation report). But see United States v. Bryant, 442 F.2d 775,
778 (D.C. Cir. 1971):

We hold that the discretion whether-and to what extent-defendant or
his counsel is to have access to the presentence report . . • must be exercised in each individual case.
644161 N.W.2d 66 (Iowa 1968).
G45 See, e.g., United States v. Fischer, 381 F .2d 509, 513 (2d Cir. 1967) (Where

1106

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

rebut matters in confid,;ntial reports which significantly affect important
dispositional or sentenclng decisions may emerge as a constitutional necessity in the not too distant future."646

On the basis of the United States Supreme Court's determination
that the sixth amendment right of confrontation is inapplicable at the
sentencing stage,647 the Iowa Supreme Court has also concluded, in
State v. Cole,GJs that a defendant had "neither constitutional nor statutory right" to examine the investigating officer as to the validity of
the officer's conclusion, in his presentence report, that defendant was
not a fit subject for pi:obation. The supreme court reasoned that
since probation is only l:l matter of grace, and not a "right," and since
the trial court's source of information concerning determination of the
sentence is unlimited, "it follows that it was not error to refuse examination into the validity of a recommendation [by the parole agent]
the court was in no way bound to accept." 649 Noting that the defendant was allowed to testify in his own behalf, as well as to call other
witnesses, at the present•~nce hearing/ 50 the supreme court determined
there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to require
cross-examination conce1:ning the presentence report.
The supreme court's two opinions in State v. Boston651 illustrate that
a trial court "has a du~r to hear an application for a parole but has

material in no manner relates to a confidential declaration, there is little reason
to avoid disclosure of what is reported to the sentencing judge. ''This is a
matter, however, which must rest in his sound discretion."); MoDEL PENAL CoDE
§ 7.07 (5) (1963):
Before imposing sentence, the Court shall advise the defendant or his
counsel of the factual contents and the conclusions of any pre-sentence
investigation or psychiatric examination and afford fair opportunity, if
the defendant so requests.. to controvert them. The sources of confidential
information need not, however, be disclosed.
0 46 State v. Delano, 161 N.W.2d 66, 72 (Iowa 1968), quoting Bach, The Defendant's Right to Access to F'resentence Reports, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 160, 167 (1968).
The cases referred to were Kent v. Vnited States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) and Specht
v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
047 Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 606-08 (1967).
6 4 8168 N.W.2d 37, 41 (Iowa 1969).
640 Id.
6GO Id. at 40. Because a defendant is entitled to present relevant evidence concerning his claim for leniency or mitigation of sentence, State v. Boston, 233 Iowa
1249, 1258, 11 N.W.2d 407, 411 (1943), the supreme court has implied that he
must do so before sentencing. In State v. Patterson, 191 l\.W.2d 757 (Iowa 1971),
the supreme court discounted a defendant's claim that the trial court did not
have before it evidence of his cooperation in the trials of his two co-conspirators,
noting that the defendant had been represented by counsel throughout the trial
process and that the court had received a presentence report. Id.
6~1 234 Iowa 1047, 14 N.W.2d 1376 (1944); 233 Iowa 1249, 11 N.W.2d 407 (1943).

1973]

JUDICIAL DISCRETION

1107

wide discretion in what must be considered in granting or denying
the application." 652 In that case, the trial court refused to hold a hearing to consider a defendant's application for a bench parole. This refusal was pursuant to the trial court's personal policy of never allowing
a parole. Vacating the sentence of imprisonment and remanding, the
supreme court ruled that the defendant was entitled "to have his application considered on its merits." 653 On remand, the same judge held
a hearing at which the defendant's witnesses testified as to his personal
history, the circumstances surrounding his commission of the crime,
and his character and reputation.654 Again refusing to grant probation, the court nevertheless received evidence supporting defendant's
application and subsequently issued a written ruling detailing the considerations for such refusal. Thus, even though the trial court did not
change its original decision, the second denial of parole was affirmed.
In so ruling, the supreme court pinpointed the significance of properly
exercised judicial discretion, saying:
The record abundantly shows that the court decided fairly and impartially, and having done so, that decision is not open to question. Whether
the decision was as some other court would have decided is beside the
point.Gss

In the final analysis, once significant information has been brought
to the court's attention, the court must exercise its discretion in selecting the proper sentence on an individual basis, as per the peculiar
facts of the specific situation. The Iowa Supreme Court, emphasizing
the necessity for individualized sentencing, has said:
Each case must be decided upon its peculiar facts and there is no hard
and fast rule by which the punishment of those convicted of crimes must
be determined within the limits of the governing statutes.~ 5 6

That trial courts cannot bind themselves to prescribe uniform minimum sentences when the statutes set no such limits was made clear
recently in State v. Jackson. 657 In that case, the judges in one judicial
district entered into a written agreement that each would impose a
minimum, mandatory penalty for every conviction for operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants (OMVUI) of 20
days' imprisonment in the county jail, subject to probation in individual cases.658 However, the statutory penalty for a first OMVUI offense
State v. Cole, 168 N.W.2d 37, 40 (Iowa 1969).
233 Iowa at 1258, 11 N.W.2d at 411.
65·1 State v. Boston, 234 Iowa at 1048-49, 14 N.W.2d at 677-78.
655 Id. at 1053, 14 N.W.2d at 680.
65 6 State v. Kramer, 252 Iowa 916, 921-22, 109 N.W.2d 18, 21 (1961).
657 204 N.W.2d 915 (Iowa 1973).
658 The agreement, styled GENERAL ORDER, provided:
652

653

In all O.M.V.U.I. cases on a plea of guilty or conviction the penalty imposed will be a mininum sentence of imprisonment for twenty (20) days
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is either a fine or a jail sentence "for a period of [sic] not to exceed one
year," or both, but without a minimum ptmalty or a mandatory term
of imprisonment.6 fi 9
Pointing out that the setting of upper and lower limits for criminal
penalties is a matter of legislative prerogative, the supreme court said:
When judges adopt a general order that a minimum penalty shall be different than a statute prcovides, they are changing the statute, for they are
depriving themselves of the discretion to impose the minimum provided
by the statute.eoo

Since no statutory minimum is prescribed in the OMVUI statute, the
exact amount of imprisonment, if any, is left to the court's discretion
and may range from 1 day to 1 year. Indeed, no amount of imprisonment is required at all, since the court can select a fine as the alternative mode of punishment.
Stressing that the court must exercise its discretion in sentencing
on a case-by-case basis, the supreme court, quoting from a New York
case,661 said that sentencing" 'under a predetermined fixed policy cannot satisfy a statutory requirement for the exercise of discretion.' "
Rather, what is required is " 'an actual exercise of judgment upon the
part of the [individual] court' "; that is, " 'a consideration by the court
o£ the facts and circumstances which are necessary to make a sound,
fair and just determination.' " 662 Refusing to demean sentencing conferences to broaden judges' knowledge about sentencing to reduce
unwarranted discrepancies, 663 the supreme court nevertheless concluded:
But in the end no judge can abdicate his individual responsibility to pass
sentence in each case according to his lights, within the statutory limits.
Each judge must grapple with the facts and circumstances in the case before him and arrive at the sentence he regards as right.e64

Thus, had the judge in the instant case exercised his discretion and
not considered the ge~eral order as binding, then the sentence imposed
and a fine in the sum of $300.00. The foregoing must be understood as
minimums.
Consideration bearing on suspension of a sentence of imprisonment and
parole will depend in these as in other cases on the circumstances surrounding each individual case.
The foregoing policy is effective as to all sentences on and after January
3, 1972. Id. at 916.
eGo IowA CODE § 321.281 (1!173) (emphasis added).
66o 204 N.W.2d 915, 916 (Iowa 1973).
661 Application of Frazzita, 147 N.Y.S.2d 11, 16-17 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
aoz 204 N.W.2d 915, 916 (Iowa 1973).
664 See, e.g., ABA PROJECT CIN M:IN:nlrmlt STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDUl!ES1 §§ 7.1-7.3 (Approved
Draft, 1968).
664 204 N.W.2d 915, 917 (Iowa 1973).
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would not have been erroneous even though the general order itself
was invalid.

C. Allocution
Irrespective of whether the defendant has exercised his prerogatives
to file any of the aforementioned presentence motions or whether he
has simply proceeded directly to sentencing-either after the normal
delay or, upon his request, immediately-the court must afford him
the right of allocution before imposing the sentence. 665
A defendant's right of allocution when appearing for judgment is
statutorily prescribed in detail, with the court directed to ask the
defendant "whether he has any legal cause to show why judgment
should not be pronounced against him." 666 However, while a court
ordinarily has no discretion to skip this stage of the sentencing process,
the supreme court recently held, in State v. Christensen,667 that the
opportunity for a defendant to make a statement need not be verbalized in the precise words of the statute, it being sufficient for the court
to ask: "Is there anything you would like to say to the court before
I pronounce sentence ?"668
Similarly, the supreme court held, in State v. Patterson,669 that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in pronouncing sentence although merely allowing the defendant as well as the defense counsel
to "make a statement" rather than specifically referring to the p;rescribed inquiry concerning allocution. Noting that the court's extended
question-and-answer colloquy with defendant prior to sentencing had
afforded ample opportunity for the defendant to volunteer such information, the supreme court determined: "The important thing is
665 See generally Comment, 48 IowA L. REv. 172 (1962).
Although the defendant must be afforded the right of allocution, it is clear that it can be waived.
Two ways that the requirement of allocution may be waived were discussed in
State v. Rinehart, 255 Iowa 1132, 125 N.W.2d 242 (1967). First, the court noted
that the general rule is that "the answer of counsel is binding on the accused,"
and thus it is sufficient that defense counsel (rather than defendant) answered
that there was no "legal cause" why sentence should not be imposed. Id. at 1134,
125 N.W.2d at 246. Secondly, the court observed:

So, where accused moves for a new trial, assailing the verdict for several
reasons, and is afforded every opportunity to interpose objections to the
judgment, he cannot complain that the court, in pronouncing sentence,
fails to inform him of the verdict, and to ask him to show cause why
judgment should not be pronounced. Id. at 1140, 125 N.W.2d at 247, quoting 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1576 (1961).
Apparently, the same rule would apply on a motion in arrest of judgment.
666 IowA CODE § 789.6 (1973).
667 201 N.W.2d 457 (Iowa 1972).
668 Id. at 460.
669 161 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Iowa 1968).
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whether defendant had his chance to point out any reason for withholding judgment." 670 The court added: "[N]othing appears in the
record to suggest defendant in fact had any legal cause why sentence
should not be imposed." 611
Notwithstanding the possibility that a court may have some flexibility in wording its offer of the right of allocution, it is still advisable to
adhere to the standard sentencing colloquy. This was illustrated in a
recent case in the District of Columbia.672 Before sentencing a defendant convicted of possession of narcotic drugs, the court told the defendant that if he divulg;ed the name of the supplier "it might possibly
make a difference in tht; type of sentence that I impose in respect to
the user." 673 After the defendant stood silent, the court decided not to
grant probation,6 H and s·antenced the defendant to 180 days in jail, onehalf the 360-day statutory maximum. Vacating the judgment and remanding for resentencing, the appellate court observed:
What is demonstrated, therefore in this record, is not so much an abuse of
discretion as a failure tt> exercise discretion in the sentencing process.s 7 s

Even though the actual sentence was only half the maximum authorized sentence, the appellate court said that "the error in the sentencing
process was so egregious as to require that the sentence be vacated."676

D. Determination of the Specific Penalty
The trial court's determination of the specific penalty, where such a
determination may be made from within a range of permissible alternatives, is the one staga in the criminal trial process in which the
exercise of judicial discretion will most likely be left undisturbed upon
appellate review. Although the supreme court has the statutory duty
to determine whether the punishment imposed was too severe, and
may reduce it if it is found to be excessive,677 it will not interfere with
the lower court's determination
[u]nless there is an error in the sentence by reason of failure to follow a
specific statutory provision or there is an abuse of discretion .•• ,s1s

When the sentence imposed is faulty because it fails to comply with
statutory guidelines, the supreme court is freed from the normal re670

Id.

611Jd.

Williams v. United States, 293 A.2d 484 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972).
at 485-86.
674 I d. at 486.
o1u I d. at 487.
010 Id.
m See IowA CODE § 793.18 (1973).
0 7>< State v. Simpson, 254 Iowa 637, 645, 118 N.W.2d 606, 611 (1962); accord,
State v. Cupples, 260 Iowa 1192, 1197, 152 N.W.2d 277, 280 (1967).
672

673Jd.
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quirement that sentences will be overturned as excessive only where
there has been abuse of discretion and then it makes its own independent determination of the "right" sentence.679 This type of sentencing
error is most likely to occur in those situations where the court's discretion is substantially restricted. For example, there are a few crimes
for which the punishment is :fixed or mandatory, thus leaving nothing
to the sentencing court's discretion. These include the five crimes punishable exclusively by life imprisonment.680 Some of the other more
serious felonies are punishable for a term of years up to and including
life, with the number of years to be selected from within the permissible range by the trial court in the exercise of its sound discretion. 681
Other serious felonies are punishable exclusively by an indeterminate
term of imprisonment, subject to a statutory maximum, in the penitentiary or reformatory,682 thus leaving the effective determination of the
amount of time to be served in the hands of the parole board.683 This
leaves the sentencing judge with no discretion since he can choose
neither the mode of punishment nor the length of incarceration within
the one mode.
On the other hand, many of the less serious felonies are punishable
in the alternative. Thus, if the court decides to imprison the defendant, it may impose either an indeterminate term in the penitentiary or
reformatory, or a shorter, more definite term in the county jai1.684 As
the supreme court has observed:
Neither the trial court nor this court has any discretion as to the period
of confinement in the penitentiary. . .• The discretion is only between a
penitentiary sentence and a fine and jail sentence.685

Nevertheless, if the trial court selects the jail-sentence alternative, it
can exercise broad discretion in determining the exact duration of sen67 9 See State v. Stevenson, 195 N.W.2d 358, 360 (Iowa 1972). Notwithstanding
the statutory stricture on increasing punishment on appeal, IowA CODE § 793.18
(1973), a sentence may be modified in some cases even where the end result of
the supreme court's action may be an increase in punishment. See State v.
Weise, 201 N.W.2d 734, 738 (Iowa 1972).
6so See IowA CoDE §§ 690.2 (first-degree murder), 689.1 (treason), 706.3 (kidnapping for ransom), 697.1 (death caused by explosives), 711.4 (train robbery)
(1973).
681 See, e.g., id. § 708.2 (1973) (aggravated burglary).
682 See, e.g., id. § 690.10 (1973) (manslaughter).
683 State v. Kulish, 260 Iowa 138, 145, 148 N.W.2d 428, 433 (1967) (dictum);
State v. Johnson, 196 N.W.2d 563, 571 (Iowa 1972):
The indeterminate sentencing act, section 789.13, requires the sentence if
it imposes a penitentiary term shall not be fixed by the court, but it is
imposed by law.
684 See, e.g., IowA CoDE § 703.1 (1973) (bigamy).
685 State v. Simpson, 254 Iowa 637, 645, 118 N.W.2d 606, 611 (1962).
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tence. This is possible not only because the indeterminate sentencing
provision applies only to terms of imprisonment in the penitentiary or
reformatory, but also because practically all of these alternative jail
sentences are for period'> "not to exceed one year," thus permitting the
judge to choose any number of days between 1 and 365.
The crime of burglary with aggravation, punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for any term of years up to and including
life, 080 presents the trial court with the broadest range of permissible
imprisonment in the Iowa criminal code. This sentencing authority
permits the judge, in his discretion, to sentence a defendant to a period
of from 1 year to life. Even when a life term is imposed, the sentence
will not be disturbed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. A life
term was upheld in State v. Kendall}681 for example, with the supreme
court merely noting that the trial court's action was justifiable because
the defendant had assaulted a person with intent to commit rape during the burglary.
State v. Johnson688 is a recent illustration that the trial court's selection of even a harsh alternative penalty will not be overturned upon
appeal merely because the supreme court might disagree with the severity of the sentence imposed. The defendant had been convicted of
false drawing and uttering of a check and sentenced to an indeterminate term of 7 years in the penitentiary, although the court could have
sentenced him to a mere jail term of any number of days up to a maximum of 1 year. 689 Conceding the trial court's right within the prescribed statutory alternatives "to fix such punishment for the crime as
it thought defendant des<:~rved," the supreme court mused: "Although
the sentence seems quite severe in view of the amount of the check,
we cannot say there was an abuse of discretion." 090
In State v. O'Dell, 091 the supreme court, summarizing its philosophy
regarding reduction of sentences it considers too severe, said:
[T]his power will be exercised when the court below has manifestly visited too severe a penalty, one disproportionate to the degree of guilt. as
shown by the proo£,69 2

The court added that there must be "some legal data" upon which to
base any reduction of sentence.093
Knox v. Harrison694 is one of the rare instances in which the Iowa
o86 IowA CoDE § 708.2 (1973).
687167 N.W.2d 909, 911-12 (Iowa 1969).
08B196 N.W.2d 563 (Iowa 1972).
08o See IowA CoDE§ 713.3 (1973).
ooo 196 N.W.2d at 571.
oo1 240 Iowa 1157, 39 N.W.2d 100 (1949).
602 Id. at 1161, 39 N.W.2d at 102.
693 Id., 39 N.W.2d at 102.
094185 N.W.2d 718 (Iowa 1971).
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Supreme Court has reduced an otherwise legally imposed criminal
penalty for being excessive. In this bizarre series o£ events, the de~
£endant spat in the judge's face upon being sentenced on a simple mis~
demeanor charge. Following an adjudication o£ guilt on a charge o£
contempt £or the spitting incident, he was sentenced by a second judge
to 6 months' imprisonment in the county jail.695 However, the defendant's conduct during the hearing before the second judge led to a second citation £or contempt and ultimately to an additional 6 months' imprisonment, with the two terms to run consecutively, as well as a $500
fine, the statutory maximum penalty. 696 Modifying the judgment in
the second case, the supreme court said it "believe [ d] the sentence
was excessive under the record here." 697 Speculating that the sentencing judge, who had heard both contempt cases and imposed both sentences, had been influenced in the second case by the defendant's conduct against the first judge, the supreme court said that the earlier
incident should not affect the penalty for the contemptuous conduct in
the second judge's court. Therefore, the supreme court modified the
judgment by making the second 6-month term run concurrently with
the sentence imposed in the first case and withdrew the $500 fine. 698
Although not discussing this case in such terms, the supreme court's
approach amounted to a determination that the trial court had abused
its discretion in exercising its statutory authority to order that the two
sentences run consecutively.699

E. Special Sentencing Considerations
To this point, the discussion o£ the sentencing process has focused on
£actors which apply to all cases. In addition to these generally applicable sentencing considerations, there are a number o£ more specific
elements that are applicable only in certain situations. Some o£ these
can have the effect o£ increasing the court's discretionary powers,
while others tend to narrow the scope o£ the court's sentencing options.
The most significant o£ these specific £actors include the determination
of the locus o£ imprisonment, the sentencing options available in
OMVUI cases, the sentencing o£ juveniles convicted in criminal court,
and the problem o£ the unrepresented indigent defendant.

1. Locus of the Imprisonment
Once a court has decided to imprison a convicted felon, it may have
some discretion as to the locus o£ the imprisonment. The factors in695 This sentence was upheld in Knox v. Municipal Court, 185 N.W.2d 705 (Iowa
1971).
696185 N.W.2d at 720; see IowA CoDE § 665.4 (1973).
697185 N.W.2d at 720 (Iowa 1971).
698 Id.
699 The statute authorizing consecutive sentences is IowA CODE § 789.12 (1973).
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volved in determining whether there is discretion in selection of the
place of commitment include: the nature of the crime, the age of the
defendant, the sex of the defendant, and the defendant's prior criminal
record.
The penalty for some felonies is statutorily prescribed in the alternative, leaving it to the sentencing court's discretion whether the defendant is to be imprisoned in the penitentiary or adult reformatory
or in the county jail.700 The most innovative development in this connection has been the statutory authorization for sentencing, at the
court's discretion, to a local minimum-security correctional facility, if
available, instead of exdusively to the county jail.701 To date, however, this sentencing option is only available to judges in central Iowa,
since the only such local correctional facility in operation is in Des
Moines. 702
Whenever a male defendant is to be incarcerated in the penitentiary
or reformatory, there may be some discretion as to which of these
state institutions the sentencing court selects. However, there is no
such discretion if the defendant is a female, since there is no women's
penitentiary in Iowa, only a women's adult reformatory. On the other
hand, a male defendant, unless he has been convicted of certain felonies,703 must be committed to the men's reformatory if he is under 30
at the time of commitm•:nt and has never before been convicted of a
felony. 704 If he has been convicted of murder, treason, sodomy, or incest, however, he must be sent to the penitentiary irrespective of his
age or prior record. Se1ection of the locus of commitment is a matter
of the trial court's discretion "as the particular circumstances may
warrant," irrespective of age and prior record, when the crime is rape,
robbery, or breaking and entering a "dwelling house" in the nighttime.706

2. OMVUI Dispositions
When the offense is operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants, the trial court's sentencing options include not
only imposition of imprisonment and/or a fine, but the court may also
"order the defendant, at his own expense, to enroll [in], attend and
successfully complete a course for drinking drivers." 706 On a defend100

See notes 684-86 supra and accompanying text.

101 See IowA CoDE§ 356A.3 (1973).
102 See generally Oxberger, Revolution in Corrections, 22 DRAKE L. REv. 250
(1973).
703 These include murder, treason, sodomy, and incest. IowA CoDE § 789.16
(1973).
704 Id.
1o5 I d.
7UO Id. § 321B.16.
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ant's first OMVUI conviction, this provision is operative, in the court's
discretion, either "in lieu of, or prior to or after the imposition of
[criminal] punishment," as well as being in addition to the court's
authority to commit OMVUI offenders to a state treatment facility. 707
For subsequent OMVUI convictions, the court can still order the defendant to attend the instructional course, but this alternative cannot
be imposed as a substitute for the prescribed criminal penalty. 708
Moreover, while the court is authorized to order the defendant commited to a state treatment facility after any conviction for OMVUI,
such commitment can be in lieu of the prescribed criminal penalty
only on the second or subsequent conviction.709

3. Juvenile Defendants in Criminal Court
When a defendant is a juvenile whose case has been transferred to
criminal court from juvenile court, the special sentencing provisions
of section 232.72 come into play. Specifically, the trial court may,
with the consent of the defendant, transfer the convicted juvenile back
to juvenile court for further disposition under the juvenile system, or
it may put the defendant on probation and then set aside his conviction
after successful completion of at least 1 year of probation.710 However,
the supreme court has repeatedly made it clear that the trial court can
also sentence the juvenile under the criminal statutes like any other
convicted defendant. As with sentencing in general, choosing among
these three options is a matter for the trial court's sound discretion. 711
State v. Davis112 is the most recent, and possibly the most comprehensive, opinion upholding an exercise of judicial discretion in not
affording special treatment for juveniles convicted of a crime. Following transfer from juvenile court, the defendant pleaded guilty to breaking and entering. In addition to the two leniency options under section 232.72, the trial court could have imposed sentence under section
708.8. This provision, as the general penalty clause for breaking and
entering, prescribes alternative sentences, in the court's discretion, of
imprisonment not exceeding 10 years in the penitentiary, or a jail term

101

Id.; see id. § 321.281.

1os See id. §

321B~6.

Id. § 321.281.
no IowA ConE § 232.72 (1973).
711 See, e.g., Ethridge v. Hildreth, 253 Iowa 855, 859, 114 N.W.2d 311, 314 (1962);
State v. Reed, 207 Iowa 557, 561, 218 N.W. 609, 610 (1928):
709

[I]t was within the discretion of the district court whether or not the
penalty should be attached for the crime, or whether the defendant
should be referred to the juvenile court for final disposition of his case
thereunder.
712195 N.W.2d 677 (Iowa 1972).
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not to exceed 1 year and a fine not exceeding $100.713 Although the
defendant was a juvenile, the court opted for the more severe alternative and sentenced the defendant to a term of imprisonment in the
men's reformatory not to exceed 10 years.
Affirming, the supreme court said the trial court rightfully did not
use its powers for special disposition here since "[t]he information at
the court's disposal did not merit special action." 714 Recognizing that
the trial court had £ulfilled its general responsibility of determining a
proper sentence after a consideration of "all pertinent matters,"m the
supreme court noted that the defendant had committed a number of
previous offenses and was on parole from the boy's training school at
the time of the instant offense. Once the criminal court determined
not to exercise its option to afford him special treatment, the defendant, albeit a juvenile, stood on the same footing as any other convicted
defendant. Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion in the imposition of the penalty and the supreme court did not interfere with the
sentence imposed, since it did not exceed the statutory limit. Moreover, it was no abuse of the trial court's discretion to deny the defendant a bench parole, sinc:e its discretion in granting or withholding
bench paroles is apparently as "broad" when acting specially under
section 232.72 716 as it is when acting under the general probation provision, section 247.20.717

4. The Unrepresented Indigent Defendant
A sentencing court's scope of judicial discretion in choosing among
alternative modes of authorized penalties can be narrowed when the
defendant is an indigent. In light of the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 718 unless an indigent defendant
knowingly and intelligently waives his sixth amendment right to counsel, a trial court can maintain its ordinary option under an alternative
sentencing statute to impose a sentence of imprisonment only by appointing trial counsel for him. In other words, an unrepresented indigent defendant who did not waive his right to counsel cannot be sentenced to imprisonment even though the applicable criminal statute
provides for punishment t~ither by imprisonment or by fine or by both.
The trial court's failure to appoint trial counsel, absent a waiver, thus
operates to destroy the court's sta~tory authority to exercise its ordi-

ns IowA CoDE § 708.8 (1973).
195 N.W.2d at 678.
71~ Id.
716 See id.
111 IowA CoDE§ 247.20 (1973); see text accompanying notes 812-32 infra.
718 407 u.s. 25, 36-37 (1972).
114
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nary discretion in choosing among sentencing alternatives by limiting
the sentence to a fine. 719

F. Resentencing
Another area in which recent federal constitutional decisions have
intervened to reduce judicial discretion has been that of resentencing
persons reconvicted subsequent to successful appeals of their original
convictions. A court's discretion in imposing harsher penalties after a
retrial in such circumstances was significantly curtailed in 1969 by the
United States Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Pearce. 120
Until Pearce, there was nothing in Iowa's statutes or in Iowa Supreme Court pronouncements that precluded a trial court from imposing a harsher penalty upon reconviction for any reason whatsoever. 721
In that case, however, the Supreme Court, conceding that "neither the
double jeopardy provision nor the Equal Protection Clause !imposes an
absolute bar to a more severe sentence upon reconviction," 722 nevertheless held that due process of law, under the fourteenth amendment,
"requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he
receives after a new trial." 723 To ensure against such vindictiveness,
the Court concluded that the reasons for the harsher resentence must
"affirmatively appear" in the record and, further, that these reasons
must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original
sentencing proceeding,724

Thus, Pearce does not preclude harsher resentencing when a factual
basis therefore appears in the record for appellate review. This was
made clear in Moon v. Maryland/ 25 in which the United States Supreme Court upheld a more severe sentence upon reconviction.
The Pearce doctrine was applied by the Iowa Supreme Court in
State v. Pilcher/ 26 in which a defendant's sentence was increased from
50 to 60 years following his reconviction after a successful appeal. Because the case had been tried before Pearce, the supreme court applied the Pearce doctrine under its statutory authority to reduce the

719 In addition, it may be constitutionally improper to imprison such an indigent
defendant if he subsequently fails to pay his fine. See text accompanying notes
795-811 infra.
720 395 u.s. 711, 726 (1969).
72IState v. Pilcher, 171 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Iowa 1969).
122 395 U.S. at 723.
723 Id. at 725.
724 I d. at 726.
725 398 U.S. 319, 320-21 (1970) (per curiam).
12s 171 N.W.2d 251 (Iowa 1969).
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sentence so as to bring it within proper limits. 727 The second sentence
was reduced to 50 years since "the constitutional legitimacy of the
extra ten years [did] not appear [in the record]." 728 Although there
was no claim that the trial court "was motivated in the slightest degree by vindictiveness," 729 the supreme court nevertheless pointed out
that the reasons for increasing the duration of the sentence did not appear in the record, as required by Pearce. 730
In Colten v. Kentucky.131 the United States Supreme Court refused
to apply the Pearce doctrine to an increased sentence following reconviction on a de novo trial before a different, higher court than the one
in which the defendant was originally convicted. Pointing out that two
different courts are involved in this type of two-tier trial court system,
the Supreme Court observed that the higher court on a de novo appeal is not "asked to find error in another court's work." 732 Rather,
the Court declared:
[T]he Kentucky court in which Colten had the unrestricted right to have
a new trial was merely asked to accord the same trial, under the same
rules and procedures, available to defendants whose cases are begun in
that court in the first instance.1aa

Thus, no additional evidence was necessary to justify a more severe
penalty imposed by the higher court after the new trial. Indeed, the
latter court was not required to justify the harsher penalty at all, since
the penalty imposed was within the permissible range under the applicable statute.
The Iowa Supreme Court has followed Colten in upholding a harsher
penalty after trial de novo in district court following a guilty plea on
a non-indictable misdemeanor in municipal court. 734 In City of Cedar
Rapids v. Klees, 735 the defendant had pleaded guilty to a violation under city ordinance and was fined $25. Upon reconviction in a trial de
novo in the district court, however, he was sentenced to a 5 days in
jaU.

VII.

JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND PosTSENTENCING IssUES

Once the defendant has been sentenced, the criminal process, at
727 IOWA CODE § 793.18 (H173).
N.W.2d at 254.

728171
12n

I d.

1ao Id.
731407

u.s. 104

(1972).

I d. at 117.
733 I d.
734 Such courts will be abolished as of .Tuly 2, 1973, when Iowa's Unified Trial
Court Act becomes effective. See Unified Trial Court Act, ch. 1124, § 45 [1972]
Iowa Laws 454.
735 201 N.W.2d 920, 921 (Ic·wa 1972) (per curiam).
732
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least at the trial court level, is nominally completed. However, the
trial court may still have an opportunity to exercise judicial discretion
in a number of proceedings that may occur either individually or in
combination after sentence has been imposed.

A. Appeal
One such postsentencing procedure involves the decision to appeal,
which, under Iowa law, may be made by either the defendant or the
state.736 In either case, the appeal can only be from a final judgment,737 and the criminal court, unlike its civil counterpart,738 has
absolutely no discretion in permitting or denying an appeal. When
the defendant is the appellant: "The matter of appeal ... in a criminal
case is not discretionary in Iowa. He may appeal as a matter of
right." 739 This right of appeal is purely statutory/40 however, and
certain requisites ordinarily still must be met if the defendant is to
successfully invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate court.741
The trial court does have some discretion in the appellate process742
when the defendant is alleged to be indigent. In the first instance, this
discretion is exercised in the court's determination of whether the defendant is in fact indigent. In doing so, "it is proper for the court to
require a reasonable showing [that the defendant] is unable to employ counsel." 743 As discussed earlier/44 however, there are no statutory rules as to what constitutes indigency for purposes of appointing
private counsel nor has the supreme court fashioned any guidelines
other than a listing of general factors for the trial court to consider.

736 IOWA CODE § 793.1 (1973).
737 Id. § 793.2; see, e.g., State v. Coughlin, 200 N.W.2d 525, 526 (Iowa 1972);
State v. Hocker, 178 N.W.2d 317 (Iowa 1971); State v. Hellickson, 162 N.W.2d
390, 392 (Iowa 1968).
Because the supreme court may not increase a criminal penalty set by the sentencing judge, IowA CODE§§ 793.18, .20 (1973), the trial court's authorized exercise
of its discretion, in setting less than maximum penalites, see text accompanying
notes 677-98 supra, is nonreviewable at least as to that particular defendant.
73S See IowA R. CIV. P. 33 (trial court can certify for appeal any action, except
one involving an interest in real estate, where "the amount in controversy, as
shown by the pleadings, is less than $1000 . . .") .
739 Weaver v. Herrick, 258 Iowa 796, 799, 140 N.W.2d 178, 180 (1966).
740State v. Olsen, 180 Iowa 97, 99, 162 N.W. 781, 782 (1917) (dictum).
741 See IowA CoDE § 793.4 (1973).
742 For another aspect of judicial discretion in the appellate process, see IowA
CODE § 793.10 (1973) (sentencing court has discretion to order that defendant,
who is unable to give appeal bail, continue to be detained in local custody instead of being taken to the penitentiary "to abide the judgment on the appeal,
if the defendant desires it.") .
74 3Frink v. Bennett, 162 N.W.2d 404, 406 (Iowa 1968) (dictum).
744 See text accompanying notes 20-25 supra.
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In Sill v. District Court,745 the trial court was held to have abused
its discretion in refusing to appoint appellate counsel for a defendant
who had appointive counsel at trial. The trial court may have been
swayed by its reflections that the defendant suffered from no lmown
infirmities and that he had been seen drinking with some friends, but
the implication in SilL is that the trial court improperly exercised its
discretion by considering these factors since they were extraneous to
the issue of whether the defendant had the financial resources to employ his own attorney for his appeal.
An additional opportunity for the exercise of discretion in the case
of an indigent defendant, the decision whether to order that ·he be
furnished a free transcript of the trial proceedings for use on appeal,T~a
was eliminated in 1956 by the United States Supreme Court decision
in Griffin v. Illinois. 141 Applying Griffin, the Iowa Supreme Court
ruled in Larson v. Bennettu 8 that "an indigent is now entitled on
direct appeal from his Cl)nviction to a transcript sufficient to insure an
adeqaute appellate review." 749 Nevertheless, it is still proper for the
trial court to require a reasonable showing that the applicant is unable
to pay for his own transcript. 7 ~ 0
As previously menticned, the state may also appeal under Iowa
law, 761 but, unlike the defendant, not as a matter of right. The supreme court's guideline for permitting an appeal by the state, which,
in any case is limited to questions of law and may not result in a
reversal or modification of a judgment "so as to increase the punishment,"762 is that the case must involve questions of law whose determination will be generally beneficial or guide the trial courts in the
future/ 63 Even a successful state's appeal, by statute, "in no case
stays the operation of a judgment in favor of the defendant." 754
m 184 N.W.2d 699, 700 (Iowa 1971).
The statute provides that after perfection of an appeal and a showing of
indigency, the judge may order a transcript "made at the expense of the county
where said defendant was tried." IowA CODE § 793.8 (1973). The ordering of
a free transcript rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Waddle,
94 Iowa 748, 64 N.W. 276, 277 (1895). For specific abuses of discretion in the
trial court's refusal to order a free transcript under the particular circumstances
see Weaver v. Herrick, 258 Iowa 796, 800-02, 140 N.W.2d 178, 180-81 (1966); State
v. Harris, 151 Iowa 234, 237, 130 N.W. 1082, 1083 (1911).
747351 u.s. 12, 19-20 (19513).
748160 N.W.2d 303 (Iowa 1268).
749 Id. at 306.
1GO See Frink v. Bennett, 1.62 N.W.2d 404, 406 (Iowa 1968) (no absolute right
to free transcript of the defendant's former trial). See also Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227-30 (1971).
Tut IowA CoDE § 793.1 (1973).
162[d. § 793.20.
1aa State v. Kriens, 255 Iowa 1130, 1131, 125 N.W.2d 263, 264 (1963).
764 IOWA CODE § 793.9 (1978).
746
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These general principles notwithstanding, the supreme court can
reverse an unauthorized judgment of acquittal, one which is deemed
totally void because not permitted by law, and order entry of lawful
judgment upon remand. In State v. Deets,155 the trial court sustained
a postconviction motion in arrest of judgment and then entered a
judgment of acquittal. The entry of this judgment went beyond the
limited purpose of an order in arrest of judgment, that is, to place a
defendant "in the same situation or position as he was before commencement of the prosecution."756 The acquittal in effect transformed
the order in arrest of judgment into a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a motion unauthorized in the Iowa criminal
code.757 Holding that the trial court's entry of a postconviction judgment o£ acquittal was "totally void and of no legal force or effect
because not permitted by law," the supreme court remanded the case
for entry of lawful judgment.758

B. Motion in Arrest of Judgment
Another postsentencing procedure that provides the trial court with
an opportunity to exercise its discretion is the motion in arrest of
judgment. Unlike a motion for a new trial, which must be made
before judgment/59 a motion in arrest of judgment may be made before or after judgment.760 As previously discussed, a motion in arrest
of judgment made before judgment is an application to the court that
no judgment be rendered upon the verdict or plea of guilty.761 When
this motion is made after judgment and sentencing, however, it is in
effect a motion to set aside both the conviction and the sentence.762
In State v. Hellickson/ 63 for example, defendant had pleaded guilty
and been sentenced, but subsequently filed a motion to arrest the
judgment together with motion for leave o£ court to withdraw his
guilty plea.
Hellickson's asserted ground for arrest of judgment was that his
guilty plea had not been entered knowingly and intelligently and was
therefore void. The trial court, exercising its discretion, in the limited
vein of reaching an "either-or" type decision from the conflicting
evidence, determined that the plea was not coerced and denied relief.
755195 N.W.2d 118 (Iowa 1972).
756 I d. at 123.
7 57 Id. at 124.
7 58

Id. at 125.

759 IOWA CODE § 787.2 (1973).

I d. § 788.2.
See text accompanying note 568 supTa.
762 The order in arrest of judgment cannot be used to acquit the defendant,
however. See text accompanying notes 581-84 supTa.
1ss 162 N.W.2d 390 (Iowa 1968).
760

'76 1
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Affirming, the supreme court defined its own task as being limited to
determining "whether there is substantial evidence supporting the
findings and conclusions reached by the trial court. 764
In most circumstances, however, a trial court's ruling on a motion
in arrest of judgment made after entry of judgment is not appealable.
This general rule applies when "the grounds for the [motion] appeared in the record at the time final judgment was entered" and
the record "could have been reviewed on appeal from the judgment."766 As the quoted statement suggests, the general rule is not
applicable when the grounds for the motion "are not apparent but
inhere in the whole record," and thus "would not appear on the record
had appeal been taken from the judgment imposing sentence." 766
Allowing the defendant to appeal the denial of his motion, however,
cannot lead to successive appeals. A defendant thus cannot move for
an arrest of judgment, appeal from a denial thereof, and upon affirmance, seek additional postconviction relief "on the same grounds
previously asserted." 767

C. Postconviction Relief
Another method by which the defendant can attack the validity of
his conviction or sentence is by way of application for postconviction
relief. 708 This remedy, which was established by the Iowa General
Assembly in 1971, supersedes the writ of habeas corpus in all situations in which persons have been "convicted of, or sentenced for, a
public offense." 769 Otherwise, this remedy, by statute, "is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy, incident to the proceedings
in the trial court, or of direct review of the sentence or conviction," 770
and it cannot be used to relitigate any issues already adequately
raised in a previous proceeding. 771 This is an action at law, triable
to the court in which the challenged conviction or sentence took
place.772
The trial court's adjudication on this petition is critical, since appellate review "is on assigned errors and not de novo." 773 Accordingly, the supreme court does not disturb the postconviction judgment
764 Id. at 394.
7Gu I d.

at 393.

1oo I d.
101 Id.

IowA ConE §§ 663A.1-.11 (1973).
Id. § 663A.1.
11o Id. § 663A.2.
711 I d. § 663A.8.
As to the adequacy of the earlier raising of the issue see
State v. Masters, 196 N.W.2d 548, 550-51 (Iowa 1972).
112 State v. Mulqueen, 188 N.W.2d 360, 362 (Iowa 1971).
773 Benton v. State, 199 N.W.2d 56, 57 (Iowa 1972) •
1os
100
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entered in such a proceeding "[i]f the trial court's findings of fact are
supported by substantial evidence and are justified as a matter of
law." 774 Stated differently, the trial court's "attendant findings are
binding on [the supreme court] if substantially supported by the
record, unless induced by an erroneous concept of the law." 775
With respect to indigent defendants, it is not clear whether they
must be afforded appointive counsel in postconviction relief hearings.
In State v. Mulqueen,176 the supreme court held that, under the circumstances, the trial court erred in refusing to appoint counsel for an
indigent applicant of subnormal intelligence who also had psychiatric
problems.777 However, the court added: "That is not to be construed,
however, as meaning an attorney must always be appointed ...." 778
Also, because the authority to provide a free transcript appears to
stem from the same provision as that which authorizes the appointment
of counsel,779 it appears that a trial court possesses some discretion in
determining whether to order a free transcript of the proceeding being
challenged on postconviction petition by an indigent.
In Mulqueen, the supreme court pointed out that the existence of
discretion in deciding whether or not to hold an evidentiary hearing
on a petition for postconviction relief depends upon which of the two
methods of summary disposition of the hearing question is being
sought.780 When the court is acting on its own initiative, it can exercise its discretion in determining whether there are sufficient material
facts at issue to warrant an evidentiary hearing. To properly exercise
this discretion, the court can dispose of the matter without an evidentiary hearing only when " 'the motion and files and records of the case
conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.' " 781 This
conclusive determination that no material issue of fact exists cannot
be made, however, when the factual allegations relate "to purported
occurrences outside the courtroom and upon which the record could,
therefore, cast no real light," unless the circumstances were of a kind
that the judge " 'could completely resolve by drawing upon his own
personal knowledge or recollection.' " 782 On the other hand, a motion
for summary disposition by the opposing party, being in reality a
Id.
ns Parsons v. Brewer, 202 N.W.2d 49, 52 (Iowa 1972).
776 188 N.W.2d 360 (Iowa 1971).
777 Id. at 365-66.
778 I d. at 366.
779 IowA ConE § 663A.5 (1973).
1so I d., § 663A.6.
7 8 1 188 N.W.2d at 367, quoting Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 495
(1962).
782 Id., quoting 368 U.S. at 495.
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motion for summary judgment,T83 cannot be granted absent an evidentiary hearing. Thus, in Mulqueen, the supreme court decided that
the trial court "proceeded erroneously in peremptorily sustaining respondent State's motion to dismiss movant's application." 784

D. Nunc Pro Tunc Orders
Once the court has pronounced sentence, the defendant is usually
no longer subject to further execution by that court. However, proceedings nunc pro tunc can alter this pursuant to a statute which
allows amendments of the record within 60 days of signature by the
judge. 780 This statutory power has also been enlarged so as to inhere
in the court independent of the statute.786 Generally, nunc pro tunc
entries are restricted to corrections of records which may be made to
conform to the actual pronouncement of a court and can be made
during or after expiration of term of court. 787 Lapse of time will not
bar exercise of this power,788 although it has been held that a nunc
pro tunc order correcting a judgment by adding the insertion in the
record of an original oral pronouncement of a £ne 6 years after execution and satisfaction of judgment was not permissible. 789 This was
later differentiated from a nunc pro tunc order imposed as conditional
and contingent commitment for "the mode of enforcing payment of the
£ne" 700 which was permitted. This was based on the reasoning that
the latter order was a "ministerial" or "clerical" error (recording of
judgment) and not a "judicial" error (rendition of judgment) .791 In
the same case,
the power of the court to amend records of its judgments by correcting
mistakes must not be confused with the power of the court to modify or
vacate an existing judgment.792

It thus can be presumed that after the 60-day statutory limit,T93 defendants are ultimately free from court execution through amendment
at 368.
184Jd.
78G IowA CoDE § 602.15 (1973).
786 See Peterson v. Eitzen, 173 N.W.2d 848, 853 (Iowa 1970).
78 7 State v. Harbour, 240 Iowa 705, 710-11, 37 N.W.2d 290, 293 (1949):
783Jd.

The correction was sought to make the record entry conform to the actual
pronouncement of the court • . . . Such proceedings are clearly within
the inherent power of the court and the existing statutes are merely
cumulative.
7 88
789

Parenti v. District Court, 198 Iowa 560, 564, 199 N.W. 259, 260-61 (1924).
Smith v. District Court, 132 Iowa 603, 607, 109 N.W. 1085, 1087 (1906).
1oo State v. Harbour, 240 Iowa 705, 712, 37 N.W.2d 290, 294 (1949).
1o1 I d., 37 N.W.2d at 294.
1o2 I d. at 714, 37 N.W.2d at 295.
1oa IowA CoDE § 602.15 (1973).
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by nunc pro tunc entries for all but "clerical" errors. In this regard,
·the trial court's discretionary acts will not be reviewed since the Iowa
Supreme Court has said it examines records without regard to "technical errors or defects." 794

E. Imprisonment for Failure to Pay a Fine
Where the sentence imposed by the trial court includes the requirement that the defendant pay a fine, the court must be prepared te
deal not only with the full panoply of considerations attendant to the
imposition of a sentence of imprisonment, but also with the significant
body of law that limits the court's discretion to imprison a defendant
for failure to pay a fine. In this regard, the trial court's actions are
governed by statutory prescriptions tempered significantly by federal
constitutional doctrine.
The statutory prescriptions are the basic starting point, since they
empower the judge to order a defendant jailed upon default of the
fine. Iowa's statute, which is permissive rather than obligatory in
nature, provides: "A judgment that the defendant pay a fine may also
direct that he be imprisoned until the fine is satisfied," and it gives
the defendant a credit not exceeding 3% dollars for each day he is so
imprisoned.795 While this provision generally is made part of the
original judgment, it need not be, since the Iowa Supreme Court has
held that it can be added subsequently pursuant both to the Iowa
Code796 and the court's own inherent powers.797
Until1971, the states were free to follow their own procedural rules
in this area: and Iowa took the position that "[t]he making of the
order for jail commitment, in default of payment of the fine, is discretionary with the court." 798 This discretionary approach was sharply
curtailed, however, by the United States Supreme Court in Tate v.
Short. 799 In Tate, the Supreme Court declared that imprisonment resulting from an indigent's failure to pay a fine is "unconstitutional
discrimination"800 under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. That is, the federal constitution
"prohibits the State from imposing a fine as a sentence and then automatically converting it into a jail term solely because the defendant is
indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full."sol

Leaving the question open until raised in a concrete case, the SuState v. Herzoff, 200 Iowa 889, 892, 205 N.W. 501, 502 (1925).
§ 789.17 (1973).
Id. § 602.15.
7 97Peterson v. Eitzen, 173 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Iowa 1970).
7 98 State v. Rand, 239 Iowa 551, 555, 32 N.W.2d 79, 81 (1948).
799 401 u.s. 395, 398-99 (1971).
8oo Id. at 397-98.
80 1 Id. at 398, quoting Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508, 509 (1970).
794

795
7 96
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preme Court noted, however, that its holding in Tate was not to be
understood "as precluding 1mprisonment as an enforcement method
when alternative means are unsuccessful despite the defendant's reasonable efforts to satisfy the fines by those means ...." 802
In State v. Snyder,803 the Iowa Supreme Court interpreted Tate to
preclude a trial court, which is aware of the defendant's indigency,
from ordering his imprisonment "solely because he cannot make immediate payment of a fine by reason of mdigency ...." 804 In Snyder,
the trial court was aware of the defendant's indigency since both trial
and appellate counsel were appointed for him, and thus it was unnecessary for him to file any motion after pronouncement of sentence
to inform the court of his indigency. The Iowa Supreme Court, by
vacating the sentence in Snyder, appears to be implying that the imprisonment-by-default provision must be administered in the following
way: Once the court has pronounced a judgment involving a fine, an
indigent defendant should inform the trial court of his indigency as a
basis for modification of the judgment requiring immediate payment
in one lump sum. If a defendant adequately demonstrates his indigency, then a reasonable alternative plan of payment, for example,
payments in installments, based upon his ability to pay, should be
established. The provision in the judgment for default imprisonment
should then have a qualifying clause to the effect that such imprisonment is to take effect only after the defendant fails to satisfy the fine
under the alternative plan. The terms of this plan could be set forth
in the judgment itself.
It must be cautioned that neither the United States nor the Iowa
Supreme Court has spe·~ificially held that imprisonment can follow a
defendant's failure to meet reasonable alternatives m satisfaction of
the fine. However, the United States Supreme Court emphasized in
Tate that its holding "dl)eS not suggest any constitutional infirmity in
imprisonment of a defendant with the means to pay a fine who refuses
or neglects to do so."805 In a similar vein, the Iowa Supreme Court
has upheld the imprisonment of an indigent defendant convicted of
failing to make court-ordered child support payments.806 The court
interpreted the child-support statute807 as making "no invidious distinction between rich and poor. All who willfully fail to support their
children are equally subject to its punitive provisions."808 Because
willfulness is an element of this crime and he had been convicted, it
so2 Id. at 400-01.
8oa 203 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa :L972).
so4 Id. at 290.
8oa Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 400 (1971).
soo State v. Hopp, 190 N.W.2d 836, 837 (Iowa

§ 233.1(5) (1973).
sos190 N.W.2d at 837.
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followed that the defendant was imprisoned for violation of the statute
rather than merely because of his financial disability.
State v. Milliken809 illustrates that a trial court is not only restricted
in the manner in which it may imprison indigents for failure to pay
fines, it is even restricted in what it says regarding a defendant's indigency during the sentencing colloquy. Noting that his sentencing
alternatives were either a fine or imprisonment in the penitentiary or
both, the trial judge in Milliken mused: "There is no jail sentence
possible in this case, except possibly to coerce payment of a fine."
Noting that the defendant was a pauper and thus probably could not
pay a fine, the judge continued:
I am convinced that he ought to spend some time in prison or in jail and
the only possibility of that is by sending him to the penitentiary ••••810

While reversing the conviction on other grounds, the supreme court
strongly disapproved the trial court's sentencing remarks. Even i£
viewed as nothing more than a colloquial rationalization for the sentence imposed, the remarks were to be "condemned." However, i£
the judge's reference to the defendant's indigency was intended as
"an openly expressed determination that defendant's inability to pay
a reasonable fine, per se, dictated an institutional commitment," it was
not only to be "condemned," it was "patently impermissible." 811

F. Probation
Once the trial court has sentenced a defendant to a term of imprisonment, it may then order suspension of the execution of that part of
the judgment and place the defendant on probation.812 Whether it
grants probation is a matter that lies strictly within the court's judicial
discretion. That is, a decision to refuse to grant probation (bench
parole) is not a matter of personal discretion to be made arbitrarily.
This means, for one thing, that the court must exercise its discretion
by considering a defendant's application on the merits instead of
merely denying applications in adherence to a personal policy of not
granting probation. 813 After hearing the evidence on both sides of the
question, the trial court should then detail its reasons for granting
or denying probation in each particular case to facilitate effective
appellate review. 814
Once the trial court has properly exercised its discretion in considering an application for probation, it may decide not to grant probation,
204 N.W.2d 594 (Iowa 1973).
s1o I d. at 598.
811 Id.
812 IowA CoDE § 247.20 (1973). This provision is not applicable if the defendant
has been convicted of treason, murder, or certain drug offenses. Id.
813State v. Boston, 233 Iowa 1249, 1256-59, 11 N.W.2d 407, 411-12 (1943).
814 State v. Boston, 234 Iowa 1047, 1052-53, 14 N.W.2d 676, 679-80 (1944).
809

1128

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

and unless the court has acted in an arbitrary manner,81 ~ a disappointed
defendant has, as a practical matter, lost his fight. This is because the
supreme court has consistently held that there is "broad discretion in
the granting or withholding of bench paroles ...." 816 The breadth of
this discretion is evidenced by the supreme court's observation, in
State v. Krana, 817 that it was obvious that the trial judge "was fully
aware of his discretionary power to grant ... a bench parole regardless
of defendant's two prior convictions" and the fact that, in the absence
of a convincing showing that the trial court has acted arbitrarily, the
supreme court has never overturned a trial court's denial of a bench
parole.
Iowa's general probation statute requires that probation be granted,
if at all, "at time of or after sentence is pronounced but before imprisonment."818 Accordingly, it would appear that once the trial court has
exercised its rather considerable discretion in making the "either-or"
decision about granting probation, it has little or no opportunity to
exercise discretion in any other phase of the probation procedure. This
initial impression may be somewhat deceptive. To begin with, since
1971 the trial courts in Iowa have been able to employ a sentencing
option known as "shock" probation, a device that has been tried successfully in several jurisdictions.819 The Iowa "shock" probation pro. vision820 allows the court. to "shock" the defendant by sending him to
jail for a short time before making a decision about probation. However, the Iowa statute is only applicable in situations where the defendant has been sentem:ed to a county jail or other local detention
facility. 821
In addition, the trial court also has the opportunity to exercise
substantial discretion in making decisions about whether to revoke
probations. Because Iowa's statutes "do not prescribe procedure for
81G State v. Boston, 233 Iowa 1249, 1258, 11 N.W.2d 407, 411 (1943).
816 State v. Cole, 168 N.W1d 37, 40 (Iowa 1969).
811159 N.W.2d 413, 416 (Iov;a 1968).
818 IOWA CODE § 247.20 (1973).
81° See Johnson, Recent Developments in the Law of Probation, 53 J. OF CRIM.
L. & CRll\liNOLOGY 194, 197 (1962).
820 IowA CODE § 356.47 (1973).
s21 Id. The Iowa Criminal Code Review Study Committee has proposed expanding this concept to permit delayed probation on parolable. offenses for inmates of all correctional institutions. Iowa Criminal Code Rev. Study Comm.,
Proposed Iowa Criminal Code, ch. 3, § 203 (1973). However, the Committee
suggests two additional provisions to better structure the operation of the statute.
First, the court would have to act, if at all, within a prescribed period of time and,
secondly, the decision on wh·~ther or not to exercise this option would be "discretionary with the court." 'I'he court's decision on whether to grant or withhold
such delayed probation would be "not subject to appeal." Id.
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revocation hearings," trial courts must look to supreme court decisions for ground rules concerning procedures at a probation revocation
hearing. The general standard is that probation cannot be revoked
"arbitrarily, capriciously, or without any information."823 The substance of a proper revocation proceeding, then, is left essentially to
the trial court's discretion, provided there is a showing of a sufficient
factual basis for any revocation order.824'
In determining whether there is a sufficient factual basis, the supreme court has said that the trial court's order revoking probation
will be upheld where "[s]ubstantial evidence was introduced ..• permitting the trial court to make its finding on the basis of a preponderance of the evidence."825 Further, while the strict rules of evidence
in criminal trials do not apply in revocation hearings, the facts on
which the court bases its revocation decision nevertheless "may not
rest on rumor or surmise."826 Thus, hearsay is admissible, but the
supreme court has cautioned that, "revocation does not constitute an
abuse of discretion if the fact of the violation is established by evidence which is competent."821
What has been said so far about evidentiary rules and hearings may
be largely inapplicable in a number of cases, for the Iowa Supreme
Court has traditionally taken the position that no hearing is required
as long as probation is not revoked "arbitrarily, capriciously, or without any information."828 The United States Supreme Court's prescription of minimal due process requirements for parole revocation in
Morrissey v. Brewer,829 however, strongly suggests that probation revocations without hearings may no longer be constitutionally permissible. In Morrissey, the Court overturned the Iowa parole revocation
"no hearing" procedure and held that, under the fourteenth amendment, a parolee is entitled: to written notice of alleged violations; disclosure of evidence against him; the opportunity to present witnesses
and evidence; the right of confrontation, unless the hearing officer
finds good cause for not allowing confrontation; and a written finding
of facts as to reasons for revoking parole. 830 The Iowa Supreme Court,
without deciding whether a hearing is required on all parole revocations, merely noted, in State v. Hughes,831 that the instant issues preState v. Hughes, 200 N.W.2d 559, 561 (Iowa 1972).
Id. at 562.
824 Id.
825 Id. at 563.
826 Id.
827 Id. (emphasis added).
828 Cole v. Holliday, 171 N.W.2d 603, 606 (Iowa 1969).
829 408 u.s. 471 (1972).
8so Id. at 484-90.
831 200 N.W.2d 559 (Iowa 1972).
8 22
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sented questions of application of the Morrissey principles to "a hearing which was in fact held." 832 Quite clearly, however, the Morrissey
principles should logically extend to the requiring of a hearing on a
probation revocation proceeding in a state court.

G. Reduction

of Sentence

Once the trial court has imposed a valid sentence, it loses jurisdiction
over the case except for its authority to subsequently revoke probation
where it has imposed a sentence of imprisonment but suspended its
execution. This lack of judicial authority to alter sentences is inconsequential for inmates of the penitentiary and the reformatories, since
the state parole board determines an :inmate's actual release date subject to the maximum time fixed in the court's sentence. However,
this leaves the county jail inmate with no possibility of early release
and thus with little incentive to cooperate in any rehabilitative program. This void was filled in 1971 with the passage of a statute providing that a county jail inmate "may, upon the recommendation of
the sheriff, and at the discretion of the sentencing judge, receive a
reduction of his sentence of not more than twenty percent."833 The
court can exercise this discretion, however, only if the inmate has not
violated any jail regulations or state laws during his incarceration and
if he has faithfully performed all duties assigned to him in the jail.
VITI.

CoNCLUSION

It should be apparent: by now that "discretion is not limited to what
is authorized or what is legal but includes all that is within 'the
effective limits on the [court's] power."834 In seeking to define "the
effective limits" of their proper judicial power, trial judges do not have
to "search for and find some statute or rule prescribing the manner
of doing every act of theirs in the furtherance of proceedings before
them." 835
When there is a fixed rule they, of course, must follow it. But even
then, they sometimes have some latitude in testing the peculiar facts
of individual cases against this rule, and it is only after the court has
determined that the facts fit the legal standard that the prescribed
action must be taken. If the facts were conflicting and the proper
legal standard was applied, then this ruling will not be disturbed on
appeal. This is because the appellate courts, subject to these two
aforementioned qualifications, defer to the trial court's advantage of
personal contact with the case, especially in matters "where the situB32Jd.

at

561.

833 IOWA CODE

K.
S3G R.

831

§ ,356.46 (1!373).
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ation itself is not easily reproduced in its original character, and [thus]
cannot safely be reviewed." 836 This recognizes the importance of the
trial court having "felt the 'climate' of the trial" 837 and thus having
had the opportunity "to observe the demeanor and personalities of
the parties and their witnesses and to feel forces, powers and influences that cannot be discerned by merely reading the record . . . ."838
Accordingly, the trial court "can know better than an appellate court
what will and what will not further the cause of justice in the case
before it."839
In reality, judicial discretion permeates practically every facet of
every stage in the criminal trial process. Because the trial court's
decision more likely than not will be upheld on appeal, except in
instances o£ the most flagrant abuse, it seems that "in the atmosphere
of the courtroom the judge is, speaking with some permissible exaggeration, the center of the universe." 840 Yet, "he is not altogether a law
unto himself, but may be overruled i£ his action is such as to shock the
universal or the common sense of what is right among his fellows." 841
Judicial discretion thus is properly exercisable "only within the bounds
of reason and justice in the broader sense" 842 and it is abused, and
subject to reversal of the decision, when "it plainly overpasses these
bounds."84s
This Article should have made it apparent that there are abuses of
discretion, but the abuses appear on balance clearly to constitute the
exception and not the rule. Because of the merits of individualized
justice, "elimination of all discretionary power is both impossible and
undesirable. The sensible goal is development of a proper balance
between rule and discretion."844
In conclusion, Judge Cardozo probably best summarized the role
of the trial judge in these terms:
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to
innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit
of his own ideal of beauty or goodness. He is to draw his inspiration
from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment,
to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and
subordinated to "the primordial necessity of order in the social life." Wide
enough in all conscience is the field of discretion that remains.84G
8 36 Hubbard v. Hubbard, 77 Vt. 73, 78, 58 A. 969, 970 (1904).
837 Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Barrett, 246 F.2d 846, 849 (9th Cir. 1957).
838 Grant v. Corbitt, 95 So. 2d 25, 28 (Fla. 1957).
839 R. BoWERs, THE JUDICIAL DlsCREriON OF TRIAL CoURTS § 18, at 33 (1931).
s4o Id. § 5, at 9.
S41Hubbard v. Hubbard, 77 Vt. 73, 77-78, 58 A. 969, 970 (1904).
842 Id. at 78, 58 A. at 970.
843 Id., 58 A. at 970.
844 K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 42 (1971).
845 B. CARDOzo, THE NATURE oF THE JUDICIAL PRoCESs 141 (1921).

